Neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation—problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains. By contrast, I argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third, distinct obstacle plays a crucial role. Almost regardless of the issue area, states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement. Furthermore, the bargaining and enforcement problems interact. Using a game model, I show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced, the “shadow of the future” cuts two ways. A high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier, but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. Empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories.

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Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban

Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation

Recent work has focused on the problem of how states cooperate in the environment of anarchy. Linked to the ideas of the Prisoners' Dilemma and public goods, that work has provided important insights and lines of research. But it also has problems and limitations, which are explored in the paper. The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained. It takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of PD situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change. Many of the concepts the framework uses—e.g., cooperation and defection, the distinction between offense and defense, and the nature of power—are problematical. Issues of beliefs, perceptions, norms, and values also lead to a different perspective on cooperation.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100014635

Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation

Communication is generally regarded as an essential aspect of diplomacy. Proceeding from an understanding of diplomacy as a transhistorical phenomenon, this article distinguishes a number of pertinent dimensions of the communicative aspects of diplomacy and proffers examples taken from different eras and geographic regions. With a focus on continuity and change, the article analyzes the basic aspects of diplomatic communication and the gathering and transmission of information, as well as two important options in the diplomatic repertoire: verbal versus nonverbal and public versus private communication. Two processes of continuity and change––the ritualization of diplomatic communication and technological development––are discussed. The article concludes that today's diplomatic communication cannot be seen as the result of any unilinear process. Variations within the distinguished dimensions do not follow an evolutionary pattern but reflect historical contingency.

Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy

States use wedge strategies to prevent hostile alliances from forming or to disperse those that have formed. These strategies can cause power alignments that are otherwise unlikely to occur, and thus have significant consequences for international politics. How do such strategies work and what conditions promote their success? The wedge strategies that are likely to have significant effects use selective accommodation—concessions, compensations, and other inducements—to detach and neutralize potential adversaries. These kinds of strategies play important roles in the statecraft of both defensive and offensive powers. Defenders use selective accommodation to balance against a primary threat by neutralizing lesser ones that might ally with it. Expansionists use selective accommodation to prevent or break up blocking coalitions, which isolates opposing states by inducing potential balancers to buck-pass, bandwagon, or hide. Two cases—Great Britain's defensive attempts to accommodate Italy in the late 1930s a...

Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban

Citations

Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation

Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation

Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy

Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics

Timing and the initiation of de-escalation moves

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