scispace - formally typeset
Journal ArticleDOI

Problem structure and the use of base-rate information from experience.

TLDR
In this article, the use of base-rate information that is derived from experience in classifying examples of a category was investigated. But, the results reveal a consistent but complex pattern depending on the category structure and the nature of the ambiguous tests, participants use base rate information appropriately, ignore base rate, or use baserate information inappropriately (predict that the rare disease is more likely to be present).
Abstract
This article is concerned with the use of base-rate information that is derived from experience in classifying examples of a category The basic task involved simulated medical decision making in which participants learned to diagnose hypothetical diseases on the basis of symptom information Alternative diseases differed in their relative frequency or base rates of occurrence In five experiments initial learning was followed by a series of transfer tests designed to index the use of base-rate information On these tests, patterns of symptoms were presented that suggested more than one disease and were therefore ambiguous The alternative or candidate diseases on such tests could differ in their relative frequency of occurrence during learning For example, a symptom might be presented that had appeared with both a relatively common and a relatively rare disease If participants are using base-rate information appropriately (according to Bayes' theorem), then they should be more likely to predict that the common disease is present than that the rare disease is present on such ambiguous tests Current classification models differ in their predictions concerning the use of base-rate information For example, most prototype models imply an insensitivity to base-rate information, whereas many exemplar-based classification models predict appropriate use of base-rate information The results reveal a consistent but complex pattern Depending on the category structure and the nature of the ambiguous tests, participants use base-rate information appropriately, ignore base-rate information, or use base-rate information inappropriately (predict that the rare disease is more likely to be present) To our knowledge, no current categorization model predicts this pattern of results To account for these results, a new model is described incorporating the ideas of property or symptom competition and context-sensitive retrieval

read more

Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

ALCOVE: an exemplar-based connectionist model of category learning.

TL;DR: Alcove selectively attends to relevant stimulus dimensions, can account for a form of base-rate neglect, does not suffer catastrophic forgetting, and can exhibit 3-stage learning of high-frequency exceptions to rules, whereas such effects are not easily accounted for by models using other combinations of representation and learning method.
BookDOI

Beyond significance testing : reforming data analysis methods in behavioral research

TL;DR: Beyond Significance Testing as mentioned in this paper provides integrative and clear presentations about the limitations of statistical tests and reviews alternative methods of data analysis, such as effect size estimation (at both the group and case levels) and interval estimation (i.e., confidence intervals).
Journal ArticleDOI

The Adaptive Nature of Human Categorization.

TL;DR: The basic theory of categorization developed in Anderson (1990) is presented and the theory has been greatly extended and applied to many new phenomena and new developments and applications are described.
Journal ArticleDOI

From conditioning to category learning: an adaptive network model.

TL;DR: The authors used adaptive network theory to extend the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) least mean squares (LMS) model of associative learning to phenomena of human learning and judgment.
References
More filters
Book

Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

TL;DR: The authors described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, availability of instances or scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available.
Journal ArticleDOI

On the psychology of prediction

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the rules that determine intuitive predictions and judgments of confidence and contrast these rules to the normative principles of statistical prediction and show that people do not appear to follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction.
Related Papers (5)