Showing papers in "Sophia in 1976"

Tillich and Plato

Abstract: Although Tillich frequently denies that "being-itself "~ is a being, 1 there is, nevertheless, a residual sense in which Tillich allows that being-itself is also a singular existing individual, z I t can be seen, for example, when TiUich identifies being-itself as "the divine life", a or when he proclaims that "there is of course that being which is beyond essence and existence, which . . . we call God or, if you prefer, 'being-itself'. ''~ Moreover, TiUich informs us that being-itself has "qualities ''~ and "manifestations". ~ Most important, however, is the fact that Tillich is never hesitant in using "being-itself" as an irreducible abstract proper name viz., as the singular subject of subject-predicate assertions. 7