By tipping the scale in favor of plaintiffs in private enforcement actions, Article 9 amounts to a sort of procedural A¢â‚¬A“affirmative actionA¢â‚¬Â statute: as such, it is at odds with due process. Stefano Grassani (Pavia e Ansaldo)

One of the main objectives of the so-called Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) was to make antitrust enforcement more effective. Although in most EU countries private antitrust enforcement has been possible subject to general rules of civil law; the number of private antitrust litigations has remained relatively low. It is presumed that the complementary roles of public and private enforcement, as well as the synergy between them, will take effect if formal decisions taken during public enforcement will have binding effect with regard to follow-on private litigations. According to the Damages Directive, final national decisions on competition infringements shall have binding effect in follow-on litigations. What is to be understood under ‘binding effect’, and the potential effects thereof, has been subject to a lively debate among academics and practitioners. It has been questioned if decisions of an executive body can bind the judiciary, and if so, to what extent. What is the evidentiary value of a formal decision of a NCA regarding national courts, but also on the court of another Member State. The article deals with the main issues and arguments presented in the general debate on the binding effect of national competition law decisions, and provides a closer look on this topic with regard to specific CEE countries.

/pdf/effect-of-national-decisions-on-actions-for-competition-4vwoijtbke.pdf

The Binding Nature of NCA Decisions in Antitrust Follow-on Litigation: Is EU Antitrust Calling For Affirmative Action?

Citations

Effect of National Decisions on Actions for Competition Damages in the CEE Countries

References

Effect of National Decisions on Actions for Competition Damages in the CEE Countries

Related Papers (5)

The Provimi Decision of the High Court: Beginnings of Private Antitrust Litigation in Europe

Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement

Restoring the Legitimacy of Private Antitrust Enforcement

The "new antitrust" as seen by a plaintiff's lawyer

Introduction: Benefits of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background