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Electoral Rules and Corruption
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In this paper, the authors investigated the influence of electoral systems on corruption and found that proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.Abstract:
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the Paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.read more
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Rents, Competition, and Corruption
Alberto Ades,Rafael Di Tella +1 more
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What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?
TL;DR: This paper reviewed recent efforts by political scientists and economists to explain cross-national variation in corruption using subjective ratings, and examined the robustness of reported findings, concluding that highly developed, long-established liberal democracies, with a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a history of openness to trade, are perceived as less corrupt.
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Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
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Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them in equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture.
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Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Claudio Ferraz,Frederico Finan +1 more
Abstract: We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. {.JEL D72, K42, 017)
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