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Auctions and Auctioneering
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The article was published on 2021-05-28 and is currently open access. It has received 450 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Common value auction.read more
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A comparison of Candle Auctions and Hard Close Auctions with Common Values
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a new auction format called the Candle auction, a popular auction in the Middle Ages considering a common value framework, and theoretically and experimentally point out that the candle auction, where bidding is allowed until a stochastic deadline, yields a better outcome to the seller than the Hard Close auction.
Journal ArticleDOI
From auction theory to market design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s contributions to Economics
TL;DR: The 2020 Economics Nobel Prize was awarded to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson as discussed by the authors, who made seminal contributions to auction theory and practical market design, and they briefly described those contributions and their significance within the general context of auction theory.
A modular framework for multi-agent preference elicitation
David C. Parkes,Sébastien Lahaie +1 more
TL;DR: Experimental results demonstrate that the elicitation framework can complement current designs by allowing for alternate representations where XOR is inappropriate, resulting in fewer queries and faster convergence.
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Optimal agendas for sequential english auctions with private and common values
Yu-mei Chai,Zhong-feng Wang +1 more
TL;DR: This paper studies how to relax the restrictions on bidders in two sequential English auctions by extending the single object model to two objects without the limitation that a bidder can win at most one object.
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Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
TL;DR: The D1 criterion is used to refine the set of equilibria and characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium outcome, where the reserve price increases with the number of bidders.