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Article:
Newman, E and Zala, B (2018) Rising Powers and Order Contestation: Disaggregating the
Normative from the Representational. Third World Quarterly, 39 (5). pp. 871-888. ISSN
0143-6597
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1392085
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Third World Quarterly (forthcoming)
Rising Powers and Order Contestation:
Disaggregating the Normative from the Representational
Edward Newman and Benjamin Zala
Abstract
One of the central themes of the current literature on rising powers is that new
aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and
norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the
literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order is
imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of ÔcontestationÕ. In this
article we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can
be thought of as Ôcontestation over representationÕ: that is, contestation over who is
setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules
themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. This distinction is important for
providing a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the current power transition
and therefore for guiding attempts at accommodation on the part of the established
powers. Theoretically, the paper engages with debates on international order and
international society. Its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the
discourse of rising power summitry, in particular at meetings of the BRICS and
Shanghai Cooperation Organization groupings.
One of the central themes running through the current literature on rising powers is that the
new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms
that underpin the existing, Western-led order. This often takes the form of a discussion about
normative contestation that is assumed to be taking place and is likely to characterise the
current era of order transition. According to this, Ôrising powers are not only contesting their
position in the international system, but the very rules that govern their rise.Õ
1
However, we argue that there is ample evidence that rising powers Ð such as China, Russia
and India Ð do not necessarily seek to resist or challenge the underlying principles of
international order in all instances, but rather they seek to gain greater access to, and
representation in, the institutions and processes which define, administer and uphold
international rules. From this perspective, much of the political conflict that is associated with
the transitional international order may be better be defined not as normative contestation but
rather as Ôcontestation over representationÕ. This form of contestation reflects a demand by
rising powers to have their material interests served through greater access to and
representation in international regimes, but it is also a demand that respect and status are duly
accorded to them. That is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the
game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin.
This distinction is important for providing a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the
transition in power that currently defines international order. In pursuing this distinction, the
paper seeks to address a number of questions: Is political conflict related to the transitional
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international order fundamentally about contestation over norms, representation in regulatory
regimes, or both? If it is normative, how can we disentangle this from conventional Ôgreat
powerÕ rivalry around material, geopolitical interests? Where political conflict between
existing and emerging Ôgreat powersÕ is characterized as normative contestation, what
precisely are the norms at issue, and what is being contested? It is often remarked that the
ÔemergingÕ and ÔrisingÕ powers do not represent a coherent normative community and that
they are divided on many issues.
2
Does this mean that contestation around the Ôrules of the
gameÕ cannot be characterized as normative or taken seriously? Drawing upon the ÔEnglish
SchoolÕ approach to International Relations, is it possible to distinguish between rising
powers contesting the fundamental primary institutions of international society, and when
they are challenging secondary institutions Ð such as the composition and operating
principles of international organisations?
3
This paper examines the words and actions of rising Ð or resurgent Ð powers in order to
explore whether and to what extent they are contesting certain norms associated with
international order and traditionally championed by the established powers. The objective is
to differentiate between forms of contestation in the context of a transitional international
order. Moreover, accommodating rising powers and negotiating a peaceful power transition is
both Ôexceptionally complicatedÕ
4
and hugely important. Having an accurate understanding of
the degree and nature of contestation between rising and established powers should be of
interest and use to both scholars and practitioners alike. By paying particular attention to the
discourse used in summits held by rising power groupings, the paper will attempt to clarify
and add empirical depth to the debate around the sustainability or otherwise of the norms
underpinning the current global order. Within a framework of International Relations
scholarship which engages with contestation and international order, the empirical basis of
this paper is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry.
Rising Powers and the Assumption of Normative Contestation
The Ôinternational orderÕ Ð as a coherent, unified set of practices Ð is a problematic idea.
Nevertheless, it can be defined by the institutions which regulate international politics: the
accepted rules, reflected in the behaviour of states and other actors. These primary
institutions include fundamental norms related to state sovereignty, the rules governing the
use of armed force, international law, and diplomatic practice, amongst others. Secondary
institutions Ð such as multilateral arrangements Ð may be thought of as the means of
managing international order. This order is often associated with the distribution or balance
of material economic and military power, or the perception of such power, but it is
importantly also a matter of norms which guide or proscribe action. It is broadly agreed
(below) that the international norms and institutions which might be regarded as constituting
international order are under transition and arguably under challenge. A changing
international order might be a consequence of a sustained change in the perceived distribution
of power, especially with a pattern of rising and falling powers that has an impact upon
international norms. However, whilst it is relatively straightforward Ð but not uncontroversial
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Ð to measure material changes in power and interests, the manner in which norms emerge,
endure, or erode is more problematic.
According to many analysts, the relative rise in power of a number of non-Western states has
resulted in a process of normative contestation and resistance in international politics, and
questions relating to the creation, internalisation and institutionalisation of norms are
increasingly controversial.
5
From this perspective, rising powers are not necessarily willing to
be socialised into existing global institutions as passive Ônorm takersÕ, and various forms of
normative resistance can be seen in a range of international policy areas.
6
Connected to this,
the manner in which decisions are taken and implemented in support of international norms is
also increasingly fractious.
Many ongoing international challenges occur against the background of this apparently
changing international order, and appear to reflect a growing division between established,
liberal states (such as the US, UK and France) and ÔrisingÕ powers, including China, Russia,
India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia. The manner in which this contestation is
manifested often appears to reflect normative differences relating to Ð for example Ð the
evolving nature of state sovereignty, human rights and humanitarian intervention,
international criminal justice, development, and the use of force.
Some analysts have suggested that this constitutes a post-hegemonic, post-unipolar, or post-
Western era, with significant challenges for the liberal international order.
7
Others concede
the relative decline of the US but argue that its soft and hard power will endure, will continue
to transcend that of others, and it will continue to provide leadership and attract followers.
8
Some scholars claim that the liberal international order led by the US is resilient and that it
will be able to co-opt rising powers into its norms and institutions, even without making
substantial concessions to those states.
9
Many scholars argue that the normative power of
emerging states Ð and their power of attraction Ð is severely limited, exaggerated, and
unlikely to present a credible alternative to existing institutions of world order.
10
Their
willingness and capacity to play a global leadership role is also questioned.
11
Others argue
that a Ôglobal grand bargainÕ between the existing great powers and rising non-Western states
will be necessary in order to avoid military conflict.
12
In turn, Kupchan envisages a new
global order in which no single power or centre will dominate in material and ideological
terms.
13
Others suggest that the world faces a dangerous power vacuum which may last for
decades, as the Western alliance declines and emerging powers are unable or unwilling to
provide public goods.
14
Yet, there is strong support for the idea that the material power of
rising states has significant implications for the normative underpinning of international
order, as a challenge to the ÔWestern domination of ideas and norms in international societyÕ,
even if existing norms are not being rejected wholesale.
15
Despite these varied conceptions of the transitional global order, the notion that the rise of
new powers Ôrepresents a profound challenge to both the structure of the international system
and the normative foundations of international societyÕ
16
has become widespread. Kahler has
captured the general tone of this argument, suggesting that Ô[r]ising powers will aim to place
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their imprint on reconstructed global institutions, and that stamp will differ markedly from a
status quo supported by the incumbent powers.Õ
17
In some cases this argument is expressed in
terms of a general challenge to the contours of the existing order per se
18
and in other cases
this is conceived specifically as being a challenge to the liberal underpinnings of this order.
The latter is captured by the recent prediction that Ô[a]s the so-called rising powers take up
their positions as major players in the international system, alternative conceptions of order
and governance will challenge established power structures and existing visions of liberal
order.Õ
19
Schweller and Pu have put this more pointedly and in a structural context in
claiming that Ôa rising power must delegitimize the unipoleÕs global authority and order
through discursive and cost-imposing practices of resistance that pave the way for the next
phase of full-fledged balancing and global contestation.Õ
20
Much debate focuses on whether
the liberal or the Western-led international order has come to an end, and if we are entering a
new phase. Yet these are not discrete or neat phases or models where one ends and another
begins, and there can be multiple forms and understandings of international order operating in
parallel. This debate, therefore, would benefit from a more precise analysis of the concept
and practice of contestation as it relates to international order.
Contestation in World Politics
Despite its centrality to many understandings of world politics, contestation is a somewhat
under defined concept in the International Relations scholarship. Finnemore has written that
normative contestation is Ôin large part what politics is all about; it is about competing values
and understandings of what is good, desirable, and appropriate in our collective communal
life.Õ
21
Yet the body of work that seeks to establish definitions and specifically to distinguish
between different types of contestation is relatively small.
In a recent article tracing debates in this literature, Wolff and Zimmermann have very few
authors to choose from to explore the concept of contestation, all of whom have approached
the topic from very different theoretical perspectives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, each
approached the concept in ways that have little to unite them conceptually beyond a common
purpose in tracking and highlighting empirically the contestation they see as already present,
particularly in relation to global governance norms that are ignored by the mainstream liberal
literature.
22
Elements of this relatively small literature do, however, attempt to categorise and define
contestation to some degree. Wolff and Zimmerman, and Wiener, approach contestation as an
interactive practice which reflects resistance but which can also generate adapted or modified
norms.
23
Contessi defines normative contestation as Ôan instance of strategic social
construction that aims at undermining or displacing an accepted or emerging intersubjective
meaning through the formulation by actors of competing discursive interventions that
challenge the meaning of norms that embody conflictive interpretations of values.Õ
24
This
raises the definitional threshold relatively high in terms of requiring a direct challenge to the
meaning of a norm but in so doing holds the promise of allowing for a greater level of
analytical precision. It is this precision that is missing in much of the literature that presumes