How hard is it to control an election
TLDR
In this paper, the authors show that some voting schemes that are in principle susceptible to control are nevertheless resistant in practice due to excessive computational costs; others are vulnerable due to their computational complexity.About:
This article is published in Mathematical and Computer Modelling.The article was published on 1992-08-01 and is currently open access. It has received 425 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Cardinal voting systems & Approval voting.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate
TL;DR: This article characterize the exact number of candidates for which manipulation becomes hard for the plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, veto, plurality with runoff, regular cup, and randomized cup protocols and shows that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Noam Nisan,Amir Ronen +1 more
TL;DR: It is proved that essentially all reasonable approximations or heuristics for combinatorial auctions as well as a wide class of cost minimization problems yield non-truthful VCG-based mechanisms and proposes a general method for circumventing the above problem.
Journal ArticleDOI
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
TL;DR: Among systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland voting is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control and vulnerability results for microbribery are proven via a novel technique involving min-cost network flow.
Journal ArticleDOI
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Noam Nisan,Amir Ronen +1 more
TL;DR: It is proved that essentially all reasonable approximations or heuristics for combinatorial auctions as well as a wide class of cost minimization problems yield non-truthful VCG-based mechanisms and proposes a general method for circumventing the above problem.
Book ChapterDOI
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
TL;DR: This short paper gives a general introduction to computational social choice, by proposing a taxonomy of the issues addressed by this discipline, together with some illustrative examples and an (incomplete) bibliography.
References
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Book
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
TL;DR: The second edition of a quarterly column as discussed by the authors provides a continuing update to the list of problems (NP-complete and harder) presented by M. R. Garey and myself in our book "Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness,” W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1979.
Journal ArticleDOI
New Directions in Cryptography
TL;DR: This paper suggests ways to solve currently open problems in cryptography, and discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.
Journal ArticleDOI
The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
TL;DR: A voting rule is exhibited that efficiently computes winners but is computationally resistant to strategic manipulation, showing how computational complexity might protect the integrity of social choice.
Journal ArticleDOI
Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
TL;DR: It is shown that a voting scheme suggested by Lewis Carroll can be impractical in that it can be computationally prohibitive to determine whether any particular candidate has won an election, and a class of "impracticality theorems" are suggested which say that any fair voting scheme must, in the worst-case, require excessive computation to determine a winner.