Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good
Reads0
Chats0
About:
This article is published in Harvard Law Review.The article was published on 1992-06-01. It has received 8 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Debtor & Opportunism.read more
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Rethinking Business Rescue in Nigeria: Borrowing Virtues from Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code
TL;DR: In this paper, a business rescue regime for Nigeria is proposed, where a sweeping moratorium from creditor enforcement (automatic stay), the adoption of the principle of debtor-in-possession, and the legislative incentivizing of post insolvency financing for the distressed business by way of creating a super-priority position for the financer are discussed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Investment Incentives, Bankruptcies and Reverse Convertible Debt
TL;DR: In this article, an inversion of convertible debt is designed so that the conversion option is less costly ex post (i.e., after issue of debt) to bondholders than the default put implicitly embedded in non-convertible debt.
Journal ArticleDOI
Vulture litigation in the context of sovereign debt: global or local solutions?
TL;DR: The idea of anti-vulture legislation, i.e. domestic law dealing with holdout strategies and "vulture" litigation against a sovereign debtor in financial distress, differs radically from existing...
The Propensity to Save and Incentives to Reduce Debt
Lei Mao,Yuri Tserlukevich +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explain large cash holdings in levered financial systems by low incentives to reduce debt and show that debt reduction cannot be rationalized in the absence of frictions such as bankruptcy costs, transaction costs, dispersed debt ownership, and taxes.
Book ChapterDOI
Re-evaluation: Collectivisation of Creditor Protection Through Private Governance
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply the common pool resource theory to the bilateral private governance system created by covenants and an event of default clause to evaluate the potential negative externailities of covenants.