Open AccessBook
Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
John J. Bartholdi,James B. Orlin +1 more
TLDR
Evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation is given and it is proved that it is NP-complete to recognize when an STV election violates monotonicity, suggesting that non-monotonicity in STV elections might be perceived as less threatening since it is in effect “hidden” and hard to exploit for strategic advantage.Abstract:
We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candidate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more dicult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistance to manipulation is inherent to STV and does not depend on hopeful extraneous assumptions like the presumed diculty of learning the preferences of the other voters. We also prove that it is NP-complete to recognize when an STV election violates monotonicity. This suggests that non-monotonicity in STV elections might be perceived as less threatening since it is in eect “hidden” and hard to exploit for strategic advantage.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
How hard is it to control an election
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that some voting schemes that are in principle susceptible to control are nevertheless resistant in practice due to excessive computational costs; others are vulnerable due to their computational complexity.
Journal ArticleDOI
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate
TL;DR: This article characterize the exact number of candidates for which manipulation becomes hard for the plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, veto, plurality with runoff, regular cup, and randomized cup protocols and shows that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.
BookDOI
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
TL;DR: This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively and offers detailed introductions to each of the field's major themes.
Proceedings Article
Complexity of mechanism design
Vincent Conitzer,Tuomas Sandholm +1 more
TL;DR: Focusing-on settings where side payments are not possible, it is shown that the mechanism design problem is NP-complete for deterministic mechanisms and if the authors allow randomized mechanisms, the mechanisms design problem becomes tractable.
Journal ArticleDOI
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
TL;DR: Among systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland voting is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control and vulnerability results for microbribery are proven via a novel technique involving min-cost network flow.
References
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Book
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
TL;DR: The second edition of a quarterly column as discussed by the authors provides a continuing update to the list of problems (NP-complete and harder) presented by M. R. Garey and myself in our book "Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness,” W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1979.
Journal ArticleDOI
Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation, i.e., an individual can manipulate a voting scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the "honest" outcome.
Journal ArticleDOI
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
TL;DR: In this paper, the strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, nonnegative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions.