Vo l. 8(5), p p . 124-137, Aug ust 2014
DO I: 10.5897/ AJPSIR08.066
Artic le Numb e r: C36FC 5B46971
ISSN 1996-0832
C o p yrig ht © 2014
Autho r(s) re ta in the c o p yrig ht o f this a rtic le
http :/ / www.a c a d e mic jo urna ls.o rg / AJPSIR
African Journal of Political Science and
International Relations
Full Length Research Paper
“Clientele democracy”: Political party funding and
candidate selection in Nigeria
Sulaiman Balarabe Kura
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, PMB 2346, Sokoto, Nigeria.
Received 15 December, 2008; Accepted 21 September, 2010
The upsurge of democracy during the third and fourth waves democratic epochs has led to a
“proliferation of alternative conceptual forms…involving democracy ‘with adjectives’” (Collier and
Levitsky, 1997:430). Clientele democracy, though similar with neopatrimonial democracy, is
distinguished in both concept and substance. At the heart of the development of different democracy
are the nature and character of political parties. The character of political parties in turn is highly
influenced by the pattern of party funding, which accordingly determines the system of candidate
selection and nomination and the overall organisation of political parties. This paper argues that
political parties as conditio sine qua non to modern democracy significantly contribute to the
development of “clientele” democracy in Nigeria. This is evident in the nature of political party funding
and candidate selection (both for party offices and general elections). In this context, this paper
examines the various aspects of political party funding and strategies for candidate selection in Nigeria.
The paper contends that the system of party funding and candidates’ selection in the country are re-
constructing a new form of democracy that can arguably be called “clientele” democracy, in which
godfatherism is the defining political technique of political party activities. The godfathers, in addition
to serving as major party funders, also fully control their political terrain, through which they control
both parties and the electorates. The paper argues that this practice is undermining political party
institutionalisation in Nigeria.
Key words: Clientelism, democracy, political parties, party funding, candidate selection.
INTRODUCTION
“Clientele democracy” and political parties
Two important theoretical issues have attracted the atten-
tion of comparativists during the last quarter of twentieth
century:
firstly, the transformation of authoritarian regimes
into democracy. Secondly, new democratic political
regimes are exhibiting distinguishing characteristics that
differentiate individual regimes and that as well
differentiate them from established democracies. This
consequently gave leverage to political scientists to
define and describe different kinds of democracies. The
intellectual effort led to what Collier and Levitsky (1997:1)
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Autho r a g re e tha t this a rtic le re ma in p e rma ne ntly o p e n a c c e ss und e r the te rms o f the C re a tive C o mmo ns
Attrib utio n Lic e nse 4.0 Inte rna tio na l Lic e nse
term “democracy with adjectives”. They argue that with
the phenomenal global upsurge in democratisation and
attendant scholarly attention thereof, scholars tried to
“increase analytic differentiation” in order to disaggregate
the variety of democracies and provide normative and
empirical conceptual validation. In this seminal work,
Collier and Levitsky identify different adjectives employed
to conceptualise and explain different kinds of
democracies. Using Sartori’s (1970) moving up and down
the ladder of classical subtypes, they distinguished
regimes: civilian, competitive and electoral regimes from
democracies: parliamentary, two-party and federal and
illiberal democracies. Each of these democracies is
distinct in both substance and procedure.
This classification does not represent the exhaustive
list of the types and sub-types of democracies. The
general problem is that the proliferation of democracy vis-
à-vis the new terms and concepts that emerged thereof
to describe it, mostly “mean approximately the same
thing. The consequence once again can be growing
scholarly confusion.” It is therefore, important for students
of political science to always “define and explicate the
concept of democracy they are using so as to situate
themselves unambiguously…” (Collier and Levitsky,
1997:8). Because of this reason, defining clientele
democracy is imperative.
Just like in other regions, in Africa too, the winds of
democratisation gave rise to “range of regimes”, which
are easily grouped into “imperfect democracies” (van de
Walle, 2002:1-2). Be it as it may, as a result of this
conceptual differentiation to define “precisely” these
range of regimes, scholars seem to intuitively shy away
from linking the emergence of regimes to the activities of
political parties. To fill this theoretical gap, Gunther and
Diamond (2002), appreciating the transformation of
political parties during this period, attempt to reclassify
parties based on their functions in representative
democracy. They have identified five broad typologies of
parties, grouped under either pluralistic or proto-
hegemonic. Under each of these typologies, there is
range of parties.
1
These typologies and classification of
parties are important conceptual innovation in a period
when political parties are undergoing radical transfor-
mation and facing new challenges.
Although it is theoretically difficult, associating the
“democracy with adjectives” and typologies of parties
would help in identifying the nature and texture of parties
that operate in different political regimes. This under-
standing will in turn inform researchers about the extent
to which parties “make” democracies. It is in this context,
that this paper argues that clientelistic parties (Gunther
1
For example, the typologies are elite parties (local notable and clientelistic);
ethnicity-based parties (ethnic and congress parties); Electoralist parties (catch-
all, programmatic and personalistic parties); movement parties (left-libertarian
and post-industrial extreme right parties); and mass-based parties, which are
reclassified into: (i) ideological/socialist (class-mass and Leninist parties); (ii)
ideological nationalist (pluralist nationalist and ultranationalist parties); and
(iii) religious (denominational-mass and religious fundamentalist parties).
Kura 125
and Diamond, 2002) in Africa contribute to further
entrenchment of what can be arguably described as
“clientele democracy”. Furthermore, clientelistic parties
and clientele democracies are arguably the functions of
socio-political and economic system. In other words,
political parties and the type of democracies they create
are products of the system in which they operate. To this
extent, the nature of party funding (formal and informal)
and candidate selection and nomination (as important
activities of parties) are salient in the creation of a
clientele democracy. This paper examines the methods
and techniques of party funding and candidate selection
in clientelistic Nigeria and argues that these issues have
transformed democratic politics in the country in which
godfathers as major party funders become the de facto
and informal leaders of parties and form the core of
“invisible” government political leadership. This political
transformation has mixed implication for the development
of political parties and democratisation in Nigeria.
Clientelism and political parties: a ‘symbiotic’
relationship
Unlike clientelism, which is a socio-political and economic
activity, political parties are an institution. It can therefore,
be hypothesised that in a hyper-clientelistic society, there
is a symbiotic relationship between clientelistic activities
and political parties. Each feeds on and reinforces the
other. The terms ‘clientelism’, ‘patronage’, ‘patron-client
clusters’ (Joseph, 1987) are often used interchangeably
to refer to a form of personal, social and dyadic relation-
ship of exchange characterised by a sense of obligation
and depicts disproportion of power between the parties
(actors) involved (Hopkin, 2006). This dyadic exchange
system of relationship involves “the patron providing
clients with access to the basic means of subsistence
and the clients reciprocating with a combination of
economic goods and services … and social acts of
deference and loyalty” (Mason, 1986:489). Clientelistic
relationship is asymmetrical, hierarchical and reciprocal.
Historically, this system originated during feudalism, in
which feudal lords (patrons) offer favours to the vassals
in exchange for obligatory support, loyalty in form of rents,
labour, etc. The unequal and obligatory nature of this
relationship suggests its exploitative character. Magaloni
et al. (2002) argue that the patron as a monopolist
controls and exploits the market power and expect total
compliance from clients who need such services.
Perhaps, because of its unequal and hierarchical trait,
clientelism is often associated with underdeveloped
societies and at early stages of political institutionalisation.
It is therefore, assumed that as societies developed,
socio-political and economic structures become differen-
tiated and institutionalised, clientelism would radically
disappear. Evidently, the phenomenon has not only
continued but transformed and new sophisticated
clientelistic methods are now being employed. The nature
126 Afr. J. Pol. Sci. Int. Relat.
of the methods differed from society to society depending
on its level of socio-political development. By implication,
even the character of exchange resources involved in
such relationship have also changed. Today, scholars
conveniently speak of old and new clientelism (Hopkin,
2006).
In electoral politics, clientelism involves politicians
providing favours and benefits in exchange for votes. It is
largely seen as a form of political investment. Hopkin
(2006:3) stresses that in clientelistic-electoral contexts
“patrons, or their agents, stand for election and their
clients vote for them, sometimes out of a general sense
of obligation and attachment, sometimes as part of a
specific exchange for services rendered or promised.” As
a result of socio-political and economic transformation
accentuated by modernisation, with attendant develop-
ment in education, urbanisation and globalisation,
traditional clientelistic exchange was replaced with new
form of clientelism. He argues that:
These developments have weakened traditional patron-
client ties, which made way for new forms of exchange.
Organised political parties, with relatively bureaucratised
structures, replaced landlords and local notables as
patrons (Hopkin, 2006:3).
While conceptual precision is important in any political
analysis, the transformation of clientelism and the
complexes of the activities involved make such effort
difficult. However, Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980:50)
identified the following analytical features of clientelism,
patron-client relation or patronage system as the terms
are interchangeably used:
1. Patron-client relation and exchange are usually
particularistic and diffuse;
2. Clientelistic interactions are based on simultaneous
exchange of different types of resources, which are
instrumental, economic and political and promises of
solidarity and loyalty;
3. The resources involve in such exchange are affected
by ‘package-deal’. This means neither resource (from
both the patron and client) can be exchanged separately;
4. Consequently, there is usually a strong element of
solidarity
in clientelistic relations. There is an interpersonal
loyalty and attachment between the two parties. Some-
time, this relation can be ambivalent, however element of
solidarity can be strong;
5. Clientelistic relations are not normally based on any
fully legal or contractual terms. These relations are
opposed to established laws of societies and are based
on informal but tightly binding understandings;
2
2
As we will see, in Nigeria such informal clientelistic relations though opposed
to established laws, however, attempt was made to legal such relationship
between patrons and their clients. In Anambra state for example, the governor
was made to sign a resignation letter and made a videoed resignation clip
before election. When the relationship between the patron and the client
6. Patron-client relations are established voluntarily and
could be abandoned voluntarily;
7. Clientelistic relations are entered into between
individuals or networks of individuals in a vertical pattern
instead of between organised corporate groups; and
8. These relations are based on strong elements of
inequality and of differences in power. The patrons have
monopoly over economic and political resources that are
important to clients.
Based on the above characteristics, it is apparent that
any political and economic institution built on the
threshold of clientelism would have significant impact on
its functionality. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) argue
that in contemporary societies, variability of income more
than issue of poverty alone is the driving force of clien-
telism. No wonder, therefore that clientelistic activities
often flourish in political and economically insecure
societies and is an integral part of the ‘politics of survival’
for both clients and patrons (Migdal, 1988). Thus the
relationship between clientelism and good democracy is
often hostile.
There is no gainsaying the fact that advance
democracies were founded on clientelistic structures,
however, as democracy develops such clientelistic activi-
ties steadily eroded. It should, however be maintained
that democratic institutions in societies with deeply rooted
clientelistic features function differently from those where
clientelistic activities are minimal and sanctioned accor-
dingly. Table 1 provides contrasting features between
political institutions in archetypal clientelistic societies and
those in liberal democratic polities.
The above continuum does not exist in pure form in any
society.
In other words, no society exhibits an archetypical
clientelism. A mixture of the two is often common. Where
clientelism is dominant as the case in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Daloz and Chabal, 1999), such democracies could be
described as clientele democracies. In such societies,
despite the existence of democratic structures, every
aspect of government activities is coloured by clientelism
and patronage politics. In clientele democracies, the
thread of clientelism permeates the whole society and
dictates the pattern of formal and informal political and
economic activities. Clientelistic considerations are the
norms rather than exceptions. Democratic institutions are
not only established on clientelistic socio-political struc-
tures but are equally compelled to function in clientelistic
tones and textures.
For instance, political parties operating in clientele
democracies could arguably be called clientele parties, all
things being equal. Clientele parties exhibit all charac-
teristics of weakly institutionalised parties. They are
personalistic, particularistic and factionalised organisa-
tions. Patron-client relation characterises the activities of
political parties. Parties are established to achieve
clientelistic objectives, perhaps because in democracy
(governor) went sour, the governor was kidnapped and these documents were
presented as evidence of his purported resignation.
Kura 127
Table 1. Continuum of political and decision making systems.
Clientelistic Democratic
Authority is personal and resides with individuals Authority is institutional and resides with officials roles
Core values: personal enrichment and aggrandisement Core values: rule of law, fair elections and majority rule
Leaders tend to monopolise power and unaccountable for their
actions
Leaders share power with others and are accountable for their
actions
Leaders’ relation to supporters and citizens is opaque and often
unreliable
Leaders’ relation to supporters is transparent and predictable
Regular procedures or existing procedures regarding government
turnover are not followed
Regular procedures exist regarding leaders’ replacement or
change of government
Leaders hold onto power by providing personal favours that
secure loyalty of citizens
Leaders only hold onto power by providing collective benefits
that earn support of large segments of society
Policy decisions are taken in secret without public discussion or
participation
Policy decisions are taken in the open after public discussion
and review
Political parties are organised around personalities
Political parties are organised around stated programmes and
ideologies
Civil society is fragmented and characterised by vertical links Civil society is deep and characterised by horizontal links
Decision making standards are tacit and procedures are
impossible to follow from outside
Decision making standards are explicit and procedures are
transparent
Supporters’ interests and needs guide policy decisions Public interests and needs guide policy decisions
Extensive scope exists for patronage appointments and often
outside the jurisdiction of political regulations
Limited scope exists for patronage appointments and based
on the jurisdiction of political regulations
Source: Adopted from Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:5).
they are the dominant political institutions. Historically,
according to Gunther and Diamond (2001), historically,
clientelistic (clientele) parties began to emerge in 19
th
century as a result of the extension of franchise,
industrialisation and urbanisation and the changing
perspective of political mobilisation. This period saw the
decline in obsequiousness to local elites, which necessi-
tated the use of exchange of favours and coercion as
instruments of political mobilisation. Contextually, Gunther
and Diamond (2001:14) define clientelistic party as a:
Confederation of notables [elites], each with his own
geographically, functionally, or personalistically based
support organised internally as particularistic factions.
Such a party typically has a weak organisation and
places little or no stress on programme or ideology. Its
principal function is to coordinate the individual campaign
efforts of notables, usually indirectly or loosely, for the
purpose of securing power at the national level. Their
campaign activities, in turn, are based on hierarchical
chains of interpersonal relationships of a quasi-feudal
variety, in which relatively durable patterns of loyalty are
linked with the exchange of services and obligations.
Evident from the above conceptualisation is that most
political parties operating in developing clientele demo-
cracies
actually exhibit these characteristics. The eventual
decline of clientelistic parties in 19
th
and early 20
th
centuries marked the beginning of the development of
institutionalised parties and democracy. Does the
proliferation of clientele parties today portends the
beginning of the long hope of democratic consolidation
and party institutionalisation? The answer is rooted in the
changing nature of modern clientelism and the sophis-
tication of the instruments of clientelistic mobilisation. Put
differently, while the changing nature of globalisation and
political transformation of modern states are offering
good hope of deepening democratisation, the same forces
and complex nature of modern governance system seem
to be dashing such hopes. In developing democracies,
parties are the instruments of clientelistic networks and
coercive political mobilisation. Clientele democracies
create clientelistic parties. Clientelistic parties in turn
strengthen such clientelistic activities. There is therefore,
a symbiotic relationship between clientelism and clientele
political parties. One of the strongest mechanisms of
entrenching such clientelistic networks within political
party organisation is through party funding and candidate
selection. The next section examines the pattern of party
funding and candidate selection, and how they influence
the activities of political parties.
PARTY FUNDING AND CANDIDATE SELECTION:
UNDERSTANDING THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
Party funding: Party funding and candidate selection are
the two most important activities of party organisation
through which clientelistic networks are strengthened.
They are also important areas, which if handle well can
128 Afr. J. Pol. Sci. Int. Relat.
aid party institutionalisation. In particular, research on the
issues of party funding is grossly limited. Fisher and
Eisenstadt (2004) argue that ironically, despite extensive
studies on virtually all aspects of parties, financial issues
seem to have eluded and escaped the attention of
academic researchers. In fact, such studies rarely exist
on the nexus between party finance and candidate
selection as potentially relevant areas that undermine
and/or strengthen party organisation. The importance of
party funding is underscored by the contribution money
can make in democracy and especially in developing
economies where few elites control both the sources and
distribution of money. By implication, money more than
anything, is a source of political power and political power
in turn is a source of economic power. While in a
competitive democratic system, money can be used by
parties for campaign reasons, to maintain inter-election
organisations and for research and administration (Paltiel,
1981), in clientelistic systems, money is used to advance
and fund clientelistic networks and maintain patron-client
relations between and during elections.
Moreover, the centrality of party funding is underlined
by how even in Western democracies, it contributes to
general crises affecting political party institutions. For
example, Hopkin (2004) argues that the manner in which
parties fund their activities has been quite embarrassing.
For example, series of corruption scandals have affected
Western European parties and their leaders. He stresses
that in Italy, France, Belgium, and Spain and even in
Germany and the UK, parties have been involved in
funding scandals related to corruption and violation of
funding regulations. Similarly, studies have evidently
documented the growing increase in corruption through
political party funding (Bryan and Baer, 2005; Williams,
2000a, b; Pujas and Rhodes, 2001; Philip, 2001). The
diversities of democracies as well as different typologies
of parties identified earlier mean that party financing
activities differ from one democracy to another and from
one types of party to another. Hopkin (2004), for instance,
employing theories of democracy, identifies the
differences in the mode of party funding among mass
parties, elite parties, cartel parties and clientelistic parties.
It is therefore, difficult to establish a strict distinction in
terms of party funding among democracies and parties
because
of obvious reasons. A brief theoretical discussion
of the system of funding clientelistic parties is imperative.
In clientelistic democracies, party membership could be
created through the use of state resources to distribute to
clients and other citizens as incentives. Individuals are
easily enticed to become party members and supporters
in anticipation of patronage and largesse from prospective
party candidates. According to Hopkin (2004), these
favours can include but not restricted to provisions of
government jobs to party members or their relatives,
allocation of public contracts or preferential consideration
in the allocation of welfare benefits, such as housing,
disability allowances, and other discretionary benefits.
This method helps clientelistic parties to develop mass
membership organisation and strengthen their grassroots
penetration. This system of party funding was dominant
in the US in 19
th
and early 20
th
centuries during the prime
period of clientelistic parties (Gunther and Diamond,
2001; Shefter, 1994; Geddes, 1994; Gellner and
Waterbury, 1977). Beyond underdeveloped bureaucracy,
which was easily influenced by a political party (Lyrintzis,
1984; Shefter, 1994, cited in Hokin, 2004) in contem-
porary clientele democracies, poverty, low level of
education and general economic underdevelopment as
well as the socio-cultural nature of such societies
contributes to the “success” of clientelistic strategies of
party funding. It is therefore, not surprising to find that:
In Western European democracies neither of these
conditions hold in the contemporary; so clientelistic
strategies alone are unlikely to succeed in sustaining
mass organisations, although they may serve to com-
plement other [party] organisational strategies (Hopkin,
2004:632).
Instead, what is obtained in contemporary Western
democracies is externally-finance and self-financing elite
and cartel parties (Hopki, 2004). Despite its utility, van
Bienzen (2004) cautions against public funding of parties.
Perhaps, because of its complexities and susceptibility to
corruption and absolute abuse, certain mechanisms are
designed to regulate party funding. The importance of
institutions as rules and regulations and as organisations
has drawn the attention of political science and
comparativist scholars.
Candidate selection and nomination: Just like party
funding, candidate selection and nomination procedures
differ among democracies and among typologies of
parties. There are two categories of candidates selected
and/or nominated by political parties. Candidates are
selected for manning party offices across all the branches
and chapters of political parties. Candidates are
nominated also to contest general elections. Unlike for
party leadership positions, in the latter, candidates are
selected by different political parties to compete in
national or local elections. In any case, candidate
nomination, which in broader terms is synonymous with
recruitment, is one of the important functions of political
parties across democracies. In fact, many party scholars
define a political party in terms of this function
(Schlesinger, 1991; Sartori, 1976). Katz (2001:277) notes
that candidate selection “is a vital activity in the life of any
political party. It is the primary screening device in the
process through which the party in office is reproduced.
As such, it raises central questions about the ideological
and sociological identities of the party as a whole”. The
method(s)
which a party(s) employ in candidate selections
and nominations has incontrovertible implications on
those selected or elected and indeed how they behave in