Showing papers in "The China Quarterly in 2000"
TL;DR: A notable feature of the reform programme sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been the expansion of social organizations as discussed by the authors, which has created an increased organizational sphere and social space in which to operate and to represent social interests, and to convey those interests into the policy-making process.
Abstract: One notable feature of the reform programme sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been the expansion of social organizations. With greater social space created by the reforms and with the state unable or unwilling to carry the same wide range of services and functions as before, organizations with varying degrees of autonomy from the party-state structures have been set up. They have been allowed or have created an increased organizational sphere and social space in which to operate and to represent social interests, and to convey those interests into the policy-making process. They not only liaise between state and society but also fulfil vital welfare functions that would otherwise go unserved.
452 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the significance of the Organic Law on Villagers' Committees rests with what happens after a village election, while the existence of the law reveals little about the actual distribution of power and decision-making in China's villages.
Abstract: While the election process is important, the significance of the Organic Law on Villagers' Committees rests with what happens after a village election. The existence of the law reveals little about the actual distribution of power and decision-making in China's villages. Even free and fair elections cannot be assumed to bring meaningful change to the contours of rural power where there is a dual authority structure – Party and government – in every village. The villagers' committee is now elected, but the Party secretary is still appointed by the higher levels of the CCP. Which is the locus of power?
239 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a long festering crisis in the relations between peasants and the local state was identified, and the central authorities have been ordering their local agents to lighten the burdens of the peasants, yet the problem persists to the present.
Abstract: China's countryside has undergone tremendous changes in the last two decades, but the changes and the benefits that came with them were not distributed evenly. Rapid rural industrialization in the Eastern, coastal provinces under the aegis of the local developmental state dramatically improved the lives of villagers. In contrast, township and village enterprises (TVEs) and incomes grew much more slowly in the Central belt of provinces and still more slowly in the Western belt. Because agriculture was the major resource, rural governments had to rely on extraction of taxes and fees from the peasants in order to meet their expenses and to carry out developmental programmes. Here, predatory state agents imposed heavy financial burdens on the peasants. The result was a long festering crisis in the relations between peasants and the local state. Since the mid-1980s, the central authorities have been ordering their local agents to lighten the burdens of the peasants, yet the problem persists to the present. Why has it been so intractable?
231 citations
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors proposed a voting reform for Guangxi villages, which began as a stopgap effort to fill a political vacuum, after much debate and two decades of uneven implementation, is now enshrined in a national law.
Abstract: When residents of a few Guangxi villages decided to elect their own leaders in late 1980 and early 1981, none of them could have known they were starting a historic reform. What began as a stopgap effort to fill a political vacuum, after much debate and two decades of uneven implementation, is now enshrined in a national law. Procedures for holding elections have been spelled out and implementing regulations are being formulated at all levels. Voting is now mandatory every three years in every village, bar none.
199 citations
TL;DR: Zhang et al. as mentioned in this paper pointed out that strong and influential government agencies such as planning commissions (jiwei), economic commissions (jingwei), construction commissions (jianwei), and industrial and commercial authorities are reluctant to endorse and enforce stringent environmental measures for fear that they might slow down economic growth.
Abstract: Researchers on China's environmental governance have usually maintained that the inferior bureaucratic status of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) (formerly the National Environmental Protection Agency) and its local agencies have accounted for the limited enforcement of environmental regulations in China. Environmental agencies at all levels have found it difficult to obtain active support and co-operation from other bureaucratic authorities in charge of economic development to take a tough stand on tackling environmental problems. Strong and influential government agencies such as planning commissions (jiwei), economic commissions (jingwei), construction commissions (jianwei), and industrial and commercial authorities are known to be reluctant to endorse and enforce stringent environmental measures for fear that they might slow down economic growth. With a strong pro-growth orientation, both central and local governments have usually sided with these economic bureaus and have subordinated environmental protection to economic interests when the two have been in conflict.
127 citations
TL;DR: In many ways, village elections are a kind of Rorschach test, an ambiguous drawing that is interpreted by people according to their predisposition towards China rather than the quality of the elections as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Direct elections for village leaders have been conducted in China since 1988, but they remain little known or casually dismissed by urban Chinese and the international community. Those who are aware of China's village elections have sharply divergent views as to their genuineness or effectiveness. Some are sceptical that the Chinese Communist Party would ever permit a competitive election that could threaten its grip on power. Others see the elections as a first stage in the building of democracy in China. In many ways, village elections are a kind of Rorschach test, an ambiguous drawing that is interpreted by people according to their predisposition towards China rather than the quality of the elections.
121 citations
TL;DR: The urban Residents' Committees (RCs; jumin weiyuanhui) have received relatively little study in recent years as mentioned in this paper, and this neglect is understandable, since the RCs remain pervasive in most areas of most cities and engage the energies of millions of activists and volunteers.
Abstract: While observers of China have always paid attention to the “base-level” administrative institutions and mass organizations created by the Communist party-state, urban Residents' Committees (RCs; jumin weiyuanhui) have received relatively little study in recent years. Though the RCs remain pervasive in most areas of most cities and engage the energies of millions of activists and volunteers, this neglect is understandable. During the Mao era, Western writing on neighbourhood organizations emphasized their role in helping to police and administer the harsh political order that gripped the cities. In the 1980s and 1990s, the authorities have yielded much greater space to a private sphere in which law-abiding individuals are relatively free from intrusion. Instruments of state penetration such as the RCs have seemed less worthy of analysis. They also lack the requisite autonomy to qualify as part of an emergent civil society, and moreover their limited progress in serving as a focus for democratic participation earns them much less international attention than their rural equivalents, the Villagers' Committees. They may even seem worthy of derision rather than study; merely mentioning the term juweihui often brings an amused smile to people's faces, as it connotes ageing, officious busy bodies poking into people's personal matters.
95 citations
TL;DR: In a speech at the Central Work Conference on Poverty Eradication on 23 September 1996 Premier Li Peng declared that the country could see an end to poverty in its rural areas by the end of the century as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Poverty alleviation is on China's political agenda and ambitions are high in a country experiencing rapid economic growth. In a speech at the Central Work Conference on Poverty Eradication on 23 September 1996 Premier Li Peng declared that the country could see an end to poverty in its rural areas by the end of the century. This would mean lifting the country's remaining 65 million poor out of poverty.
91 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a series of nation-wide inspections (zhifa jiancha) carried out after 1985 was revealed, revealing that there were over 50,000 violations, and more than 60,000 in both the 1994 and the 1997 inspections.
Abstract: As an institutional effort to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the statistics collected across the country, the Chinese government enacted the Chinese Statistical Law in 1983. Its enforcement, however, remains a big problem as revealed by a series of nation-wide inspections (zhifa jiancha) carried out after 1985. In the 1989 inspection, for example, there were over 50,000 violations, and more than 60,000 in both the 1994 and the 1997 inspections.1 Such violations, mainly in the form of statistical manipulation, have reportedly occurred at various administrative levels from village to prefecture and even province. In 1998, for example, although the unexpected floods in China and the Asian financial crisis made it difficult for the Chinese government to achieve its pre-estimated growth rate, only one of the 31 principal administrative regions (Xinjiang) reported that it grew at a rate of 7.8 per cent (the national figure), whereas all the rest reported a growth rate of 8 per cent or more. While different ways of price calculation might be partially responsible for the discrepancies between national and provincial figures, “exaggerations about economic performance did exist in some regions.”
90 citations
TL;DR: In late July, neighbouring villages prepare to fight once again over access to forests which produce wild matsutake mushrooms, a high-value Japanese luxury food that has been harvested and exported from the region for the past 12 years as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Villages scattered along the steep slopes of north-west Yunnan present a serene picture of colourful prayer flags fluttering from rooftops and only the occasional vehicle raising dust from dirt roads. But for the past few years, summers have been a time of intense and often violent conflict. In late July, neighbouring villages prepare to fight once again over access to forests which produce wild matsutake mushrooms, a high-value Japanese luxury food that has been harvested and exported from the region for the past 12 years. The quiet summer nightlife in the nearby county seat has been transformed to a bustling mushroom market busiest between midnight and dawn. Why has this market come into existence, and what have been its effects on access to and control over forest resources?
74 citations
TL;DR: In this article, some surveys conducted in recent years within the PRC asked people of different backgrounds and residential areas if they were interested in politics and governance issues, if they conversed with others about their political interests, and if they believed they had some control over their political life.
Abstract: Are the values and attitudes of ordinary people in the People's Republic of China (PRC) compatible with behaviour necessary for a liberal democracy to evolve? Or are they likely to obstruct such evolution? Some surveys conducted in recent years within the PRC asked people of different backgrounds and residential areas if they were interested in politics and governance issues, if they conversed with others about their political interests, and if they believed they had some control over their political life. These and other related questions produced survey findings which are discussed and interpreted below to provide some conjectures about the questions posed above.
TL;DR: The Museum of the Chinese People's War of Resistance to Japan as mentioned in this paper has a motor inside the waxwork of the peasant, which makes his body twitch jerkily as if in response to the scalpel, an unending series of little movements until the switch is turned off at closing time.
Abstract: At Wanping, around 50 kilometres from the centre of Beijing, the shots that began the eight-year war between China and Japan were fired in 1937. On the site there now stands the Memorial Museum of the Chinese People's War of Resistance to Japan (the museum's own translation of its title, Zhongguo renmin kang-Ri zhanzheng jinianguan). Inside, a wide array of materials is displayed, but among the most prominent are the waxwork diorama reconstructions of Japanese atrocities against the Chinese. One such display shows a Japanese scientist in a white coat, intent on carrying out a gruesome bacteriological warfare experiment, plunging his scalpel into the living, trussed-up body of a Chinese peasant resistance fighter. But just in case this is not enough to drive the message home, the museum designers have added a refinement: a motor inside the waxwork of the peasant, which makes his body twitch jerkily as if in response to the scalpel, an unending series of little movements until the switch is turned off at closing time.
TL;DR: The Third Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 1993 decided in principle for a comprehensive reform of central-provincial fiscal relations.
Abstract: The Third Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 1993 decided in principle for a comprehensive reform of central-provincial fiscal relations. Soon after the Plenum, the central government announced that the new fiscal system, known as the tax-assignment system ( fenshuizhi ), would be implemented nation-wide in 1994. With the aim of providing adequate revenues for government, particularly the central government, by revamping central-provincial revenue-sharing arrangements, the reform is to “[change] the current fiscal contractual responsibility system of local authorities to a tax assignment system …” and to “gradually increase the percentage of fiscal income in the gross national product (GNP) and rationally determine the proportion between central and local fiscal income.”
TL;DR: The post-Mao reform era in China has seen the demise of utopianism as discussed by the authors, which has produced Chinese worlds increasingly riven with anachronisms represented by the apparent contradictions of a "planned market" or "socialist market" economy.
Abstract: The post-Mao reform era in China has seen the demise of utopianism. Where once the rhetoric of an unfolding socialist utopia worked to spur on the masses in their subjugation to a national cause, since the 1980s the rhetoric has entailed varying degrees of hedonism with the proliferation of consumerism, individualism, self-reliance and personal responsibility devolved to the individual or family. This has produced Chinese worlds increasingly riven with anachronisms represented by the apparent contradictions of a “planned market” or “socialist market” economy. The realm of media production in the 1990s has found itself caught in the middle of this sphere of social and rhetorical contention, engendering its own contradictions. Indeed the contradictions exhibited there may be more exaggerated than elsewhere; most notably in how Party control of the media has continued alongside increasing pressures on media organizations to compete for readerships, audiences and advertisers on an open market. Characteristic of this situation has been the emergence of new forms of media populism.
TL;DR: In 1996, the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Senkaku (Senkaku) Islands intensified to the point where the American mass circulation periodical Time asked: “Will the next Asian war be fought over a few tiny islands?” That such a question could be asked seems incredible given that the Diaoyu Islands, which lie north-east of Taiwan and west of Okinawa, consist of only five small islands and three rocky outcroppings with a total landmass of no more than 7 square kilometres or 3 square miles as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In 1996, the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands intensified to the point where the American mass circulation periodical Time asked: “Will the next Asian war be fought over a few tiny islands?” That such a question could be asked seems incredible given that the Diaoyu Islands, which lie north-east of Taiwan and west of Okinawa, consist of only five small islands and three rocky outcroppings with a total landmass of no more than 7 square kilometres or 3 square miles. Apart from their miniscule size, the islands are uninhabited, are incapable of supporting human habitation for an extended period of time and are unlikely to support any economic life of their own from indigenous resources.
TL;DR: The question illustrates the growing awareness within the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture that rangeland policy as it emerged after the demise of the people's communes in the 1980s is ripe for revision and suggests an interest in examining and learning from the experience in the West.
Abstract: Along with growing attention to the environment over the 1980s and 1990s, rangeland protection and management have surfaced on the political agenda of the central leadership. However, current rangeland policy has been beset with problems of implementation, and desertification and rangeland degradation are reported to have increased at an alarming rate. The main pillar of rangeland policy in China is the 1985 Rangeland Law. This paper deals in detail with the formulation and rationale of the law, the state institutions involved in its making, their clashes of interests, as well as central-provincial relations. It shows that the most critical issue and inherent contradiction of the law concerns land tenure and the distinction between state and collective property.
TL;DR: For example, in this paper, a delegation of the Carter Center was invited to observe the electoral processes that produce delegates to people's congress, chairmen and deputy chairmen of these congresses, and government leaders at the township level.
Abstract: Progress in democratization is widely judged by how well elections function as instruments allowing ordinary citizens to choose political leaders to represent their preferences. In January 1999, I travelled to villages and towns in Chongqing as a member of a Carter Center delegation invited by the National People's Congress (NPC) to observe the electoral processes that produce delegates to people's congresses, chairmen and deputy chairmen of these congresses, and government leaders at the township level. The Carter Center is an American nongovernment organization associated with Emory University, with an executive board chaired by former President Carter. As part of its mission to enhance freedom and democracy, the Center has observed and reported on Chinese village elections in delegation visits that began in 1996. Ours was the first delegation to observe people's congress elections, however. Only weeks before we visited Chongqing, voters a hundred miles away, in Sichuan's Buyun township, elected a head of township government in an unprecedented exercise of authority vested constitutionally and legally in their people's congress delegates. Juxtaposing the experience of the Buyun elections with the normal processes by which township leaders emerge offers a useful perspective from which to consider electoral mechanisms of representation in China today. My main conclusion is that these mechanisms are designed to align voter preferences with the preferences of Communist Party committees. Ordinary voters and people's congress delegates have choices among candidates in elections at the township level, but these choices are normally constrained by Communist Party committee pre-selection of candidates designated for positions of leadership.
TL;DR: The thirty members of Chang's society were asked to meet at his house on the 18th of the seventh month as mentioned in this paper, and they were going to help him with his need for funds.
Abstract: The thirty members of Mr. Chang's society were asked to meet at his house on the 18th of the seventh month. As they were coming at his request and were going to help him with his need for funds. Mr. Chang provided a feast for his friends. A feast was served at all subsequent meetings of the [credit] society, but after the first meeting each member paid his share of the expense. (Sidney D. Gamble, “A Chinese mutual savings society,” Far Eastern Quarterly, No. 41 (1944), p. 41)
TL;DR: In this article, the British had sought to enhance their legitimacy in the absence of democracy through endorsement from representatives of the "business elite" (the families which owned the leading banking, commercial, industrial and real estate enterprises, together with the senior executives of major public companies and leading professionals).
Abstract: In preparing for the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, the Chinese government had to decide which individuals and groups would occupy the commanding heights of the post-colonial political landscape. During the colonial era, the British had sought to enhance their legitimacy in the absence of democracy through endorsement from representatives of the “business elite” (the families which owned the leading banking, commercial, industrial and real estate enterprises, together with the senior executives of major public companies and leading professionals). In return, this elite and its proxies were granted a privileged role in policy and law-making throughout most of British rule. Chinese officials responsible for managing the transition from British to Chinese rule proved equally eager to have this group's support, and well before 1997 China had replaced “the colonial bureaucracy as the political partner of the bourgeoisie” and was recruiting a majority of its new political establishment from the business elite.
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors pointed out that corruption has penetrated China's public sector, and the state financial system is among the worst examples, and pointed out the corrupt practices in China's financial system.
Abstract: Although the Chinese leadership and international observers disagree on many things about China, they share at least one assessment: corruption has penetrated China's public sector, and the state financial system is among the worst examples. In Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index released annually since the early 1990s, China has been placed either into the bottom group (“the most corrupt”) or at the lower tier (“more corrupt than the majority”). During the Asian financial crisis The Economist even called the Chinese state banks “the worst banking system in Asia.” The Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin, when addressing a 1996 general meeting on Party discipline, marked several domains as the “major problem area” where big corruption and crime cases concentrated, and the financial sector topped the list. The Prosecutor General, in his 1998 work report, urged law enforcers to pay special attention to the abuses of power by financial officials.
TL;DR: The democratic reforms initiated by Chris Patten, the last colonial governor of Hong Kong, accelerated party formation and competition in the last few years of British rule as discussed by the authors, and since then measures of democratization initiated by the British in anticipation of their withdrawal in 1997 made available a portion of political power for public contest.
Abstract: Before the late 1980s, political parties were unknown phenomena in colonial Hong Kong. Since then measures of democratization initiated by the British in anticipation of their withdrawal in 1997 made available a portion of political power for public contest. The democratic reforms initiated by Chris Patten, the last colonial governor of Hong Kong, accelerated party formation and competition in the last few years of British rule.
TL;DR: For historical and nationalistic reasons, foreigners occupy an extremely sensitive position in China today as mentioned in this paper, and the Chinese authorities' line on managing foreigners is to treat insiders and outsiders differently, treat insiders differently, be strict internally, relaxed to the outside world.
Abstract: Nei waiyou bie, neijin wai song “treat insiders and outsiders differently,” “be strict internally, relaxed to the outside world,” so goes the Chinese authorities' line on managing foreigners. For historical and nationalistic reasons, foreigners occupy an extremely sensitive position in China today. To the outside world China's leaders talk of “friendship” (youhao guanxi) and celebrate “foreign friends” (waiguo pengyou). But in their internal documents these catch-phrases are simply the tropes of a deliberate strategy to control and manage foreigners' presence and activities in China.
TL;DR: For example, this paper pointed out that the recent emphasis on the law in government policy and political rhetoric in China in recent years inspires great interest and significance, and the importance of the issues of institutionalization and power distribution in the analysis of Chinese politics, what is the significance of this development of the law?
Abstract: For two reasons the elevation of the law in government policy and political rhetoric in China in recent years inspires great interest and significance. The first is related to the perennial debate on the desirability and possibility of a “government of laws” versus a “government of men” in Chinese history. To what extent does the recent emphasis on the law indicate a movement towards the former from the latter? Given the importance of the issues of institutionalization and power distribution in the analysis of Chinese politics, what is the significance of this development of the law? What is, in other words, the meaning of the recent policy on the “rule of law”? Does it mean something new and what is that newness? The second cause of interest is the mere appearance of the topic itself. Why, and how, is it possible that the recent surge of deliberations on the rule of law occurred at all, if, as is often believed, individual leaders have heavily dominated Chinese politics? In other words, what underlying processes are at work to motivate the leaders to advocate the supremacy of the law, rather than the supremacy of their own authority?
TL;DR: The average ages of members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elected in 1997 are 65, 63 and 63 respectively as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Shortly after Jiang Zemin and his so-called “third generation of leaders” took over power from Deng Xiaoping and other revolutionary veterans, China began to face a new round of political succession. This is no surprise because Jiang is already 72 years old, and two other top leaders, Premier Zhu Rongji and Head of People's Congress Li Peng, are also in their early 70s. The average ages of members of the Standing Committee, Politburo and Secretariat of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elected in 1997 are 65, 63 and 63 respectively. These three pivotal, hierarchical leadership organizations all consist of similar age groups. When the next Party congress convenes, these political bodies will be occupied by people with an average age of 68 to 70. This narrow age distribution among the top leadership may cause problems for political succession in the future.
TL;DR: For example, this paper investigated the actors and influences affecting China's arms control and non-proliferation decision-making and found that Chinese writings on arms control, while growing in number, tend to be descriptive rather than analytical and usually provide little insight into China's policy-making.
Abstract: Over the course of the 1990s, China's arms control and nonproliferation policies have undergone a remarkable evolution. Since 1992, China has signed three major, international arms control treaties – the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – which it had previously lambasted for years. In addition, Beijing has continued to improve on and clarify many of its previous nonproliferation commitments as well as to adopt a legally based export control system covering a variety of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies. These developments are mirrored by the expanding roles and growing influence of a number of new bureaucratic actors in China devoted to examining its participation in the international arms control and nonproliferation regime. Most notably, in 1997 China's Foreign Ministry established a department exclusively devoted to arms control and disarmament issues. Yet despite these broad trends, little is known about the actors and influences (external and internal) affecting Beijing's arms control and nonproliferation decision-making. Chinese writings on arms control, while growing in number, tend to be descriptive rather than analytical and usually provide little insight into China's policy-making on arms control and nonproliferation.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the impact of migration on inter-household inequality in Wanzai county, north-west Jiangxi, by examining the inter-relationships between migration and three other agents of stratification: household composition, local off-farm employment and land.
Abstract: This article examines the impact of migration on inter-household inequality in Wanzai county, north-west Jiangxi. A full investigation into the causal relationships between migration and inequality requires testing through longitudinal data. Although this study is based on data gathered at a fixed time, it is robust in examining the inter-relationships between migration and three other agents of stratification: household composition, local off-farm employment and land.
TL;DR: Chiang Kai-shek as discussed by the authors reminded his audience that Sun Yat-sen's highest goal was to build a political system in which sovereignty resided with the people [zuchuan zaimin] and then said that in order to oppose communism and recover our nation, the primary task of our party is to carry out local elections, build our nation's political system and establish the solid foundations for our people to practise democracy.
Abstract: In October 1952, while addressing the Seventh Congress of the Kuomintang (KMT), the party chairman and president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek, reminded his audience that “Sun Yat-sen's highest goal was to build a political system in which sovereignty resided with the people [zuchuan zaimin]” Chiang then said that “in order to oppose communism and recover our nation, the primary task of our party is to carry out local elections, build our nation's political system, and establish the solid foundations for our people to practise democracy.”
TL;DR: In this article, the basic-level cadres desist from monitoring adultery and sex, forcing confessions, humiliating and tying people up, hanging, beating, and organizing struggle sessions [against women seeking divorce].
Abstract: Many peasants misunderstand the Marriage Law. They blindly emphasize that the Marriage Law “liberated” them. This is the case for some women in particular, who have become very unconventional and dissolute in their sexual relations. They have several partners at once, and often switch among them, choosing whichever man appeals to them on that particular day. They also recklessly flirt with many men.We [provincial authorities] demand the basic-level cadres desist from monitoring adultery and sex, forcing confessions, humiliating and tying people up, hanging, beating, and organizing struggle sessions [against women seeking divorce].
TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper surveyed Chinese interpretations of Sino-U.S. relations during the 1990s and assessed their influence on Chinese foreign policy by evaluating how well China's America watchers understand the United States and assess their influence.
Abstract: The People's Republic of China (PRC) has hundreds of analysts who interpret American policy for a Chinese audience. Some hold positions in government ministries, but many are in semi-official research institutes. These “America watchers” advise Chinese policy-makers and write internal papers which circulate among the top leadership. By influencing how China's leaders view the United States, they indirectly help shape policy. This article describes the community of America watchers and examines the theoretical orientations they use to understand international relations and to think about the United States. By surveying Chinese interpretations of Sino-U.S. relations during the 1990s, it seeks to evaluate how well China's America watchers understand the United States and assess their influence on Chinese foreign policy.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the institutional framework, socio-economic context and outcome of Hong Kong's first post-handover legislative elections of May 1998 and explored the effects of the disconnect between political participation, political representation and political power.
Abstract: Electoral democracy has been defined as "a system of government in which the principal positions of effective government power are filled, directly or indirectly, through meaningful, regular, free and fair ... elections."' By this criterion, Hong Kong today falls short of being an electoral democracy. There are periodic elections, and there is a 60-seat Legislative Council (LegCo), at least some of whose members are chosen by universal adult suffrage. There are also a number of organized, highly articulate political parties whose legislative members are frequent, outspoken critics of the government and its policies. And there is a system of transparent electoral laws and procedures administered by a professionally neutral civil service, ensuring that elections remain free and fair. Yet for all its manifest electoral virtues, democracy in post-handover Hong Kong is highly constrained and confined, as noted in the previous article by Suzanne Pepper. The Legislative Council has little power to initiate or enact legislation. The non-democratically selected chief executive is effectively immune from LegCo oversight and accountability. Opposition parties, though vocal, are largely impotent. Ordinary citizens, while exercising the right to vote, lack any regular, institutionalized mechanism for ensuring governmental responsiveness. And finally, there is the ever-present "China factor" the giant shadow cast over all political life in Hong Kong by the physical proximity and sovereign prerogatives of the People's Republic of China. Because of these factors, and because a clear institutional disconnect separates Hong Kong's semi-democratic electoral forms from its executive-dominated governmental essence, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) today presents a curious case study of democratic deformity, a case where elections are free, fair and regular but not particularly meaningful.2 This article examines the institutional framework, socio-economic context and outcome of Hong Kong's first post-handover legislative elections of May 1998. The aim is to elucidate the effects of the disconnect between political participation, political representation and political power in the new SAR. The article concludes by exploring the