B. Peter Rosendorff

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation, finding that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a preferential trading agreement as autocratic countries.

TL;DR: The authors analyzed the relationship between regime type and trade policy and found that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country-pairs (composed of an autocracy and a democracy).

TL;DR: The escape clause is endogenous in a model of repeated trade-barrier setting in the presence of symmetric, two-sided, political uncertainty as discussed by the authors, allowing countries to temporarily deviate from their obligations in periods of excessive, unexpected political pressure at some prenegotiated cost.

TL;DR: This article investigated the willingness of policy-makers to provide credible announcements of policyrelevant variables, and showed that the availability (or absence) of that data is correlated with regime type, even after controlling for level of development, participation in IMF programs, country-specific effects, and the effects of time.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the relationship between regime type and the willingness of policy makers to provide credible announcements on policy-relevant variables, and demonstrate empirically that the availability (or absence) of policyrelevant data is correlated with regime type, even after controlling for GDP per capita, IMF participation, country fixed-effects, and time trends.