The main contribution of this paper is a novel account of ontological dependence While dependence is often explained in terms of modality and existence, there are relations of dependence that slip through the mesh of such an account Starting from an idea proposed by Jonathan Lowe, the article develops an account of ontological dependence based on a notion of explanation; on its basis, certain relations of dependence can be established that cannot be accounted by the modal-existential account Dependence is only one of two main topics of this paper, for it is approached via a discussion of the category of substance On a traditional view, substances can be characterised as independent entities Before the background of a modal-existential account of dependence, this idea appears problematic The proposed notion of explanatory dependence is shown to vindicate the traditional approach to substance

background

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Aristotle's theory of substance

A Certain Kind of Trinity: Dependence, Substance, Explanation

Poser la question du divin chez Aristote, c’est determiner a quelle question la conception aristotelicienne du divin est censee repondre. L’examen methodique de l’integralite du corpus aristotelicum et, tout particulierement, des trois textes dans lesquels Aristote place l’etude des realites divines au centre de son enquete (Physique, VII-VIII ; De Cœlo, I-II, Metaphysique, Lambda) permet de formuler deux conclusions principales. En premier lieu, il apparait clairement que la question du divin n’est pas, aux yeux d’Aristote, de nature theologique, mais archologique. Nulle part, en effet, l’etude du divin n’est menee pour elle-Meme; elle s’ancre, au contraire, dans un examen explicitement dedie aux principes premiers de la phusis ou des ousiai. La conception aristotelicienne du divin et des dieux est ainsi le produit d’un examen methodique des etres premiers et des principes, examen grâce auquel Aristote espere produire une determination rigoureuse du mode d’etre du principe en tant que tel et resoudre, par la meme, certaines apories relatives a la question de l’arche. En second lieu, il convient de noter que les principaux textes devolus a l’etude des etres divins se distinguent les uns des autres par des nuances methodologiques significatives. Selon que la question du divin prend naissance au sein de la science naturelle ou de la science des substances, selon qu’elle appartient a la physique ou a l’ousiologie, la preuve de l’existence des realites divines, de meme que la description de leur nature et de leurs fonctions, font l’objet de formulations diverses, toutes infeodees a la logique conceptuelle de la science qui les rend possibles. En somme, chaque examen des realites divines se distingue par sa tournure singuliere, qui n’est autre que le produit de la regionalisation des discours, c’est-A-Dire de leur adaptation methodologique aux outils de la science qui les engendre.

https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01315023/document

La question du divin dans la philosophie aristotélicienne

Laws of nature and natural laws

In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.

Aristotle's Concept of Mind

This is an investigation of Aristotle's conception of accidental compounds (or “kooky objects,” as Gareth Matthews has called them)—entities such as the pale man and the musical man. I begin with Matthews's pioneering work into kooky objects, and argue that they are not so far removed from our ordinary thinking as is commonly supposed. I go on to assess their utility in solving some familiar puzzles involving substitutivity in epistemic contexts, and compare the kooky object approach to more modern approaches involving the notion of referential opacity. I conclude by proposing that Aristotle provides an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the Categories and Metaphysics.

background or methods

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Aristotle's theory of substance

Citations

A Certain Kind of Trinity: Dependence, Substance, Explanation

La question du divin dans la philosophie aristotélicienne

Laws of nature and natural laws

Aristotle's Concept of Mind

Kooky objects revisited: aristotle's ontology

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