Journal ArticleDOI
Empirical comparisons of voting procedures
TLDR
In this article, voting data from 48 elections over a four-year period was used to compare different social choice and ranking procedures, showing that most elections had a majority candidate and this candidate did not have the most first-place votes about 10 to 20% of the time.Abstract:
This article considers decision making in living systems at the levels of the organization, society, or supranational system. It examines voting data from 48 elections over a four-year period that are used to compare different social choice and ranking procedures. Each election had four to six nominees and approximately 1,000 voters. The data indicate that most elections had a majority candidate and that this candidate did not have the most first-place votes about 10 to 20% of the time. Rankings of nominees were compared for the plurality, Hare, and Australian preference procedures. With five nominees, the plurality and Hare rankings differed about 28% of the time, the plurality and Australian preference rankings differed about 55% of the time, and the Hare and Australian preference rankings differed about 62% of the time
Although the data came from a very different source than data previously analyzed by Coombs, Cohen, and Chamberlin (1984), the present conclusions agree closely with theirs in areas where comparisons can be made.read more
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
R. G. Niemi,John R. Wright +1 more
TL;DR: This article used thermometer ratings from nationally-representative samples of the U.S. to determine what it is about presidential candidates that leads to few cycles of cyclical preferences, and found that the highest amounts of unidimensionality often do not occur along partisan or left/right lines.
Journal ArticleDOI
Designing Products and Services for Consumer Welfare: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
Sunil Gupta,Rajeev Kohli +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the theoretical and empirical issues that arise for a public-sector decision maker who wishes to use the target population's preferences as an input for designing new products and services.
Book ChapterDOI
Chapter 30 Voting procedures
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the strategies that voters employ to try to effect better outcomes as long as they are allowed by the rules of a voting procedure and discuss how decision theory, and to a less extent game theory, can be used to illuminate the choice of better and worse strategies under different voting procedures.
Book ChapterDOI
Multiperson Decision Making: A Selective Review
TL;DR: In this article, a review of multiperson decision making from the perspective of social choice theory and the theory of elections is presented, interweaving abstract theory and practical concerns that deserve consideration in evaluating alternative election methods and designing good election systems.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
TL;DR: In this article, a Condorcet social choice function elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists, and several extensions of the simple majority principle have been proposed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss what can go wrong with sophisticated voting systems designed to remedy problems of simpler systems, such as simple voting systems, and propose a solution to the problem.
Book
Condorcet's paradox
TL;DR: In this article, the cases of two and three candidates and the case of more than three candidates are discussed. But the cases for two candidates are different from those of three candidates.
Journal ArticleDOI
A comparative analysis of group decision methods
TL;DR: The authors examined some explicit social choice functions that are generalizations of the simple majority decision rule, including summation procedures and completions of Condorcet's criterion (an alternative with a simple majority over each other alternative shall win).