Journal ArticleDOI
The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
TLDR
A voting rule is exhibited that efficiently computes winners but is computationally resistant to strategic manipulation, showing how computational complexity might protect the integrity of social choice.Abstract:
We show how computational complexity might protect the integrity of social choice. We exhibit a voting rule that efficiently computes winners but is computationally resistant to strategic manipulation. It is NP-complete for a manipulative voter to determine how to exploit knowledge of the preferences of others. In contrast, many standard voting schemes can be manipulated with only polynomial computational effort.read more
Citations
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Book
Algorithmic Game Theory
TL;DR: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.
Journal ArticleDOI
Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
TL;DR: It is shown that a voting scheme suggested by Lewis Carroll can be impractical in that it can be computationally prohibitive to determine whether any particular candidate has won an election, and a class of "impracticality theorems" are suggested which say that any fair voting scheme must, in the worst-case, require excessive computation to determine a winner.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
TL;DR: It is proved that the maximum Nash welfare solution selects allocations that are envy free up to one good --- a compelling notion that is quite elusive when coupled with economic efficiency.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Efficient similarity search and classification via rank aggregation
TL;DR: This work proposes a novel approach to performing efficient similarity search and classification in high dimensional data and proves that with high probability, it produces a result that is a (1 + ε) factor approximation to the Euclidean nearest neighbor.
Journal ArticleDOI
How hard is it to control an election
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that some voting schemes that are in principle susceptible to control are nevertheless resistant in practice due to excessive computational costs; others are vulnerable due to their computational complexity.
References
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Book
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
TL;DR: The second edition of a quarterly column as discussed by the authors provides a continuing update to the list of problems (NP-complete and harder) presented by M. R. Garey and myself in our book "Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness,” W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1979.
Journal ArticleDOI
Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation, i.e., an individual can manipulate a voting scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the "honest" outcome.