How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases - when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority - and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.

background

https://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Block_BBS.pdf

Some Varieties of Functionalism

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience.

https://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/final_revised_proof.pdf

Two neural correlates of consciousness

The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include: • 40-hertz oscillations in the cerebral cortex (Crick and Koch 1990) • Intralaminar nuclei in the thalamus (Bogen 1995) • Re-entrant loops in thalamocortical systems (Edelman 1989) • 40-hertz rhythmic activity in thalamocortical systems (Llinas et al 1994) • Extended reticular-thalamic activation system (Newman and Baars 1993) • Neural assemblies bound by NMDA (Flohr 1995) • Certain neurochemical levels of activation (Hobson 1997) • Certain neurons in inferior temporal cortex (Sheinberg and Logothetis 1997) • Neurons in extrastriate visual cortex projecting to prefrontal areas (Crick and Koch 1995) • Visual processing within the ventral stream (Milner and Goodale 1995) (A longer list can be found in Chalmers 1998. Review articles on neural correlates of consciousness, especially visual consciousness, can be found in Crick and Koch 1998 and Milner 1995.)

methods

/pdf/what-is-a-neural-correlate-of-consciousness-fr0nqfsekx.pdf

What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness

This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.

/pdf/a-phenomenal-dispositional-account-of-belief-1pr57ozgrq.pdf

A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief

Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that the mind sometimes extends outside the body to encompass features of the environment (HEC). HEC has been criticised by Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, and Robert Rupert. In this paper, I argue for two claims: (1) HEC is a harder target than those critics have supposed; HEC is entailed by functionalism, a commonly held view in philosophy ofmind, and one to which those critics are already committed. (2) he version ofHEC entailed by functionalism is more radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest. I argue that this version of HEC is so radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism. he conclusion of the paper is against both HEC and functionalism.

/pdf/extended-cognition-and-functionalism-5695o1vg5w.pdf

Some Varieties of Functionalism

Citations

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience.

Two neural correlates of consciousness

What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness

A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief

Extended Cognition and Functionalism

Related Papers (5)

Psychophysical and theoretical identifications

Troubles with functionalism

Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s Mind and the Physical World

Naming and Necessity

Causality and Properties