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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population.

Mayuko Nakamaru, +2 more
- 07 Jan 1997 - 
- Vol. 184, Iss: 1, pp 65-81
TLDR
The spatial structure modifies the condition for the development of cooperation in two different ways: it facilitates the evolution of cooperation due to spontaneously formed positive correlation between neighbors, but it also inhibits cooperation because of the advantage of being spiteful by killing neighbors and then replacing them.
About: 
This article is published in Journal of Theoretical Biology.The article was published on 1997-01-07 and is currently open access. It has received 326 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Population.

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Evolutionary games on graphs

György Szabó, +1 more
- 01 Jul 2007 - 
TL;DR: The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.
Journal ArticleDOI

A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks

Hisashi Ohtsuki, +3 more
- 25 May 2006 - 
TL;DR: A surprisingly simple rule is described that is a good approximation for all graphs that are analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k.
Journal ArticleDOI

Coevolutionary games--a mini review.

Matjaz Perc, +1 more
- 01 Feb 2010 - 
TL;DR: A review of recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject can be found in this article.
Journal ArticleDOI

Evolutionary dynamics on graphs

Erez Lieberman Aiden, +4 more
- 20 Jan 2005 - 
TL;DR: This work determines the fixation probability of mutants, and characterize those graphs for which fixation behaviour is identical to that of a homogeneous population, and shows that the outcome of evolutionary games can depend entirely on the structure of the underlying graph.
Journal ArticleDOI

The evolution of cooperation and altruism – a general framework and a classification of models

Laurent Lehmann, +2 more
- 01 Sep 2006 - 
TL;DR: A synthetic conceptual framework is developed that delineates the conditions necessary for the evolution of altruism and cooperation and classifies them into four general categories.
Frequently Asked Questions (5)
Q1. What are the contributions in "The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population" ?

The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals is studied in a lattice-structured habitat, where individuals interact locally only with their neighbors. 

A key to the success of a person in human societies is the ability to make trustful cooperative relationships with many other people. 

It is quite plausible that pair approximation fails if the whole system is segregated into large subareas in which the relative density of TFT and AD greatly differ and long range spatial correlation of states is large. 

Bistability was observed for the case of w=0.6—TFT is fixed in all 50 runs if the initial rT is 0.7 and 0.9, but AD is fixed if the initial rT is 0.5 or smaller. 

If the invasion of a single mutant is not a unique event but occurs recurrently, then a small but positive probability of establishment is sufficient for the ultimate success of invasion.