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Journal ArticleDOI

Basic logical knowledge

Bob Hale
- 01 Mar 2002 - 
- Vol. 51, Iss: 51, pp 279-304
TLDR
Logical knowledge is knowledge about logic that is not the same thing as knowledge that is gained by using logic, i.e. inferential knowledge, and it is barely open to question that—if there is any logical knowledge at all—there is a lot of inferential logical knowledge.
Abstract
At least some of us, at least some of the time—when not in the grip of radical sceptical doubt—are inclined to believe that we know, for example, that if we infer a conclusion from two true premises, one a conditional whose consequent is that conclusion and the other the antecedent of that conditional, then our conclusion must be true, or that we know similar things about other simple patterns of inference. If we do indeed have knowledge of this sort, it is what I mean by logical knowledge. Logical knowledge is, roughly speaking, knowledge about logic—such as knowledge that a certain principle of inference necessarily preserves truth, or that every proposition of a certain form must be true—and so is not the same thing as knowledge that is gained by using logic, i.e. inferential knowledge. That is not to say, of course, that logical knowledge can't be inferential. On the contrary, it is barely open to question that—if there is any logical knowledge at all—there is a lot of inferential logical knowledge. For example, if we know that the introduction and elimination principles for the conditional are truth-preserving, we can surely get to know, by inference, that the principle of hypothetical syllogism (i.e. transitivity of the conditional) is so too, not to mention other, less obvious and more recondite, examples of putative logical knowledge.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI

Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws

TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that there is a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non-inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non-empirical and is to allow of any finite, non-circular reconstruction.
Journal ArticleDOI

Believing one’s reasons are good

TL;DR: This paper articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic Responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, and defends Inferential internalism against charges of incoherence.
Journal ArticleDOI

Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens

TL;DR: In this article, a critical discussion of attempts to ground the justification of modus ponens (and related rules of inference) on its purported role in constituting the meaning of relevant natural language terms is presented.
Journal ArticleDOI

Intuitions for inferences

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others?
Dissertation

The structure of logical consequence : proof-theoretic conceptions

TL;DR: Hjortland and Thomassen as mentioned in this paper developed a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of prooftheory and proposed a new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

A counterexample to modus ponens

TL;DR: In this article, a critique s'etend a theory of conditionnels contrefactuels de Stalnaker, and a serie de contre-exemples and demonstrations are presented for andablir que la regle logique classique du modus ponens (si, si p alors q, et si p, alors Q) n'est pas toujours valide.
BookDOI

New Essays on the A Priori

Paul Boghossian, +1 more
- 26 Oct 2000 - 
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the relations of the a priori to meaning, justification, definition and ontology, and consider the role of the notion in Leibniz, Kant, Frege and Wittgenstein.
Journal ArticleDOI

Tonk, Plonk and Plink

TL;DR: In this article, Prior characterizes the role of tonk in inference by describing how it behaves as conclusion, and as premiss: (1) A ├ A-tonk-B, and (2) A −tonk −B ├ B (where we have used the sign ‘├' for deducibility).
Book

Language Mind and Logic

Butterfield
TL;DR: A collection of essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language as mentioned in this paper, concludes the informal series stemming from the meetings sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation.