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Book ChapterDOI

Ownership of the Firm

Henry Hansmann
- 01 Oct 1988 - 
- Vol. 4, Iss: 2, pp 267-304
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TLDR
In this paper, the authors explore the economic factors responsible for different patterns of ownership in large-scale enterprise in the United States, including consumer retail cooperatives, business-owned wholesale and supply cooperatives and public utility cooperatives.
Abstract
Introduction Most large-scale enterprise in the United States is organized in the form of the conventional business corporation, in which the firm is collectively owned by investors of capital. Other ownership patterns are prominent in a number of important industries, however. Many firms, for example, are owned by their customers. These include not just consumer retail cooperatives, which are relatively rare, but also business-owned wholesale and supply cooperatives, which are quite common, as well as public utility cooperatives, mutual insurance companies, mutual banking institutions, and cooperative and condominium housing. Further, many firms are owned by persons who supply the firm with some factor of production other than capital. Worker-owned firms, which predominate in professional services such as law and accounting, are conspicuous examples, as are the agricultural processing and marketing cooperatives that dominate the markets for many farm products. Finally, a number of important service industries are heavily populated by nonprofit firms, which have no owners at all. In this essay I explore the economic factors responsible for these different patterns of ownership. In recent years a number of scholars have explored various aspects of enterprise ownership. In particular, Williamson and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian have dealt insightfully with the influence of transactionspecific investments on the assignment of ownership, and I shall draw heavily here on the concepts they have developed. Similarly, a number of writers have looked at questions of ownership in particular contexts.

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TL;DR: The authors surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and presents a survey of the literature.
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A Survey of Corporate Governance

TL;DR: Corporate Governance as mentioned in this paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and shows that most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.
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Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest european companies

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies and found a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market-to-book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns).
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Power in a Theory of the Firm

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources, which can be better than ownership because: i) the power agents get from access is more contingent on them making the right investment; ii) ownership has adverse effects on the incentive to specialize.
ReportDOI

Power in a Theory of the Firm

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources, in which the power agents get from access is more contingent on their making the right investment and ownership has adverse effects on the incentive to specialize.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
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The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

TL;DR: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work in the field of economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers

TL;DR: In this paper, the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, how debt can substitute for dividends, why diversification programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidationmotivated takeovers, and why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil.
Journal ArticleDOI

Separation of ownership and control

TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.