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Local decentralization and the theory of optimal government.
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This article is published in Research Papers in Economics.The article was published on 1968-12-01 and is currently open access. It has received 39 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Public finance & Local government.read more
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The joint‐decision trap: lessons from german federalism and european integration
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the similarities between joint decision making in German federalism and decision-making in the European Community and argued that the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de facto requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a "problem-solving" (as opposed to a "bargaining") style of decision making can be maintained.
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A critique of tiebout's theory of local public expenditures
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that the notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium, except under very restrictive assumptions, and that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of Tiebout's theory, then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be Pareto optimal.
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Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions
TL;DR: The authors constructs a model to show how wealth, technology, and preferences can interact to provide common incentives for people to form segregated groups for the provision of local collective goods, that is, goods which cannot readily be supplied and priced on a variable unit-of-services basis, but which are best provided communally at the same level to all members of the association, in such a way that nonmembers are excluded from enjoying them altogether.
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Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic
TL;DR: In a state government, individuals may seek to extend the laws passed in some states to the entire nation or may oppose preemptive laws because they benefit from variety as mentioned in this paper, and since these motivations are absent in a unitary system, national support for a law will depend upon whether a unitarily or a federal structure prevails.