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Why Power Indices and Coalition Formation
Manfred J. Holler,Guillermo Owen +1 more
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In this article, the main arguments that motivate the growing interest in power indices and the theory of coalition formation are discussed, and the main reasons are those of substantial growth in the application of power indices to political institutions, especially the European Union, intensive discussion of the monotonicity properties of various indices, and a probabilistic interpretation of power, coalition formation, and power measures.Abstract:
This introductory note discusses the main arguments that motivate the growing interest in power indices and the theory of coalition formation that also determine the selection of contributions to this volume. The main arguments are those of substantial growth in the application of power indices to political institutions, especially the European Union, the intensive discussion of the monotonicity properties of various indices, and the probabilistic interpretation of power, coalition formation, and power measures.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
Dan S. Felsenthal,Moshé Machover +1 more
TL;DR: It is concluded that the first of these decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU is an improvement on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.
Posted Content
The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision
TL;DR: Making symmetric preference assumptions for members of CM and EP, CM is on an average much more conservative because of its internal qualified majority rule, which makes CM by an order of magnitude more influential than EP, in contrast to a seeming formal parity between the two ‘co-legislators’.
Journal ArticleDOI
Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
TL;DR: This account of the history of voting-power measurement shows how the concept was re-invented several times and how the circumstances in which it was reinvented led to conceptual confusion as to the true meaning of what is being measured.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
TL;DR: The Shapley-Shubik power index notion is introduced when passing from ordinary simple games or ternary voting games with abstention to this wider class of voting systems and the pivotal role of players is analysed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Institutionalist research on the European Union: a critical review
TL;DR: The recent wealth of institutionalist rational choice literature on the EU has been examined in this paper. But it is difficult to see which new assumptions are of most import, as it is sometimes hard to see the new assumptions that make empirical comparison with earlier models problematic.
References
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Book
An Economic Theory of Democracy
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Book ChapterDOI
A Value for n-person Games
TL;DR: In this paper, an examination of elementary properties of a value for the essential case is presented, which is deduced from a set of three axioms, having simple intuitive interpretations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Contributions to the Theory of Games.
TL;DR: The description for this book, Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV, will be forthcoming.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
Lloyd S. Shapley,Martin Shubik +1 more
TL;DR: The method of measuring power, based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, is presented here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and is intended as a first step in the attack on these problems.
Book
Contributions to the theory of games
TL;DR: Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40) Volume IV, the authors is a collection of contributions to the theory of games, with a focus on games and games.