Showing papers on "Commission published in 1981"

Surviving the New International Economic Disorder@@@North-South: A Programme for Survival. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues.

Abstract: Library has French version: Nord Sud : un programme de survie; rapport de la Commission independante sur les problemes de developpement international

The Right to Development

Abstract: On 17 May 1980 Mr. J. de Koning, the Minister for Development Co-operation, addressed a public meeting of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues in The Hague. The Brandt Commission, as it is otherwise known, had recently published a report which made various proposals for structural reforms in the economic relations between the developed countries and the Third World — also with the aim of breaking the almost hopeless deadlock the North-South dialogue had reached.

The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners

Abstract: ECONOMISTS increasingly have come to view the regulatory process as a device for transferring wealth among factions in society according to their political clout, but so far it is unclear whether the process has been dominated by the interests of regulated producers, consumers, or some combination of the two.' Relatively little attention has been given in this literature to the rewards that regulators themselves may obtain from the process. One obvious possibility would be for ex-officials to take jobs with firms that were formerly under their jurisdiction. This incentive would be especially strong for regulatory commissioners. Commissioners receive direct salaries that are not large, serve terms of office that are fixed by statute, and face uncertain prospects of reappointment-all of which lead them to take a shorter run view of their situation compared to that of their bureaucratic counterparts in civil service.2 A commission might be viewed as "captured" by regulated firms or related organizations if a large proportion of its membership either has experienced precommission employment or has accepted postcommission employment with such groups. The purpose of this paper is to discover how common this behavior has been.

An Investigation of the Equal Commission Rate Policy for a Multi-Product Salesforce

Abstract: For a multi-product sales force, the policy of paying commissions as an equal percentage of realized gross margins is shown to be in general, nonoptimal from the firm's profit maximization point of view. For a homogeneous salesforce, the nonoptimality results from the fact that earlier research while taking into account the effect of commission rates on a salesperson's allocations of total time to the multiple products, has not incorporated the effect of commission rates on salesperson's total selling time resulting from his/her trading off income vs. total time to maximize utility. The equal commission rate policy is, however, optimal for the cases of i salesperson with a fixed total selling time and a minimum income requirement and ii "fair-income" salesperson whose total selling time is merely a function of income and not based on rate of change of income as in the utility maximization case. If the salesforce is heterogeneous e.g., different salespersons have differing sales responses to selling time this makes the equal commission rate policy to be, in general, nonoptimal even for the restrictive cases i and ii. It is suggested that the commission rates be set higher for products with greater elasticities relating quantities sold to selling times. The common practice of paying commissions as a percentage of total dollar sales rather than gross margins is shown to be optimal under certain assumptions.

The SEC and the Public Interest

Abstract: "Throughout most of its 44-year history, the Securities and Exchange Commission enjoyed a reputation as one of the government's most effective and admired agencies; widely regarded by the public as dynamic, vigilant, productive, and unbeholden to either politicians or the securities industry," according to an article in "Business Week." "Today, however, a lot fewer people view the agency that way, and increasingly it is under attack for moving farther and farther away from its traditional watchdog role and becoming, instead, an activist in forcing change--not only in the securities industry but in the corporate boardrooms as well."However, the role of the SEC in the changes that are occurring in the securities industry is viewed very differently by the authors of this significant study. The authors conclude that the role of the SEC is best viewed as that of a broker balancing out the strongly competing groups in the securities industry.The book addresses the premises on which the SEC was founded to determine the extent to which they still apply in today's trading and disclosure environment. Following their review of the historical development of the SEC and an examination of some recent and pending issues facing the commission, the authors consider three particular areas in depth: the deregulation of fixed commission rates, the development of a national market system, and the corporate disclosure system. All three are fundamental to the basic mandate of the commission but nevertheless illustrate the growing power and activity of the agency in areas that previously had been left entirely to the private sector for innovative development.Looking ahead, the book identifies some of the specific issues arising from these three areas of concern that the SEC is expected to face in coming years. As its authors state, "We have made a strong case in this book that the SEC administers should be judged in terms of their costs and benefits and that many of the SEC's regulations are antiquated in today's trading environment."

Federal Trade Commission Act

Abstract: The original Federal Trade Commission Act stated “That unfair methods of competition are hereby declared unlawful.” The current law, in 15 U.S.C. 45, broadened the statement to “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” The Federal Trade Commission was established with the power and a directive to prevent such unfair and deceptive acts or practices.

Advertising and Tobacco

Abstract: Statement Prepared for the Toronto Transit Commission It is not easy for me, a citizen of the United States, to make representations to a transit authority in another country, especially when my representations encourage a decision that would appear not to be in the authority's best financial interest. It is my understanding that the Toronto Board of Health has recommended that the Toronto Transit Commission refuse to accept future tobacco advertising. Both bodies are to be commended: your local health board for taking this preventive medical initiative and your commission for agreeing to review the matter. It is also my understanding that your local municipal councils, board of education, parent-teacher organizations, and various health and consumer groups all have supported the health board's recommendation. With a coalition like this, it is possible to make a desired health decision with widespread community backing. I cannot overstate the value of a positive

The Interaction between Research and Public Policy: The Case of Unemployment Insurance

Abstract: This essay examines the role of economic research in affecting the recommendations of the National Commission of Unemployment Compensation, and the likely impacts of that Commission and economists' research findings on policy. Using a questionnaire addressed to Commission members, I find that most became quite aware of the results of research on the labor- market effects of unemployment insurance, with the degree of recognition proportional to the strength of the consensus among economists on a particular result; that the members had little awareness of the identity of particular economists who had done the research; and that, though the members claimed their recommendations were influenced importantly by research, that influence is difficult to detect in the Commission's Report. Because that Report goes against the tenor of current labor- market policy, its short-run impact will likely be small; and, because the focus of interest in policy will change over time, its long-term influence may not be great. Economic research, though, is shown to have had an immediate impact in three specific cases; and its long-run effect, by conditioning the policy discussion, has been and will likely be substantial.

The Existence of Monopoly Profits in the Motor Carrier Industry

Abstract: THE effect of the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) regulation of the motor carrier industry on the allocation of resources within the transportation sector has been the subject of heated public debate since the advent of such regulation in 1935. Opponents of ICC regulation have charged that it has restricted entry into the motor carrier industry, allowed regulated truckers to earn excessive profits, redistributed income from consumers to producers, and misallocated traffic among the various transportation modes.1 One published estimate suggests the costs of ICC motor carrier regulation could total $2.5-$3.3 billion per year.2 Trucking industry spokesman disagree. In The Case for Economic Regulation of the Motor Carrier Industry, recently submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the American Trucking Association argues that continuing present regulation is important to the public welfare. They believe entry controls, rate regulation, and collective rate-making rights are all necessary to "prevent destructive competition and assure continuity of service." They believe that controls on entry "promote sound competition and avoid destructive competition" and maintain a "financially viable industry," that authority

EEC antitrust procedure

Abstract: This third edition takes full account of all cases, decisions and administrative practices up to the beginning of 1994. It provides a detailed, authoritative and practical guide to the procedures of the EC Commission and the European Court of Justice in antitrust cases. Each stage in the procedure is described thoroughly and the author provides practical advice on making notifications to the Commission and on making defending complaints. There is also a detailed examination of the Commission's power to impose fines and guidance on controversial matters such as legal professional privilege and extraterritorial jurisdiction. This edition also takes account of the EEA Agreement.

The 'Razor Gang' Decisions, the Guidelines to the Commissions, and Commonwealth Education Policy.

Abstract: Introduction In recent months the Commonwealth Government has announced two sets of important and farreaching decisions with regard to its future policies on education. These decisions include sudden, fundamental and, in some cases, quite unexpected changes in direction. They also appear to signal possible shifts in future Commonwealth-State roles and relations on education. First, on 30 April 1981 the Prime Minister announced to the Federal Parliament his Government's decisions with regard to the Review of Commonwealth Functions. This Review was carried out immediately after the 1980 general elections by a committee of senior Ministers -the so called 'Razor Gang' -chaired by the MinisterofCommerce and Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Uberal Party, Sir Phillip Lynch. The Government's decisions on the Review affect a wide range of government policy areas (in fact, all portfolios) including education. Second, on 4 June 1981 the Minister for Education made a detailed statement to the Parliament on Commonwealth education policy and announced the Government's decisions on financial guidelines to the Tertiary Education Commission and the Schools Commission for the calendar year 1982 and for the triennium 1982-84.

Statewide Remedies for Public Underrepresentation in Regulatory Proceedings

Abstract: With some recent exceptions, regulatory agencies have tended to adopt policies favorable to regulated industries and unfavorable to underrepresented interests.' These underrepresented interests are often characterized as "consumer" interests, but this is an oversimplification. In truth, some consumers are well-represented in regulatory proceedings. Large business consumers, for instance, are wellrepresented before the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and state public utility commissions. The problem, then, is not that consumers as a whole are poorly represented but that certain groups are poorly represented. Among these underrepresented groups are residential consumers and the poor. By law, regulatory officials are required to represent the entire public, including consumers, the poor, and other interests. Yet, regulators depend on outside intervenors for information that substantiates alternative points of view. If the only information regulators receive is furnished by regulated industries, regulatory decisions are likely to reflect the regulated industries' values. As Cramton has noted, "Our regulators and government servants are generally persons of ability who are trying to do the best job they can under difficult circumstances. But their perspectives are limited by the information that is available."' Thus, regulators cannot be expected to make sound decisions without input from the full range of interests affected by their decisions-a principle increasingly accepted by the courts.3 There are two principal external remedies to the problem of underrepresented interests in regulatory agency proceedings. The first remedy involves direct participation in agency proceedings by citizens' groups or individual citizens. This approach emphasizes the need for citizens to speak for themselves rather than through intermediaries. The second remedy involves representation of underrepresented interests by proxies-government officials outside the agency who are paid to represent underrepresented interests, such as consumer interests. This approach empha-

Martin Navarro: Treasurer, Contador, Intendant, 1766-1788: Politics and Trade in Spanish Louisiana. (Volumes I and II).

Abstract: .............................................. x An Introduction....................................... 1 Chapter One: Early Life in Galicia .................. 7 Chapter Two: The Revolt of 1768: Its Causes and Its Aftermath......................... 21 Chapter Three: Navarro as Treasurer, 177C-1774 .......... 62 Chapter Four: Navarro as Contador. 1774-1779 118 Chapter Five: Supplying the War Effort, 1779-1781. . . . 180 Chapter Six: Navarro as Intendant: Administration and Fiscal Problems, 1780-1788 ............ 243

Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use

Abstract: It is important to put Dr. Reidenberg’s report and comments about the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use into historical perspective for, as was emphasized, the Commission’s existence may have been analgous to an enzyme which catalyzes a number of existing efforts that were already going in the desired direction. As shown in Figure 1, the Joint Commission’s existence has occurred relatively recently, since for several years there had been a number of efforts directed toward collecting the type of information which the Joint Commission felt should be collected and used. It is important to note from this figure that a number of efforts were going on prior and in parallel to the Joint Commission’s efforts, most prominently involving FDA’s and the Department of Commerce’s Experimental Technology Incentives Program (ETIP) interagency agreement to study post-marketing surveillance. The Joint Commission joined in this interagency effort to support the contract; and three publications (Tasks A, B, and have resulted and have provided an overview 191 of existing post-marketing activities. The third publication, Task C, presents one type of plan for a system for post-marketing surveillance. It is important to note that Tasks A and B were incorporated into both the summary and appendices of the Joint Commission report, but, in fact, represent a mutual effort coordinated by the FDA, the Joint Commission, and the Department of Commerce’s ETIP group.

Proposed standards for professional health sciences library services in hospitals of New York State.

Abstract: Hospital libraries are considered to be the basic unit of the medical information system. A major statewide effort was begun in 1978 to introduce and support legislation in the New York State Legislature which would encourage hospitals to establish and maintain libraries that meet minimum services standards. Included in this legislation is the concept that the Commissioner of Education in consultation with the Commissioner of Health shall have the power to establish standards for hospital libraries. The Ad Hoc Committee for the Promotion of Hospital Library Services, Western New York Library Resources Council, proposes The Standards for Professional Health Sciences Library Services in Hospitals of New York State to clarify and to strengthen existing hospital library standards. These standards differ specifically from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals standards in that they place equal and specific emphasis on eleven points: administration, qualifications of library staff, continuing education of library staff, requirement for a library advisory committee, required library services, required library resources, library space requirements, library budget, library network and consortium membership, documentation of library policy, and continued evaluation of the needs of the hospital for library service. Detailed interpretations are provided. An appendix describes the qualifications of a hospital library consultant.