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Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations
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In this article, the authors present a theory of domestic politics, showing how it affects international outcomes, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as legislature and executive).Abstract:
Presents a theory of domestic politics, showing how it affects international outcomes. In developing this rational choice theory, the text argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is misleading. It describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as legislature and executive). A model is constructed based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. The model is illustrated by the question of co-operation between nations.read more
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The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders
James G. March,Johan P. Olsen +1 more
TL;DR: The authors argue that the tendency of students of international political order to emphasize efficient histories and consequential bases for action leads them to underestimate the significance of rule-and identity-based action and inefficient histories.
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What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge
TL;DR: Social constructivism addresses many of the same issues addressed by neo-utilitarianism, though from a different vantage and, therefore, with different effect as discussed by the authors. But it also concerns itself with issues that neo-UTilitarianism treats by assumption, discounts, ignores, or simply cannot apprehend within its characteristic ontology and/or epistemology.
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Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation, finding that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a preferential trading agreement as autocratic countries.
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The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action
Alexander Cooley,James Ron +1 more
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Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade
TL;DR: The authors analyzed the relationship between regime type and trade policy and found that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country-pairs (composed of an autocracy and a democracy).