Journal ArticleDOI
Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using all the Tools and Sanctions
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The claim that private damages actions provide the most important deterrent to cartels in the United States ignores the enormous assistance provided by criminal enforcement, misses much that is critical in deterring cartels, and mistakenly assigns credit for detecting cartels.Abstract:
The United States applies a diverse array of tools and sanctions to deter and detect cartels. Because cartel activity is treated as a serious crime, a formidable array of criminal investigative tools is available, and convicted individuals are imprisoned. Private damages actions also yield substantial recoveries. The many tools and sanctions support each other in various ways, making each significant. But the claim that private damages actions provide the most important deterrent to cartels in the United States ignores the enormous assistance provided by criminal enforcement, misses much that is critical in deterring cartels, and mistakenly assigns credit for detecting cartels.read more
Citations
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Competition law and cartel enforcement regimes in the global south: examining the effectiveness of co-operation in south-south regional trade agreements.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make specific recommendations that are directed at enhancing the effectiveness of South-South collaborations pertaining to cross-border cartel activities in order to realize economic development and alleviate poverty.
Dissertation
The role of the leniency programme in the enforcement of competition law in the UK: a complementary enforcement procedure or an admission of the failure of enforcement authorities to tackle anticompetitive behaviour head on?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the efficacy of the leniency program in the enforcement of competition law applied in respect of cartel infringements based on cases decided by the UK's principal enforcement authority.
Journal ArticleDOI
The deterrent effect of anti-cartel enforcement: A tale of two tails
Peter L. Ormosi,Stephen Davies +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine an existing well-known database on cartels and find that the distribution of overcharge for legal cartels has significantly greater mass in its tails than the distribution for illegal cartels, suggesting that it is the lowest and highest overcharge cartels which are most likely to be deterred, or undetected, by cartel enforcement policy.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A Critical Legal Analysis
TL;DR: The United States Corporate Leniency Policy Incarnate (CLPLP) was created by the American Chamber of Commerce of Commerce and the United States Chamber of Deputies (CDPP).