Showing papers in "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science in 1997"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the signification philosophique du critere d'information d'Akaike applique aux problemes de tracage de courbe, and mesure la pertinence du principe statistique de maximisation entropique pour choisir entre des hypotheses simples and des hypotheses compliquees.
Abstract: Evaluation de la signification philosophique du critere d'information d'Akaike applique aux problemes de tracage de courbe. Examinant des exemples ou le theoreme d'Akaike est valide, et des contre-exemples ou celui-ci est invalide, l'A. mesure la pertinence du principe statistique de maximisation entropique pour choisir entre des hypotheses simples et des hypotheses compliquees
99 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a history of work on conditional assertions and conditional events is outlined. But the upshot of the historical narrative is that diverse works from various starting points have circled around a nexus of ideas without convincingly tying them together.
Abstract: This article begins by outlining some of the history--beginning with brief remarks of Quine's-of work on conditional assertions and conditional events. The upshot of the historical narrative is that diverse works from various starting points have circled around a nexus of ideas without convincingly tying them together. Section 3 shows how ideas contained in a neglected article of de Finetti's lead to a unified treatment of the topics based on the identification of conditional events as the objects of conditional bets. The penultimate section explores some of the consequences of the resulting logic of conditional events while the last defends it.
79 citations
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TL;DR: Barwise and Etchemendy as mentioned in this paper argued for a positive evidential role for pictures in mathematics, from historical considerations and some striking examples, and argued that pictures are psychologically important and heuristically useful, but only a traditional verbal or symbolic proof provides genuine evidence for a purported theorem.
Abstract: Everyone appreciates a clever mathematical picture, but the prevailing attitude is one of scepticism: diagrams, illustrations, and pictures prove nothing; they are psychologically important and heuristically useful, but only a traditional verbal/symbolic proof provides genuine evidence for a purported theorem. Like some other recent writers (Barwise and Etchemendy [1991]; Shin [1994]; and Giaquinto [1994]) I take a different view and argue, from historical considerations and some striking examples, for a positive evidential role for pictures in mathematics.
63 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors add to the above core the following tenet of decision theory: it is rational to maximize expected value, which is a well-known solution to this problem.
Abstract: There is a well-known solution to this problem, due originally to F. P. Ramsey and revived by, amongst others, I. J. Good.1 Bayesianism as a theory of rational belief is usually yoked to a theory of rational action. Indeed, standard justifications for the two theoretical tenets often already embody the presumption that it is rational to maximize expected value. So let's add to the above core the following tenet of decision theory:
62 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that backward time travel does not entail unusual numbers of coincidences, and that even if it did, that would not render its occurrence unlikely, and pointed out that even a determined auto-infanticidal maniac from murdering her younger self would be highly improbable.
Abstract: This paper argues that the most famous objection to backward time travel can carry no weight. In its classic form, the objection is that backward time travel entails the occurrence of impossible things, such as auto-infanticide—and hence is itself impossible. David Lewis has rebutted the classic version of the objection: auto-infanticide is prevented by coincidences, such as time travellers slipping on banana peels as they attempt to murder their younger selves. I focus on Paul Horwich's more recent version of the objection, according to which backward time travel entails not impossible things, but improbable ones—such as the string of slips on banana peels that would be required to stop a determined auto-infanticidal maniac from murdering her younger self—and hence is itself highly improbable. I argue that backward time travel does not entail unusual numbers of coincidences; and that, even if it did, that would not render its occurrence unlikely.
59 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a consequence of relaxing this assumption is that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects, and that such a radical move is unwarranted given the current state of understanding of the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Abstract: In quantum mechanics it is usually assumed that mutually exclusive states of affairs must be represented by orthogonal vectors. Recent attempts to solve the measurement problem, most notably the GRW theory, require the relaxation of this assumption. It is shown that a consequence of relaxing this assumption is that arithmetic does not apply to ordinary macroscopic objects. It is argued that such a radical move is unwarranted given the current state of understanding of the foundations of quantum mechanics.
45 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors criticize a recent critique by Paul Humphreys and David that the search for a computer program which will perform scientific inductions as effectively as do humans may well elude us.
Abstract: In medieval times the philosopher's stone was supposed to enable its possessors to convert base metals into gold. Its discovery would revolutionize the world, presumably not by undermining the value of gold, but by enriching its possessors and ultimately society at large. The stone was never discovered, but, as in many intellectual searches, the by-products of the hunt (such as the science of chemistry) did indeed enrich society. Quite recently another search has started which promises in its most glorious moments to be as revolutionary to society as might have been a philosopher's stone: the search for a computer program which will perform scientific inductions as effectively as do humans. As with the medieval hunt, the goal may well elude us-it certainly seems elusive enough-while the chase may nevertheless generate valuable insights and by-products; indeed, it has done so already. In this discussion we criticize a recent critique by Paul Humphreys and David
41 citations
TL;DR: Achinstein this article analyzed the scientific debate that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concerning the nature of light and concluded that coherence is insufficient to account for belief change during the wave-particle debate.
Abstract: Peter Achinstein (1990, 1991) analyses the scientific debate that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concerning the nature of light. He offers a probabilistic account of the methods employed by both particle theorists and wave theorists, and rejects any analysis of this debate in terms of coherence. He characterizes coherence through reference to William Whewell's writings concerning how "consilience of inductions" establishes an acceptable theory (Whewell, 1847) . Achinstein rejects this analysis because of its vagueness and lack of reference to empirical data, concluding that coherence is insufficient to account for the belief change that took place during the wave-particle debate.
35 citations
TL;DR: This paper develops a theory in which the open future view is consistently combined with special relativity, and presents a logical conservativity result showing that, although the openfuture view is not definable inside the causal geometry of Minkowski space-time, it can be conservatively added to it.
Abstract: The open future view is the common-sense view that there is an ontological difference between the past, the present, and the future in the sense that the past and the present are real, whereas the future is not yet a part of reality. In this paper we develop a theory in which the open future view is consistently combined with special relativity. Technically, the heart of our contribution is a logical conservativity result showing that, although the open future view is not definable inside the causal geometry of Minkowski space-time, it can be conservatively added to it.
33 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore Laudan's and Leplin's recent claim that empirically equivalent theories may be differentially confirmed and show that their attempt to prise apart empirical equivalence and epistemic parity commits them to two principles of confirmation that Hempel demonstrated to be incompatible.
Abstract: In this paper, I explore Larry Laudan's and Jarrett Leplin's recent claim that empirically equivalent theories may be differentially confirmed. I show that their attempt to prise apart empirical equivalence and epistemic parity commits them to two principles of confirmation that Hempel demonstrated to be incompatible.
33 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Moore et al. demontre que l'indeterminisme de la dynamique classique des particules est liee a la non-existence de conditions-limites dans un espace infini.
Abstract: Construction d'un modele pour la dynamique classique des particules a partir du paradoxe du vaisseau spatial examine par Moore et Benardete, sous la forme d'un super-test mesurant l'augmentation a l'infini de la vitesse d'une particule A entrant en collision avec une particule B. L'A. demontre que l'indeterminisme de la dynamique classique des particules est liee a la non-existence de conditions-limites dans un espace infini
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that these features are not among those we should expect the physical state of the world to determine, and that philosophers of physics cannot ignore metaphysics when characterizing determinism for a physical theory.
Abstract: The hole argument contends that a substantivalist has to view General Relativity as an indeterministic theory. A recent form of substantivalist reply to the hole argument has urged the substantivalist to identify qualitatively isomorphic possible worlds. Gordon Belot has argued that this form of substantivalism is unable to capture other genuine violations of determinism. This paper argues that Belot's alleged examples of indeterminism should not be seen as a violation of a form of determinism that physicists are interested in. What is undetermined in these examples, and in the hole argument, is a haecceitistic feature of the world. It is argued that these features are not among those we should expect the physical state of the world to determine. This vindicates the substantivalist reply to the hole argument, but also illustrates that philosophers of physics cannot ignore metaphysics when characterizing determinism for a physical theory.
TL;DR: Forster and Sober's solution to the curve-fitting problem is subject precisely to the problem they seek to solve as mentioned in this paper, which raises a new problem-the world fitting problem.
Abstract: This paper is a response to Forster and Sober's [1994] solution to the curve-fitting problem. If their solution is correct, it will provide us with a solution to the New Riddle of Induction as well as provide a basis for choosing realism over conventionalism. Examining this solution is also important as Forster and Sober incorporate it in much of their other philosophical work (see Forster [1995a, b, 1994] and Sober [1996, 1995, 1993]). I argue that Forster and Sober's solution is subject precisely to the problem they seek to solve. They provide a method of choosing among hypotheses but only at the cost of requiring that we have a method of choosing between different ways of conceptualizing the world. Thus the solution raises a new problem-the world-fitting problem. 1 Hypothesis choice and Akaike's theorem 2 A 'Gruesome' problem
TL;DR: The authors of Causation, Prediction, and Search as discussed by the authors used an existing formalism-parametrized directed acyclic graphs, sometimes known as Bayes networks, to represent both the causal claims and the probability constraints of otherwise diverse classes of statistical models that are used in causal explanations for continuous and categorical data.
Abstract: In an essay in this journal entitled 'The Grand Leap' (Humphreys and Freedman [1996]) Paul Humphreys and David Freedman have offered a highly critical review of our book Causation, Prediction, and Search (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines [1993];1 henceforth CPS) By omission and commission, their essay repeatedly and systematically misdescribes what we wrote, so much so that it is impossible for a reader of their article to glean even the most basic understanding of what we claimed Their review is riddled with false claims about what the procedures we described can and cannot do, and fundamental technical errors Many of the objections Humphreys and Freedman lodge against us would equally be objections to methods of causal inference (eg randomized clinical trials) that are universally accepted; still other of their 'criticisms' are simply repetitions, without attribution, of cautions we made in the book they purport to review In still other cases Humphreys and Freedman contrast our work with efforts they think better when, in fact, the work they praise derived directly from Causation, Prediction, and Search, and that legacy is explicitly acknowledged by the authors What we did in Causation, Prediction, and Search was straightforward We used an existing formalism-parametrized directed acyclic graphs, sometimes known as Bayes networks-to represent both the causal claims and the probability constraints of otherwise diverse classes of statistical models that are used in causal explanations for continuous and categorical data Under a variety of explicit, formal assumptions relating causal hypotheses (in the form of directed graphs) to constraints on associated probability distributions, we characterized statistical indistinguishability; that is, we showed how to decide whether two or more alternative causal explanations are indistinguishable from probabilities or from constraints on probabilities
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious, arguing that mental properties so understood would only be inefficiency if a law-centred rather than a property-centered approach is adopted to the introduction of efficacy into the world.
Abstract: The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the 'implementing science', e.g. neuroscience. I show why this is not a problem. The second way of formulating the doctrine takes functional properties to be causal role properties. I claim that mental properties so understood would only be inefficacious if a law-centred rather than a property-centred approach is adopted to the introduction of efficacy into the world. I develop a property-centred account that explains how mental properties can be efficacious without introducing systematic overdetermination. At the close, I provide a better characterization of the difference between these two approaches and offer an explanation as to why my way of resolving the problem has been missed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the selection history accounts of function can support a fully reductive naturalization of functional properties, and that making contributions to goals, here fitness, must be introduced as an additional constraint in the analysis, either explicitly or implicitly by appeal to individual functions or the selection-of/selection-for distinction.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that selection history accounts of function can support a fully reductive naturalization of functional properties. I argue that this assumption is false. A problem with the alternative causal role account of function in this context is that it invokes the teleological notion of a goal in analysing real function. The selection history account, if it is to have reductive status, must not do the same. But attention to certain cases of selection history in biology, specifically those involving meiotic drive, shows that selection historical explanations are available in the case of items without any plausible function. Making contributions to goals, here fitness, must be introduced as an additional constraint in the analysis, either explicitly, or implicitly by appeal to individual functions or the selection-of/selection-for distinction.
TL;DR: The empirical content of the modern definition of relativity given in the Andersonian approach to spacetime theory has been overestimated and it does not imply the empirical relativity Galileo illustrated in his famous ship thought experiment as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The empirical content of the modern definition of relativity given in the Andersonian approach to spacetime theory has been overestimated. It does not imply the empirical relativity Galileo illustrated in his famous ship thought experiment. I offer a number of arguments-some of which are in essential agreement with a recent analysis of Brown and Sypel [1995]-which make this plausible. Then I go on to present example spacetime theories which are modern relativistic but violate Galileo's relativity. I end by briefly discussing the prospects for improving on modern relativity.
TL;DR: This article argued that Ramsey's view of the calculus of subjective probabilities as logical axioms is the correct view, with powerful heuristic value, particularly in the analysis of the role of conditionalization in the Bayesian theory, where a semantic criterion of synchronic coherence is employed as the test of soundness.
Abstract: This paper argues that Ramsey's view of the calculus of subjective probabilities as, in effect, logical axioms is the correct view, with powerful heuristic value. This heuristic value is seen particularly in the analysis of the role of conditionalization in the Bayesian theory, where a semantic criterion of synchronic coherence is employed as the test of soundness, which the traditional formulation of conditionalization fails. On the other hand, there is a generally sound rule which supports conditionalization in appropriate contexts, though these contexts are not universal. This sound Bayesian rule is seen to be analogous in certain respects to the deductive rule of modus ponens.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a justification for the intuition that more-varied data are more valuable than the same number of less-varying data by showing that the more varied data help to improve the accuracy of their predictions.
Abstract: I present a justification for the intuition that more-varied data are more valuable than the same number of less-varied data by showing that the more-varied data help to improve the accuracy of our predictions.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any notion of chance which conforms to the standard calculus has wider application than the causal instances to which Mellor's notion is restricted, and also that the notion of conditional chance can be used for any instance of causality.
Abstract: Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed 'E because C'. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if -C: chc(E)>ch-c(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to the standard calculus has wider application than the causal instances to which Mellor's notion is restricted (Section 8). Other topics discussed may be gleaned from the headings below.
TL;DR: In this paper, a reinterpretation of relations semantiques has been proposed to refute the anti-realist argument of Putnam, in which l'axiome de la constructibilite peut etre sauve de la critique empirique.
Abstract: Refutation de l'argument anti-realiste de Putnam selon lequel l'axiome de la constructibilite peut etre sauve de la critique empirique par une reinterpretation des relations semantiques. L'A. montre que l'utilisation du paradoxe de Skolem n'est pas suffisamment motivee chez Putnam et que la reference a des ensembles constructibles repose sur la distinction entre les proprietes mathematiques et la realite empirique de ces ensembles
TL;DR: In this paper, Tennant claimed that the AGM postulate of recovery is false, and that AGM contractions of AGM contracts of the authors of this paper are false.
Abstract: ‘Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Towards a Computational Approach’ (Tennant [1994]; henceforth CTTC) claimed that the AGM postulate of recovery is false, and that AGM contractions of ...
TL;DR: This paper discusses and rejects some objections raised by Chihara to the book Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach, by Howson and Urbach, and argues that this is no more true than the parallel charge that the theory of deductive logic is fatally comprised because it presupposes logical omniscience.
Abstract: This paper discusses and rejects some objections raised by Chihara to the book Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach, by Howson and Urbach. Some of Chihara's objections are of independent interest because they reflect widespread misconceptions. One in particular, that the Bayesian theory presupposes logical omniscience, is widely regarded as being fatal to the entire Bayesian enterprise. It is argued here that this is no more true than the parallel charge that the theory of deductive logic is fatally comprised because it presupposes logical omniscience. Neither theory presupposes logical omniscience.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse Hyperproof-like systems in terms of languages interpreted over a common conceptual scheme and translation relations between logical expressions in such languages, and show that despite initial appearances, Hyperproof has no real theoretical merits apart from its admittedly important pragmatic advantages.
Abstract: Hyperproof is one of the first systems to permit and encourage reasoning across heterogeneous media. Its advocates argue that it has merits over and above the obvious pragmatic and cognitive ones. This paper suggests analysing Hyperproof-like systems in terms of languages interpreted over a common conceptual scheme and translation relations between logical expressions in such languages. This analysis shows that, despite initial appearances, Hyperproof has no real theoretical merits apart from its admittedly important pragmatic advantages.