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Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study
TLDR
In an experiment comparing two-person bargaining and multiperson markets in Israel, Japan, United States, and Yugoslavia, market outcomes converged to equilibrium everywhere, with no payoff-relevant differences between countries.Abstract:
In an experiment comparing two-person bargaining and multiperson markets in Israel, Japan, the United States, and Yugoslavia, market outcomes converged to equilibrium everywhere, with no payoff-relevant differences between countries Bargaining outcomes were everywhere different from equilibrium predictions (both in agreements and in the substantial frequency of disagreements) and differences were observed between countries Because of the experimental design, the fact that the market behavior is the same in all countries supports the hypothesis that the observed differences are not due to differences in languages, currencies, or experimenters, but may tentatively be attributed to cultural differences Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item)read more
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.
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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
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Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium, and that if payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutualmax and mutualmin outcomes; if payoff are large, fairness equilibrium are roughly a set of Nash equilibra.
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The nature of human altruism
Ernst Fehr,Urs Fischbacher +1 more
TL;DR: Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution.
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A Theory of Reciprocity
Armin Falk,Urs Fischbacher +1 more
TL;DR: The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action, and explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games.
References
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Book
Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences
TL;DR: This is the revision of the classic text in the field, adding two new chapters and thoroughly updating all others as discussed by the authors, and the original structure is retained, and the book continues to serve as a combined text/reference.
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An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
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A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence
TL;DR: In this paper, the author postulates that bargainers behave as if they are negotiating over both "absolute" and "relative" money, where absolute money is measured by cash, relative money by the disparity between absolute measures.
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Ultimatum bargaining behavior : a survey and comparison of experimental results
Werner Güth,Reinhard Tietz +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the ultimatum bargaining games with more than just one round where, except for the final round, nonacceptance does not cause conflict but another round of ultrmatum bargainmg for a smaller cake.
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An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining
Jack Ochs,Alvin E. Roth +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a study of alternating offer bargaining with discounting was conducted and it was found that perfect equilibrium has little predictive power under the conventional assumption that bargainers' utility is measured by their monetary payoffs.