Showing papers in "Social Choice and Welfare in 1988"
TL;DR: In this article, the partial orderings of discrete distributions derived from various poverty indices and sets of welfare functions were examined, and the natural interpretation of first, second and third degree "welfare dominance" was established.
Abstract: This paper examines the partial orderings of discrete distributions derived from various poverty indices and sets of welfare functions. The poverty ordering with respect to some index P is the ordering obtained when P ranks consistently over a range of admissible poverty lines. The poverty orderings derived from the headcount ratio, the per-capita income gap and another “distribution-sensitive” index are characterized in some detail when the poverty standard is allowed to take any positive value, and these orderings are shown to coincide with the natural interpretation of first, second and third degree “welfare dominance”, respectively. Additional results are then obtained for the situation in which the admissible poverty lines cannot exceed some finite upper bound.
282 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an extension of the theory of ethical inequality indices based on the notion of strict separability of social welfare orderings in rank-ordered subspaces.
Abstract: This paper reviews and extends the theory of ethical inequality indices. It presents a novel axiom (strict separability of social welfare orderings in rank-ordered subspaces). This axiom allows to provide joint characterizations of the most important inequality measures (Atkinson family, Kolm-Pollak family and Generalized Ginis) and of some new more general classes of indices. The whole derivation is based on weak assumptions. In an ordinal framework only continuity of the underlying ordering is required and no cardinal properties are employed.
133 citations
TL;DR: When generalized Lorenz curves cross, it is not possible to rank the underlying income distributions by the unanimous preference of all additively separable symmetric inequality-averse social welfare functions as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: When generalized Lorenz curves cross, it is not possible to rank the underlying income distributions by the unanimous preference of all additively separable symmetric inequality-averse social welfare functions. But in many cases, unanimous preference results in terms of inequality-aversion are nevertheless available. When generalized Lorenz curves cross once, variance is decisive in determining a robust welfare ranking, and can provide a rationale for choosing equity over efficiency where these two desiderata conflict. Welfare recommendations for certain types of income tax reform are implied, including cases of yield-increasing redistribution.
85 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that inequality reducing taxation is equivalent to progressive taxation in the sense of an increasing average tax rate if and only if the concept of relative inequality is used.
Abstract: The paper examines different approaches to measure tax progressivity. In particular the distributional aspect of taxation is considered in some depth. For each member of a parametric class of inequality concepts, including more than only the relative and the absolute view of inequality, a necessary and sufficient condition for a tax function to be inequality reducing with respect to this concept for all admissible pre-tax income distributions is derived, both in strong and weak form. Only three very natural properties are required to prove this result: each tax liability is less than the corresponding pre-tax income, taxation does not reverse ranks on the income scale, and inequality is reduced if a rich gives to a poor such that they do not interchange their ranks. A definition of tax progressivity based on the shown equivalence is suggested. It is demonstrated that inequality reducing taxation is equivalent to progressive taxation in the sense of an increasing average tax rate if and only if the concept of relative inequality is used.
84 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore how the behaviour of welfare, income inequality and poverty changes during the course of a country's economic development, based on Kuznet's model of sectorial dualism.
Abstract: This paper explores how the behaviour of welfare, income inequality and poverty changes during the course of a country’s economic development. The analysis is based on Kuznet’s model of sectorial dualism. The various propositions proved in the paper provide conditions under which the modern sector enlargement and enrichment will lead to higher social welfare and lower income inequality and poverty. It is demonstrated that Kuznet’s U-shaped curve may not exist or even if it does, the turning point may occur at a later stage of development. The paper provides numerical illustrations of the results using Sri Lankan data.
78 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of strategic manipulation for decision schemes that provide an adequate representation (in some sense) of the distribution of power within a committee is considered, and the concept of "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible representation" is introduced.
Abstract: We consider the problem of strategic manipulation for decision schemes that provide an adequate representation (in some sense) of the distribution of power within a committee. “Strategy-proof representation” is very restrictive: it implies that the committee contains exactly one minimal winning coalition. So we introduce the weaker concept of “Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible representation” and prove the existence of such representations for weak games under some conditions. Finally, constructing examples, we show first how necessary these conditions are—including the use of chance in the voting procedure — and second that we cannot avoid Condorcet's paradox.
47 citations
TL;DR: The Lorenz curve of income after tax is known to dominate the one before tax for all given pre-tax income distributions, if, and only if, average tax liability is increasing with income as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The Lorenz curve of income after tax is known to dominate the one before tax for all given pre-tax income distributions, if, and only if, average tax liability is increasing with income (Jakobsson 1976; Eichhorn et al. 1984). It is shown in this note that the absolute inequality of incomes (Kolm 1976) is unambiguously reduced by taxation if, and only if, tax liability is increasing with income.
41 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the author extended the author's recent work on dynamically consistent consequentialist social norms for an unrestricted domain of decision trees with risk to trees in which the population is a variable consequence.
Abstract: This paper extends the author’s recent work on dynamically consistent consequentialist social norms for an unrestricted domain of decision trees with risk to trees in which the population is a variable consequence — i.e., endogenous. Given a form of ethical liberalism and ethical irrelevance of distant ancestors, classical utilitarianism is implied (provided also that a weak continuity condition is met). The “repugnant conclusion” that having many poor people may be desirable can be avoided by denying that individuals’ interests extend to the circumstances of their birth. But it is better avoided by recognizing that potential parents have legitimate interests concerning the sizes of their families.
37 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors use the analytical framework of social choice theory for exploring the ethical foundations of population policies, arguing that non-existence is not a state and therefore that different numbers problems are conceptionally different from same numbers problems that concern much theoretical welfare economics.
Abstract: This article attempts to use the analytical framework of social choice theory for exploring the ethical foundations of population policies. It is argued that non-existence is not a state and therefore that different numbers problems are conceptionally different from same numbers problems that concern much theoretical welfare economics. By means of examples it is argued that we should not expect to find an overall ethical ordering of social states when the sizc of future generations is subject to choice.
34 citations
34 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes, and show how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.
Abstract: We present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes. These functions are contrasted with others in the literature in terms of narrowness of choice as well as their ability to satisfy certain normative and consistency conditions, and it is shown how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.
TL;DR: The parametric class of inequality measures examined in what follows contains, as extreme special cases, the inequality measures that are homogeneous of degree zero (concept of relative inequality) and those that leave inequality unchanged when all incomes, say, are increased by the same amount as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The parametric class of inequality measures examined in what follows contains, as extreme special cases, the inequality measures that are homogeneous of degree zero (concept of relative inequality) and those that leave inequality unchanged when all incomes, say, are increased by the same amount (concept of absolute inequality). The intermediate concepts studied here have the property that multiples of convex combinations of proportional and absolute changes (in all incomes) leave inequality unchanged.
TL;DR: In this article, the learning and voting strategy when a budget maximizing bureaucrat has several chances to obtain referendum approval is modeled as a sequential game with a continuum of heterogeneous voters and a dominant bureaucrat in which all agents are uncertain about the true distribution of voter preferences.
Abstract: This paper analyzes learning and voting strategy when a budget maximizing bureaucrat has several chances to obtain referendum approval. The process is modeled as a sequential game with a continuum of heterogeneous voters and a dominant bureaucrat in which all agents are uncertain about the true distribution of voter preferences. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayes Nash, so voting is strategic in the sense of foresighted but nevertheless noncooperative.
TL;DR: A conclusive story can be made out of equal absolute and equal proportional sacrifice rules if only income after some poll tax of equal total revenue is taken as basis for distributional comparisons.
Abstract: A conclusive story can be made out of equal absolute and equal proportional sacrifice rules if only income after some poll tax of equal total revenue is taken as basis for distributional comparisons.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the disagreement solution is the only additional solution to satisfy the restricted list of axioms obtained by dropping Pareto-Optimality.
Abstract: We consider the bargaining problem with a variable number of agents. Lensberg had previously characterized the Nash solution as the only solution to satisfy the following axioms: Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, and Multilateral Stability. We show that the disagreement solution is the only additional solution to satisfy the restricted list of axioms obtained by dropping Pareto-Optimality.
TL;DR: The authors showed that results similar to the Paretian Epidemic of Sen (1976) can be proved with the Pareto principle replaced by weaker conditions and showed that it is the non-imposition component which is responsible for the epidemic.
Abstract: This paper shows that results similar to the Paretian Epidemic of Sen (1976) can be proved with the Pareto principle replaced by weaker conditions. The Pareto principle can be factored into a monotonicity component and a non-imposition component. Our results show that it is the non-imposition component which is responsible for the epidemic.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define conditions of decisiveness, anonymity, unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatoriality (logically independent of the Arrowian) for aggregations of choices.
Abstract: aggregations are defined and pertinent conditions of decisiveness, anonymity, unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (stronger than the Arrowian) and non-dictatoriality (logically independent of the Arrowian) are developed for aggregations of choices. The mode is identified as a compromise aggregating variable societies of choices into a social choice, and it is shown (Theorem 4.1) to satisfy these conditions. This non-dictatorial compromise is then characterized (Theorem 5.1) in terms of three axioms paralleling those characterizing the approval voting of Sertel [7].
TL;DR: In this paper, a social choice format is introduced with separate representations for choice and preference, and definitions of what it means for rights to be compatible and for a set of rights for an individual to be respected.
Abstract: Traditional social choice theory does not distinguish between the choices and the preferences of an individual However, it is often rational for an individual to make choices that do not follow his preferences, eg when he makes compromises with other individuals A social choice format is introduced with separate representations for choice and preference It is shown how different types of rights and other legal positions can be expressed in this format Definitions are given of what it means for rights to be compatible and for a set of rights to be respected Further, it is shown that much weaker (and fully plausible) conditions are needed to avoid Sen's paradox (the impossibility of a Paretian liberal) in this social choice format than in a traditional format that does not distinguish between choices and preferences As an example of this, Sen's paradox can be avoided if each individual, ceteris paribus, prefers that her choices be respected in matters that belong to her own personal sphere
TL;DR: Theoretical Lorenz curves for a simple stochastic economy with capitalistic opportunity to move up or down are derived in this article, where the main thrust is that income alone is not a sufficient criterion of equity.
Abstract: Theoretical Lorenz curves for a bureaucracy withn seniority levels and similar curves for a simple stochastic economy with capitalistic opportunity to move up or down are derived. In both cases it is argued that equality of distribution is not an appropriate ideal. But the main thrust is that income alone is not a sufficient criterion of equity. A more general Aristotelian viewpoint is argued for. The marked increase in the equity of education between 1940 and 1984 in the United States is taken as a good example. But even within education, it is argued, detailed policies will realistically satisfy no simple set of equity principles.
TL;DR: The second theorem of welfare economics is generalized so that ethical redistribution of wealth can be carried out by the centre by means of an adjustment rule that depends only on prices and an exogenously given feasible allocation as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The second theorem of welfare economics is generalized so that ethical redistribution of wealth can be carried out by the centre by means of an adjustment rule that depends only on prices and an exogenously given feasible allocation x. When equilibrium is achieved each household i will have at least as much utility as it would derive from its component of x.
TL;DR: This article showed that the contradictory views on the relationship between independence of irrelevant alternatives and welfarism result from the use of two different forms of independence for irrelevant alternatives, one implying welfare, while the other does not.
Abstract: Two contradictory views on the relationship between independence of irrelevant alternatives and welfarism have appeared in the social choice literature. I show that the contradictory views result from the use of two different forms of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is shown that one form implies welfarism while the other does not.