Development of a Safeguards Verification Method and Instrument to Detect Pin Diversion from Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Spent Fuel Assemblies Phase I Study

TLDR: In this paper, the authors describe a concept and ongoing research to help develop a new safeguards instrument for the detection of pin diversions in a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) spent fuel assembly.

Abstract: A technical safeguards challenge has remained for decades for the IAEA to identify possible diversion of nuclear fuel pins from Light Water Reactor (LWR) spent fuel assemblies. In fact, as modern nuclear power plants are pushed to higher power levels and longer fuel cycles, fuel failures (i.e., ''leakers'') as well as the corresponding fuel assembly repairs (i.e., ''reconstitutions'') are commonplace occurrences within the industry. Fuel vendors have performed hundreds of reconstitutions in the past two decades, thus, an evolved know-how and sophisticated tools exist to disassemble irradiated fuel assemblies and replace damaged pins with dummy stainless steel or other type rods. Various attempts have been made in the past two decades to develop a technology to identify a possible diversion of pin(s) and to determine whether some pins are missing or replaced with dummy or fresh fuel pins. However, to date, there are no safeguards instruments that can detect a possible pin diversion scenario to the requirements of the IAEA. The FORK detector system [1-2] can characterize spent fuel assemblies using operator declared data, but it is not sensitive enough to detect missing pins from spent fuel assemblies. Likewise, an emission computed tomography system [3] has been used to try to detect missing pins from a spent fuel assembly, which has shown some potential for identifying possible missing pins but this capability has not yet been fully demonstrated. The use of such a device in the future would not be envisaged, especially in an inexpensive, easy to handle setting for field applications. In this article, we describe a concept and ongoing research to help develop a new safeguards instrument for the detection of pin diversions in a PWR spent fuel assembly. The proposed instrument is based on one or more very thin radiation detectors that could be inserted within the guide tubes of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) assembly. Ultimately, this work could lead to the development of a detector cluster and corresponding high-precision driving system to collect radiation signatures inside PWR spent fuel assemblies. The data obtained would provide the spatial distribution of the neutron and gamma flux fields within the spent fuel assembly, while the data analysis would be used to help identify missing or replaced pins. Monte Carlo simulations have been performed to help validate this concept using a realistic 17 x 17 PWR spent fuel assembly [4-5]. The initial results of this study show that neutron profile in the guide tubes, when obtained in the presence of missing pins, can be identifiably different from the profiles obtained without missing pins, Our latest simulations have focused upon a specific type of fission chamber that could be tested for this application.