Journal ArticleDOI
Combinatorial auction-based allocation of virtual machine instances in clouds
Sharrukh Zaman,Daniel Grosu +1 more
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TLDR
This work formulate the problem of virtual machine allocation in clouds as a combinatorial auction problem and proposes two mechanisms to solve it, and performs extensive simulation experiments to reveal that the combinatorially auction-based mechanisms can significantly improve the allocation efficiency while generating higher revenue for the cloud providers.About:
This article is published in Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing.The article was published on 2013-04-01. It has received 254 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Combinatorial auction & Auction algorithm.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
A combinatorial double auction resource allocation model in cloud computing
TL;DR: The results proved that the combinatorial double auction-based resource allocation model is an appropriate market-based model for cloud computing because it allows double-sided competition and bidding on an unrestricted number of items, which causes it to be economically efficient.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Dynamic resource provisioning in cloud computing: A randomized auction approach
TL;DR: This work studies resource allocation in a cloud market through the auction of Virtual Machine (VM) instances by introducing combinatorial auctions of heterogeneous VMs, and models dynamic VM provisioning.
Journal ArticleDOI
Virtualization of 5G Cellular Networks as a Hierarchical Combinatorial Auction
Kun Zhu,Ekram Hossain +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a hierarchical combinatorial auction mechanism is proposed to solve the resource allocation problem in 5G cellular networks, which satisfies the requirements of efficient resource allocation, strict inter-slice isolation and the ability of intra-slice customization.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Combinatorial Auction-Based Mechanism for Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds
Sharrukh Zaman,Daniel Grosu +1 more
TL;DR: This work designs an auction-based mechanism for dynamic VM provisioning and allocation that takes into account the user demand, when making provisioning decisions, and proves that the mechanism is truthful.
Journal ArticleDOI
Truthful Greedy Mechanisms for Dynamic Virtual Machine Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds
TL;DR: This work forms the dynamic VM provisioning and allocation problem for the auction-based model as an integer program considering multiple types of resources and designs truthful greedy and optimal mechanisms for the problem such that the cloud provider provisions VMs based on the requests of the winning users and determines their payments.
References
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination
TL;DR: This paper compares recent algorithms for winner determination to traditional algorithms, and presents and benchmark a mixed integer programming approach to the problem, which enables very general auctions to be treated efficiently by standard integer programming algorithms.
Posted Content
Auctions versus posted-price selling
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compared posted-price selling and auctions in an independent private-values model and found that without auctioning costs, auctioning is always optimal. But when auctioning are costly, auctions are still preferable if the marginal-revenue curve is sufficiently steep.
Journal ArticleDOI
An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents
TL;DR: This work devise a version of randomized rounding that is incentive compatible, giving a truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents (e.g., "single minded bidders") that approximately maximizes the social value of the auction.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Deconstructing Amazon EC2 Spot Instance Pricing
TL;DR: By analyzing the spot price histories of Amazon's EC2 cloud, this work reverse engineer how prices are set and construct a model that generates prices consistent with existing price traces, finding that prices are usually not market-driven as sometimes previously assumed.
Journal ArticleDOI
A futures market in computer time
TL;DR: An auction method is described for allocating computer time that allows the price of computer time to fluctuate with the demand and the relative priority of users to be controlled so that more important projects get better access.