Controlled communication networks

TLDR: In a cooperative TU (Transferable Utility) game (N, v) as modelled by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), N is a finite set of players, and the characteristic function v assigns to each subgroup of players a real number which is to be interpreted as the maximal gains this coalition can secure by cooperating.

Abstract: In a cooperative TU (Transferable Utility) game (N, v) as modelled by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), N is a finite set of players, and the characteristic function v assigns to each subgroup of players a real number which is to be interpreted as the maximal gains this coalition can secure by cooperating.

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Tilburg University
Controlled communication networks
Feltkamp, V.; van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.
Publication date:
1992
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Feltkamp, V., & van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M. (1992).
Controlled communication networks
. (Research
memorandum / Tilburg University, Department of Economics; Vol. FEW 538). Unknown Publisher.
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Download date: 10. aug.. 2022

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CONTROLLED
CONIN1tJNICATION
NETWORKS
V.
Feltkamp
A.
van den
Nouweland
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Refereed
by
Prof.dr.
S.H.
Tijs

Controlled
Communication
Networks
By
V.
Feltkamp`
and
A.
van
den
Nouweland'
Abstract
This
paper
considers
a
generalisation of
communication
situations,
namely
con-
trolled
communication
networks.
Three
solution concepts
for
controlled
commu-
nicatíon
networks
are
introduced,
the
Myerson
value,
the
position
value
and
the
mixed
value,
which
are
inspired
by
corresponding
solution
concepts
for
communi-
cation
situations,
and
a~ciomatic
characterisations
of
these
concepts are
provided.
Further,
network
games
associated
with
controlled
communication
networks
are
considered
and
it
is
shown
that
every
TU-game
can
be
obtained
as
a
network
game.
'
Depsrtment
of
Econometrics,
Tilburg
University,
P.O.
Box 90153,
5000
LE
Tilburg,
The
Netherlaada

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What are the contributions in this paper?

This paper considers a generalisation of communication situations, namely controlled communication networks. Three solution concepts for controlled communicatíon networks are introduced, the Myerson value, the position value and the mixed value, which are inspired by corresponding solution concepts for communication situations, and a~ciomatic characterisations of these concepts are provided. Further, network games associated with controlled communication networks are considered and it is shown that every TU-game can be obtained as a network game.