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Information Aggregation and Equilibrium Selection in Committees
S. Nageeb Ali,Jacob K. Goeree,Navin Kartik,Thomas R. Palfrey,Roger Myerson,David Austen-Smith +5 more
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The article was published on 2007-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 0 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Equilibrium selection.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extended the Poisson model of games with population uncertainty by allowing that expected population sizes and players' utility functions may depend on an unknown state of the world.
Journal ArticleDOI
Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1 and the pivot probability for each voter is non-zero, even in an infinite population.
Journal ArticleDOI
Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare
TL;DR: This article used Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to "enforce" its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority.
Social Learning in Elections
S. Nageeb,Navin Kartik +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a rational theory of voters' behavior in sequential elections was developed, showing that even strategic and forward-looking voters can herd on a candidate with positive probability, and such a "bandwagon" can occur with probability approaching one in large electorates.
Posted ContentDOI
An Experimental Study of Jury Deliberation
Jacob K. Goeree,Leeat Yariv +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of deliberation on collective decisions were studied in a series of experiments, and the authors found that when deliberation is prohibited, different institutions generate significantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics.