Showing papers in "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2002"
681 citations
TL;DR: The reductive functionalization (RF) model as mentioned in this paper is a non-reductive, supervenience-based model that replaces supervenient-based physicalism with functionalization.
Abstract: he elaborated his famous attacks to different kinds of non-reductive physicalism, including supervenient-based accounts. But it is only around 1993 that he begins to develop a model that replaces SC. In his recent Mind in a Physical World' Kim offers the first extended presentation of his new theory, which I will call reductive functionalization (RF). I will explore some aspects of the proposal in MIAPW with special attention to how RF fares vis-a-vis the sources of dissatisfaction that prompted Kim to abandon SC and to criticize other non-reductive, supervenience-based views.
570 citations
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281 citations
TL;DR: Wittgenstein apparently regarded G. E. Moore's "Proof of an External World" as one of his finest pieces of philosophical work as mentioned in this paper, which is an important clue for anyone who wants to understand what Wittgenstein thought a satisfactory treatment of knowledge-scepticism should accomplish.
Abstract: Wittgenstein apparently regarded G. E. Moore's "Proof of an External World" as one of his finest pieces of philosophical work.1 That is an important clue for anyone who wants to understand what Wittgenstein thought a satisfactory treatment of knowledge-scepticism should accomplish.2 I do not believe, though, that many of Moore's moder readers would share Wittgenstein's high regard. The greater part of the essay is devoted to exasperatingly slow ruminations on what it means to describe objects as "external", or "outside our minds" or "presented in space" or "to be met with in space". Nothing particularly consequential emerges. And the actual 'Proof-'which everyone on first reading feels blatantly begs the question-is confined to the last few pages. Here is the essence of it:
183 citations
TL;DR: McMahan as mentioned in this paper uses the method of testing moral views by appealing to our judgments about particular cases, rather than being as hard to assess as the ideas they are being used to test.
Abstract: This book is an important contribution to moral philosophy. With respect to the interest of its ideas, and the strength of its arguments, the level of quality is consistently high. Readers will struggle to follow the twists and turns of the discussion, not because it is badly presented or unnecessarily complex, but because it is difficult for us to think as deeply into the issues as McMahan himself does. The book uses the method of testing moral views by appealing to our judgments about particular cases. It does not offer a justification for this methodology, but in my view it practises it in the right way. Usually the examples are ones where we do make confident judgments, rather than being as hard to assess as the ideas they are being used to test. Sometimes when this method is employed as soon as one principle has been questioned on the strength of an example the reader is presented with several alternative principles that might be able to account for our judgment, so that we must consider even more examples to decide between the new contending principles. But McMahan's discussions do not leave the reader with an uneasy feeling that no real progress is being made. Also he is not committed to always following our intuitive judgments. About some issues he thinks that we should hold a view even if it seriously conflicts with our intuitions. For example, he reacts in this way to the proposal that infanticide is not a seriously wrong act of killing, at least not if we assess it in terms of the interests and moral claims of the infant whose life is ended. As its title indicates, the book discusses a wide range of issues concerned with killing and death. The main subjects are the badness of death (ch. 2), comparisons between the morality of death and killing in the case of people and in the case of animals (ch. 3), the ethics of abortion (ch. 4), and the ethics of euthanasia (ch. 5 the book does not discuss killing in self-defense or as punishment). The book is not unified by an allegiance to one moral theory, for example maximizing consequentialism or a moderate deontological view. This distinguishes it from much of the literature about these topics.
152 citations
TL;DR: Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge as discussed by the authors, and it is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone.
Abstract: Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably-held belief is non-accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability; an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge.
109 citations
TL;DR: For instance, the authors showed that there is no genuine evidence that a sentence is superficially contingent a priori knowledge in the sense that it is false at some worlds, but it is true at other worlds.
Abstract: 0.1 In 'Reference and Contingency," Gareth Evans distinguished between 'superficially contingent' and 'deeply contingent' truths. A true sentence is superficially contingent just in case the function from possible worlds to truth-values associated with that sentence reckons it false at some (non-actual) world. A deeply contingent true sentence is one for which there is no semantic guarantee that there actually exists some verifying state of affairs.2 Supposing I introduce 'Julius' by the reference fixer 'the inventor of the zip', then the sentence 'If anyone uniquely invented the zip, Julius invented the zip' is merely superficially contingent. Though false at some worlds, anyone who understands it will see that it is true at the actual world just in case 'If anyone uniquely invented the zip, then the unique inventor of the zip invented the zip' is true. Since it is quite clear that the latter can be known without empirical investigation,3 the same is true of the former. We have little trouble seeing how there can be superficially contingent a priori knowledge: once we get straight about what is involved in understanding (merely) superficially contingent sentences-which is part of the more general project of accounting for our understanding of indexical elements of language, there is no genuine
85 citations
TL;DR: The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time as discussed by the authors is a major contribution to analytical metaphysics; it confirms Lowe's standing as a leading figure in the field.
Abstract: I am happy to report that serious metaphysics is alive and well in the work of Jonathan Lowe. His recent book The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time is a major contribution to analytical metaphysics; it confirms Lowe's standing as a leading figure in the field. There is a great deal of common ground between Lowe's ideas in this book and the ideas in my own published work. Nevertheless, there are a few philosophically interesting differences of detail concerning matters that are fundamental to metaphysics. In this essay I will first explore our common background and then the philosophical significance of these differences of detail.
77 citations
TL;DR: The Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism (DESIHAHONISM) as mentioned in this paper is a variant of DESIHONIS that is immune to mental statism.
Abstract: What makes a life go well for the one who lives it? Hedonists hold that pleasure enhances the value of a life; pain diminishes it. Hedonism has been subjected to a number of objections. Some are (a) based on the claim that hedonism is a form of “mental statism”. Others are (b) based on the claim that some pleasures are base or degrading. Yet others are (c) based on the claim that when a bad person enjoys a pleasure, his receipt of that pleasure seem not to make the world better.
It is important to keep in mind that hedonism is a theory about the value of a person's life for the person who lives it, and not for the world or for others. It is also important to distinguish between sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism.
“Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism” appears to be immune to objections (a) and (b). A variant appears to be immune to all of them. Perhaps it is the answer to the question about the value of a life.
60 citations
TL;DR: Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions be chosen for themselves is typically interpreted, in Kantian terms, as taking virtuous action to have intrinsic rather than consequentialist value as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions be chosen for themselves is typically interpreted, in Kantian terms, as taking virtuous action to have intrinsic rather than consequentialist value. This raises problems about how to reconcile Aristotle's requirement with (a) the fact that virtuous actions typically aim at ends beyond themselves (usually benefits to others); and (b) Aristotle's apparent requirement that everything (including virtuous action) be chosen for the sake of eudaimonia. I offer an alternative interpretation, based on Aristotle's account of loving a friend for herself, according to which choosing a virtuous action for itself involves choosing it on account of those features of it that make it the kind of action it is, where these features include its intended consequences (such as the benefits it seeks to provide to others). I then suggest that Aristotle may take these consequences (including benefits to others) as contributing (and contributing non-instrumentally) to the agent's own eudaimonia, and that there is no conflict here with Aristotle's view that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul. For just as my activity of teaching is actualized in my students (provided they learn from me), so too my virtuous activity can be actualized in its beneficiaries. If this is right, then Aristotle's view is far from the Stoic (and proto-Kantian) view often attributed to him.
TL;DR: In this article, the notion of separability in Descartes's account of real distinction between mind and body is subject to five different interpretations, and it does not require that the attributes thought and body are separable in the sense that each can exist without the other existing.
Abstract: In the first part of this paper I explore the relations among distinctness, separability, number, and non-identity. I argue that Descartes believes plurality in things themselves arises from distinction, so that things distinct in any of the three ways are not identical. The only exception concerns universals which, considered in things themselves, are identical to particulars. I also argue that to be distinct is to be separable. Things distinct by reason are separable only in thought by means of ideas not clear and distinct. In the second part I argue that the notion of separability in Descartes's account of real distinction between mind and body is subject to five different interpretations. I claim that the heart of Cartesian dualism concerns the separability of the attributes thought and extension. It does not require that mind and body are separable in the sense that each can exist without the other existing.
TL;DR: In this paper, Brandom argues that there cannot be a justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false, which is exactly what I argued against in "Knowledge and the Internal".
Abstract: In “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Robert Brandom reads my “Knowledge and the Internal” as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social-perspectival conception of knowledge (and of objectivity in general). But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in “Knowledge and the Internal.” Seeing that P constitutes falsehood-excluding justification for believing that P. That should seem common sense, but it is made unavailable by the inferentialist conception of justification that Brandom takes for granted. So far from realizing my aims, Brandom's social-perspectival conception of knowledge is squarely in the target area of my argument in “Knowledge and the Internal,” which I restate here so as to bring that out.
TL;DR: The authors argue that will-to-power is an intentional end-directedness, involving cognitive or representational powers he is rightly loath to attribute to all organisms, and tends to downplay even in persons.
Abstract: Nietzsche attributes ‘will power’ to all living things, but this seems in sharp conflict with other positions important to him-and implausible besides. The doctrine smacks of both metaphysics and anthropomorphizing, which he elsewhere derides. Will to power seems to be an intentional end-directedness, involving cognitive or representational powers he is rightly loath to attribute to all organisms, and tends to downplay even in persons. This paper argues that we find a stronger reading of will to power-both more plausible and more consistent with Nietzsche's other views-by developing his affinities with Darwinism. By seeing will to power as an ‘internal revision’to Darwinism, opposing the latter's stress (as Nietzsche thinks) on ‘survival’, but assenting to its uses of natural selection, we can ground or naturalize that notion, congenially to Nietzsche and to us.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a theory of the content of such notions, which is largely deflationary in spirit, in the sense that it represents a broad range of semantic notions - including the concept of truth - as being entirely free from substantive metaphysical and empirical presuppositions.
Abstract: There is an important family of semantic notions that we apply to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts - as when we say that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Thought and World presents a theory of the content of such notions. The theory is largely deflationary in spirit, in the sense that it represents a broad range of semantic notions - including the concept of truth - as being entirely free from substantive metaphysical and empirical presuppositions. At the same time, however, it takes seriously and seeks to explain the intuition that there is a metaphysically or empirically 'deep' relation (a relation of mirroring or semantic correspondence) linking thoughts to reality. Thus, the theory represents a kind of compromise between deflationism and versions of the correspondence theory of truth. This book will appeal to students and professionals interested in the philosophy of logic and language.
TL;DR: Sellars is well known for his critique of the "myth of the given" in his "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" as discussed by the authors, but this critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of presentation or givenness of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition.
Abstract: Sellars is well known for his critique of the “myth of the given” in his “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the “myth”. Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of “presentation” or “givenness” of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars’ arguments, particularly those directed at the Theory of Appearing, results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. Moreover, though Sellars is clearly opposed to the view that perceptual experience cannot provide justification for beliefs about perceived objects, I argue that Sellars has failed to shake the intuitive plausibility of that view.
TL;DR: The authors argue that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation, and that if we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth, which is the kind of truth-as-correspondence realists prefer.
Abstract: An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true, and explain the notion of ontology significance and its application to persons.
Abstract: Chisholm held that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View affords a non-Chisholmian way m defend the thesis that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View shows how persons are constituted by-but not identical to-human animals. On the Constitution View, being a person determines a person's persistence conditions. On the Animalist View, being an animal determines a person's persistence conditions.
Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On Animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors defend the following two claims: reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self-deception; and the process involves a certain characteristic error of selfknowledge.
Abstract: In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self-deception; and (2), the process of self-deception involves a certain characteristic error of self-knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2). I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self-deception between those we might term “traditionalists,” and those we might term “deflationists.”
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TL;DR: In this article, a plan-laden notion of what is the "thing to do" is used to describe a moral realist's view of what constitutes being the "right" or "bad" in a moral dilemma.
Abstract: Goodness, rational permissibility, and the like might be gruesome properties. That is to say, they might not well suit causal-explanatory purposes. Or at least, these properties are gruesome for all their normative concepts tell us by themselves. Perhaps hedonists are right and such properties are anything but gruesome, but perhaps instead, the most gruesome-minded ethical pluralists are right-normative concepts by themselves don’t settle the issue. At the end of his marvelous commentary, John Hawthorne depicts the morass of dank possibilities that a “moral realist” must enter when he tries explaining how normative words and thoughts could lock on to some particular causally gruesome property that constitutes being good. Right, I say, and expressivists can direct us around the morass. Then he asks why I avoid the questions that lead moral realists into this morass. But I don’t avoid them; I offer an answer. How do plan-laden terms and concepts pick out properties?l Not all by themselves, in a way that a theory of interpretation can explain on its own. Interpretation might identify a term as plan-laden, as meaning, say, “is the thing to do” in the special sense I stipulated for that phrase. Trivially, if that’s what the term means, then it picks out whatever property constitutes being the thing to do-but what property is that? What property it is, I say, is a question of what to do. It’s a question of what to do in general, of how to live. Come to a full plan for life, and you will have come to a view on what property constitutes being the thing to do. Will you have the answer right? Again, that’s not settled just by interpreting your words and concepts; that again is a question of how to live. It can be answered only in plan-laden terms. Does a term that means “thing to do” pick out the property of holding out maximal prospects for pleasure, as a normative hedonist would claim? That’s a question of whether to go for pleasure and pleasure alone. That is the account I offer. By stipulation, it applies to “plan-laden” terms like “thing to do”-if my stipulations are coherent. Does it apply as well to normative terms like ‘ought’ and ‘good’ in our actual language? I respond in
TL;DR: In this paper, Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that most testimony is true, hence most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge, and argues that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly rocognized.
Abstract: Testimony consists in imparting information without supplying evidence or argument to back one's claims. To what extent does testimony convey epistemic warrant? C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice's maxims to undermine Coady's argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly rocognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect the scope and strength of our claims, and the level of warrant required for their responsible assertion. The maxims explain why different levels of warrant are transferred in different contexts.
TL;DR: This paper argues that the margin for error principles offered by Timothy Williamson fail to provide a good argument for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable.
Abstract: Timothy Williamson's potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation (on the meaning of ‘knowable’) seems to underlie his justification for both kinds of principles. Besides, the margin for error principles of the first kind can be used in the derivation of unacceptable consequences, while the margin for error principles of the second kind can be shown to be compatible with the falsity of epistemicism, under a number of assumptions acceptable to the epistemicist.
TL;DR: The authors argued that the generality problem is illusory and pointed out that the gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the "generality problem" is not a real problem, but an illusion.
Abstract: Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the “generality problem” is illusory.
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that if B(n) is transparent, then not all of the following of Timothy Williamson's margin for error principles can be true: B(O) stands for the claim that any man with n hairs is bald.
Abstract: 1. Transparent Propositions and Margin for Error Semantics Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator 'it is known that'. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. We know that any man with zero hairs is bald. And it also does not seem completely implausible that we know that we know it, and that we know that we know that we know it, and so on. Mario G6mez-Torrente (1997, p. 244) observes that if B(O) is transparent (where in general, B(n) stands for the claim that any man with n hairs is bald), then not all of the following of Timothy Williamson's margin for error principles can be true.
TL;DR: In Finite and Infinite Goods as discussed by the authors, Adams brings back a strongly Platonistic form of the metaphysics of value, and the primacy of the good; the idea that the excellent is more central than the desirable, the derivative status of well-being, the transcendence of good, the importance of such non-moral goods as beauty, the particularity of persons and their ways of imitating God.
Abstract: In Finite and Infinite Goods, Robert Adams brings back a strongly Platonistic form of the metaphysics of value. I applaud most of the theory's main features: the primacy of the good; the idea that the excellent is more central than the desirable, the derivative status of well-being, the transcendence of the good, the idea that excellence is resemblance to God, the importance of such non-moral goods as beauty, the particularity of persons and their ways of imitating God, and the use of direct reference theory in understanding how "good" functions semantically. All of these features I wholeheartedly endorse and use in different ways in my own theory. Throughout his book Adams is generous to competing points of view, and his thoroughness and attention to detail make his presentation persuasive without the defensive quality of so much philosophical polemic. With this book, Christian neoplatonism has emerged in a sophisticated contemporary form. As is customary in commentaries, I will focus attention on a couple of aspects of Adams's theory that I find problematic. One is the account of obligation; the other is the account of the evaluation of motives.
TL;DR: The relation between persons and their bodies is pervasive in the natural world as discussed by the authors and is not peculiar to persons and bodies, and the relation of constitution is not unique to persons or their bodies.
Abstract: Persons and Bodies develops and defends an account of persons and of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Human persons are constituted by bodies, without being identical to the bodies that constitute them—just as, I argue, statues are constituted by pieces of bronze, say, without being identical to the pieces of bronze that constitute them. The relation of constitution, therefore, is not peculiar to persons and their bodies, but is pervasive in the natural world.
TL;DR: Motivational internalism about moral judgements is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgement is necessarily connected to motivation motivation However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires.
Abstract: Motivational internalism about moral judgements is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgement is necessarily connected to motivation motivation However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right This has long been urged by David Brink Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a desire to act I will argue that more complex versions run into problems with self-effacing values of the sort Parfit highlights in another context Such values can only be attained indirectly After proposing a general account of motivation suited to the internalist thesis, I argue that Anti-Humeanism is better suited to accommodating the internalist insight
TL;DR: On Clear and Confused Ideas (2000) as mentioned in this paper is a carefully thought-out presentation of a radically externalist theory of concepts, which has the rare merit of combining rigorous philosophical analysis with refreshingly original ideas.
Abstract: Ruth Millikan's On Clear and Confused Ideas (2000) is a carefully thoughtout presentation of a radically externalist theory of concepts. The book has the rare merit of combining rigorous philosophical analysis with refreshingly original ideas. Sympathisers will enjoy getting to grips with a detailed and comprehensive version of externalism; opponents will benefit from an exacting foil against which to test their views. Those who know Millikan only for her teleosemantics will find the themes in this book new. And those who think of Millikan as primarily concerned with empirical questions of biology and psychology may be surprised by her range of influences. The book features figures like Wilfred Sellars, P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans as prominently as any more recent naturalist thinkers.
TL;DR: McDowell, Rorty, and Brandom as mentioned in this paper argue that the Myth of the Given is nothing more than a myth, and they do not succeed in proving it.
Abstract: John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.