Showing papers on "Constitution published in 1999"

Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts

Abstract: This text challenges hallowed American traditions of juidicial review and judicial supremacy, which allow U.S. judges to invalidate "unconstitutional" governmental actions. By examining a wide range of situations involving constitutional rights, the author urges the reader to to take responsibility for protecting their liberty. The book puts forward the idea of the creation of a constitutional law in which judicial declarations deserve no special consideration, citing the McCarthy incident in the 1950s as a prime example of how the judicial branch failed to enforce the will of the people.

The Constitution of Europe: "Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?" and Other Essays on European Integration

Abstract: Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Part I. 'We Will Do ...': 1. Introduction: 'We will do, and hearken' 2. The transformation of Europe 3. Fundamental rights and fundamental boundaries: on the conflict of standards and values in the protection of human rights in the European legal space 4. The external legal relations of non-unitary actors: mixity and the federal principle 5. The least-dangerous branch: a retrospective and prospective of the European Court of Justice in the arena of political integration Part II. 'We Will Hearken ...': 6. Introduction: the reformation of European constitutionalism 7. Fin-de-siecle Europe: do the new clothes have an emperor? 8. European democracy and its critics: policy and system 9. The autonomy of the Community legal order: through the looking glass 10. To be a European citizen: Eros and civilisation Index.

Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State

Abstract: Foreword Chapter 1. Constituent Power: The Concept of a CrisisOn the Juridical Concept of Constituent Power Absolute Procedure, Constitution, Revolution From Structure to the SubjectChapter 2. Virtue and Fortune: The Machiavellian Paradigm The Logic of Time and the Prince's Indecision Democracy as Absolute Government and the Reform of the Renaissance Critical Ontology of the Constituent PrincipleChapter 3. The Atlantic Model and the Theory of CounterpowerMutatio and Anakyclosis Harrington: Constituent Power as Counterpower The Constituent Motor and the Constitutionalist ObstacleChapter 4. Political Emancipation in the American ConstitutionConstituent Power and the "Frontier" of Freedom Homo Politicus and the Republican Machine Crisis of the Event and Inversion of the TendencyChapter 5. The Revolution and the Constitution of LaborRousseau's Enigma and the Time of the Sansculottes The Constitution of Labor To Terminate the RevolutionChapter 6. Communist Desire and the Dialectic RestoredConstituent Power in Revolutionary Materialism Lenin and the Soviets: The Institutional Compromise Socialism and EnterpriseChapter 7. The Constitution of Strength"Multitudo et Potentia": The Problem Constitutive Disutopia Beyond ModernityNotes Index

The presidential power of unilateral action

Abstract: In this article we highlight a formal basis for presidential power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, but has become so pivotal to presidential leadership and so central to an understanding of presidential power that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president’s formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. Our central purpose is to set out a theory of this aspect of presidential power. We argue that the president’s powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own powers—and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. We are currently in the midst of a research project to collect comprehensive data for testing this theory—data on what presidents have done, as well as on how Congress and the courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history of unilateral action, with special attention to the themes of our theoretical argument. We also make use of some early data to emerge from our project. For now it appears that the theory is well supported by the available evidence. This is a work in progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitive conclusions can be justified. A few observations about politics are so widely accepted that virtually all political scientists have committed them to memory. One of these is Richard Neustadt’s (1960) famous dictum, “Presidential power is the power to persuade,” which expresses, in shorthand form, his view that the powers of the modern American presidency are rooted in the personal qualities of the individual occupying the office—in his skills, his temperament, and his experience. This notion of the personal presidency dominated the field for decades, but its influence is on the decline. The main reason is that it seems increasingly out of sync with the facts. The personal presidency became a popular theoretical notion just as the American presidency was experiencing tremendous growth c

Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth

Abstract: 1. The Legal Framework: Institutional Normative Order 2. The State and the Law 3. The Interest of the State and the Rule of Law 4. The United Kingdom: What State? What Constitution? 5. The Benthamite Constitution: Decline and Fall? 6. A Very British Revolution? 7. Juridical Pluralism and the Risk of Constitutional Conflict 8. On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty 9. Democracy and Subsidiarity in the European Environment 10. Some Questions of Freedom 11. A Kind of Nationality 12. New Unions for Old

The Constitution of the Roman Republic

Abstract: There is no other published book in English studying the constitution of the Roman Republic as a whole. Yet the Greek historian Polybius believed that the constitution was a fundamental cause of the exponential growth of Rome's empire. He regarded the Republic as unusual in two respects: first, because it functioned so well despite being a mix of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy; secondly, because the constitution was the product of natural evolution rather than the ideals of a lawgiver. Even if historians now seek more widely for the causes of Rome's rise to power, the importance and influence of her political institutions remains. The reasons for Rome's power are both complex, on account of the mix of elements, and flexible, inasmuch as they were not founded on written statutes but on unwritten traditions reinterpreted by successive generations. Knowledge of Rome's political institutions is essential both for ancient historians and for those who study the contribution of Rome to the republican tradition of political thought from the Middle Ages to the revolutions inspired by the Enlightenment.

Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics

Abstract: Contents Preface Acknowledgments 1 Assimilating Human Rights in the Middle East Background: Legal Hybridity in the Middle East Misperceptions About Applying International Human Rights Law as Serving Imperialism Cultural Relativism Muslims Challenge Cultural Relativism Actual Human Rights Concerns in the Middle East The Emergence of International Human Rights Law Muslims' Responses to and Involvement in the UN Human Rights System Summary 2 Human Rights in International and Middle Eastern Systems: Sources and Contexts International Human Rights: Background Islamic Human Rights: Sources The Impact of Islamization on Constitutions and Justice The Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan and Its Aftermath Saudi Arabia Confronts Pressures for Reforms and Liberalization Summary 3 Islamic Tradition and Muslim Reactions to Human Rights The Premodern Islamic Heritage Muslim Reactions to Western Constitutionalism The Persistence of Traditional Priorities and Values Consequences of Insecure Philosophical Foundations Islamic Human Rights and Cultural Nationalism Ambivalent Attitudes on Human Rights Summary 4 Islamic Restrictions on Human Rights Permissible Qualifications of Rights in International Law Islamic Formulas Limiting Rights Restrictions in the Iranian Constitution Restrictions in the UIDHR Restrictions in Other Islamic Human Rights Schemes Islam and Human Rights in the New Constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq Summary 5 Discrimination Against Women and Non-Muslims Equality in the Islamic Legal Tradition Equality in Islamic Human Rights Schemes Equal Protection in US and International Law Equal Protection in Islamic Human Rights Schemes Equality in the New Afghan and Iraqi Constitutions Summary 6 Restrictions on the Rights of Women Background Islamic Law and Women's Rights Muslim Countries' Reactions to the Women's Convention Tabandeh's Ideas Mawdudi's Ideas The UIDHR Islamization in Iran and the Iranian Constitution The al-Azhar Draft Constitution The Cairo Declaration and the Saudi Basic Law Women's Rights in Pakistan The New Afghan and Iraqi Constitutions The Influence of Sex Stereotyping Summary 7 Islamic Human Rights Schemes and Religious Minorities The Historical Background of Current Issues Facing Religious Minorities International Standards Prohibiting Religious Discrimination Shari'a Law and the Rights of Non-Muslims Tabandeh's Ideas The UIDHR The Iranian Constitution Mawdudi and Pakistan's Ahmadi Minority The Cairo Declaration, the Saudi Basic Law, and the al-Azhar Draft Constitution US Policies on Religious Minorities and Developments in Afghanistan and Iraq Summary 8 The Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Muslim States Resist Human Rights for Sexual Minorities Background Sexual Minorities in the Middle East Contested Islamic Authority Tensions with the West over the Treatment of Sexual Minorities Muslim States' Objections to New UN Initiatives Summary 9 Freedom of Religion in Islamic Human Rights Schemes Controversies Regarding the Shari'a Rule on Apostasy Muslim Countries Confront Freedom of Religion The Contemporary Significance of Apostasy Tabandeh's Ideas The UIDHR The al-Azhar Draft Constitution The Iranian Constitution Sudan Under Islamization Mawdudi and Pakistani Law Affecting Religious Freedom The Cairo Declaration and the Saudi Basic Law The Afghan and Iraqi Constitutions US Interventions in the Domain of Religious Freedom Expanding the Reach of Laws Criminalizing Insults to Islam: From the Rushdie Affair to the Danish Cartoons Controversy Summary 10 An Assessment of Islamic Human Rights Schemes Appendix A: Excerpts from the Iranian Constitution Appendix B: The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam Appendix C: 2009 Resolution on Combating Defamation of Religions Glossary Bibliography Notes Index

Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory

Abstract: In this article, the authors explore a basis for presidential power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point but that has become so pivotal to presidential leadership that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president's formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. The purpose of the article is to outline a theory of this aspect of presidential power. The authors argue that the president's powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. The authors also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own powers—and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them.

Do Constitutional Amendments Matter

Abstract: Article V of the Constitution specifies how the Constitution may be amended. Notwithstanding all the attention that constitutional amendments receive, however, our constitutional order would look little different if a formal amendment process did not exist. At least since the first few decades of the Republic, constitutional amendments have not been an important means by which the Constitution, in practice, has changed. Many changes have come about without amendments. In some instances, amendments were rejected, but the law changed in the way the failed amendment sought anyway. Several amendments, thought to be important, in fact had little effect until the society changed by other means. Other amendments did little more than ratify changes that had already come about in other ways. If this thesis is correct, it suggests that the text of the amended Constitution is much less important than is generally thought; that political activity, in general, should not be focused on proposed constitutional amendments; and that American constitutional law should be thought of as the result of a complex, evolutionary process, not of discrete, self-consciously political acts by a sovereign People.

Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?

Abstract: According to the conclusions of the Florence European Council of June 1996, the main objectives of the Intergovernmental Conference were to bring the Union closer to its citizens, to strengthen its capacities for external action and to make its institutions more efficient and democratic given the coming enlargement.1 Thus, comparing this with the scope of the revision clause in Article 48(2) (ex N(2)) TEU after Maastricht, the Conference had undertaken an ambitious venture. The polit ical environment, however, was not found favourable to such substantial aims. Due to the diverging interests of the negotiators, a large volume of complex and confusing provisions, protocols and declarations emerged. This left European integration without the coherence, transparency, effectiveness and democratic legitimacy needed to meet its objectives for the coming century.2 Although the result appears to be poor at first sight, Amsterdam was not a complete failure or "non-event".3 At least three achievements justify qual-

Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process

Abstract: The Lewinsky affair played out under ground rules shaped in the Watergate affair, an earlier episode involving misconduct by a President. A predicate of the impeachment of President Clinton was the President's involvement in a private civil lawsuit. A sitting President's exposure to compulsory judicial process has been accepted almost without demur among academic commentators since the 1974 case of United States v. Nixon. As for impeachment, the academic consensus is that the Constitution defines impeachable offenses as "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," the latter terms describing an imprecisely bounded category of serious offenses. This paper contends that both of these views are misconceived. The prevailing view of impeachment and presidential immunity slights both the terms of the Constitution and history. The scope of impeachment, based on a straightforward reading of the constitutional provisions concerning it, is demonstrably different from the academic consensus. The text of the Constitution and relevant history reveal that 1) impeachable offenses are not defined in the Constitution; 2) "high crimes and misdemeanors" are an historically well-defined category of offenses aimed specifically against the state, for which removal from office is mandatory upon conviction by the Senate; 3) Congress has the power to impeach and remove civil officers for a range of offenses other than high crimes and misdemeanors; and 4) the Senate can impose sanctions less severe than removal from office--censure, for example--on civil officers convicted of such other offenses. The textual and historical support for these propositions is powerful, if not overwhelming. When impeachment is correctly understood, the question of the President's immunity from judicial process takes on a different light. There is neither a constitutional basis nor a sound footing in policy for any official action against a sitting President other than impeachment.

Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today

Abstract: Preface Introduction 1. The Doctrine of Sovereignty The Classical Doctrine of Sovereignty The People as Sovereign Parliament as Sovereign Critics of Sovereignty 2. Athenian Democracy Constitutional Development The Athenian Political System The Theory of the Athenian Constitution The Doctrine of Mixed Government The Constitutional Totalitarianism of Sparta 3. The Roman Republic The Development of the Republic, and Its Fall The Political System of the Republic Theoretical Interpretation of the Republican System 4. Countervailance Theory in Medieval Law, Catholic Ecclesiology, and Huguenot Political Theory Canon Law and Roman Law Catholic Ecclesiology and the Conciliar Movement The Huguenot Political Theorists 5. The Republic of Venice Venice and Europe The Venetian System of Government Venetian Constitutionalism Church and State The Myth of Venice Venice, Mixed Government, and Jean Bodin 6. The Dutch Republic The Golden Age of the Dutch Republic The Political History of the Republic, 1566-1814 The Republican Political System Dutch Political Theory 7. The Development of Constitutional Government and Countervailance Theory in Seventeenth-Century England Religious Toleration and Civic Freedom The Roles of Parliament "Mixed Government" and the Countervailance Model The Early Stuart Era From the Civil War to the Revolution of 1688 The Provenance of English Countervailance Theory The Eighteenth Century, and Montesquieu 8. American Constitutionalism The Political Theory of the American Revolution The State Constitutions The National Constitution The Bill of Rights and the Judiciary A Note on Provenance 9. Modern Britain Archaic Remnants: The Monarchy and the House of Lords The House of Commons and the Cabinet The Bureaucracy The Judiciary Unofficial Political Institutions: Pressure Groups Epilogue References Index

What is Constitutional Theory

Abstract: Just what is constitutional theory? How can it be, as Professor Fallon rightly says, that constitutional theory is both descriptive and prescriptive, and is supposed to produce results that seem morally right but also some results that make the theory's proponents uncomfortable? In this Reply, Professor Strauss argues that a constitutional theory tries to draw upon bases of agreement that exist within a legal culture and to extend those agreed-upon principles to resolve more controversial issues In our culture, for example, there is widespread agreement both on abstract principles-such as the idea that the text of the Constitution is important but that precedent also matters in interpreting the Constitution-and on specific points of law, such as the legitimacy of the decision in Brown v Board of Education A constitutional theory tries to organize these and other points of agreement in a way that prescribes results in cases where there is no agreement So understood, a constitutional theory is comparable to an account of the rules of grammar for a language, or perhaps to a theory of scientific or mathematical truth

Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning

Abstract: This text argues that the Constitution has a dual nature. The first aspect, on which legal scholars have focused, is the degree to which the Constitution acts as a binding set of rules that can be neutrally interpreted and externally enforced by the courts against government actors. This is the process of constitutional interpretation. But according to Keith Whittington, the Constitution also permeates politics itself, to guide and constrain political actors in the very process of making public policy. In so doing, it is also dependent on political actors, both to formulate authoritative constitutional requirements and to enforce those fundamental settlements in the future. Whittington characterizes this process, by which constitutional meaning is shaped within politics at the same time that politics is shaped by the Constitution, as one of construction as opposed to interpretation. Whittington goes on to argue that ambiguities in the constitutional text and changes in the political situation push political actors to construct their own constitutional understanding. The construction of constitutional meaning is a necessary part of the political process and a regular part of American history, how a democracy lives with a written constitution. The Constitution both binds and empowers government officials.

Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640

Abstract: Acknowledgements Introduction Part One: Principles 1. The Divine Right of Kings 2. Government by Consent 3. The Ancient Constitution Part Two: Applications 4. Conflict and Compromise 5. The Liberty of the Subject 6. The Church Postscript Postscript to the Second Edition Suggestions for Further Reading Index

Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review

Abstract: Constitutional scholarship has deteriorated into a set of armed camps, with defenders of different theories of judicial review too often talking to their own supporters but not engaging their opponents. This book breaks free of the stalemate and reinvigorates the debate over how the judiciary should interpret the Constitution. Keith Whittington reconsiders the implications of the fundamental legal commitment to faithfully interpret our written Constitution. Making use of arguments drawn from American history, political philosophy, and literary theory, he examines what it means to interpret a written constitution and how the courts should go about that task. He concludes that when interpreting the Constitution, the judiciary should adhere to the discoverable intentions of the Founders. Other originalists have also asserted that their approach is required by the Constitution but have neither defended that claim nor effectively responded to critics of their assumptions or their method. This book sympathetically examines the most sophisticated critiques of originalism based on postmodern, hermeneutic, and literary theory, as well as the most common legal arguments against originalists. Whittington explores these criticisms, their potential threat to originalism, and how originalist theory might be reconstructed to address their concerns. In a non-dogmatic and readily understandable way, he explains how originalist methods can be reconciled with an appropriate understanding of legal interpretation and why originalism has much to teach all constitutional theorists. He also shows how originalism helps realize the democratic promise of the Constitution without relying on assumptions of judicial restraint. This book carefully examines both the possibilities and the limitations of constitutional interpretation and judicial review. It shows us not only what the judiciary ought to do, but what the limits of appropriate judicial review are and how judicial review fits into a larger system of constitutional government. With its detailed and wide-ranging explorations in history, philosophy, and law, this book is essential reading for anyone interested in how the Constitution ought to be interpreted and what it means to live under a constitutional government.

Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics Approach

Abstract: A new reserch programme emerges - constitutional economics two competing approaches to constitutional economics - a comparison of Buchanan and Hayek the possibility of positive constitutional economics positive constitutional economics - a survey breaking with the notion of social contract - constitutions as based on spontaneously arisen institutions bargaining for constitutional change - towards an economic theory of constitutional change implicit constitutional change - changing the meaning of the constitution without changing the text of the document constitutional competition - foreign factors causing constitional change? outlook - connecting positive constitutional economics with the theory of economic policy.

Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet's Constitution

Abstract: Formal institutions put in place upon the establishment of a new democracy can have profound effects on political bargaining. We demonstrate how the budgetary procedure bequeathed by the outgoing Chilean military regime affects policy choices available to elected officials. Chilean budget procedure should discourage deficits, allow for a reduction in the relative size of the defense budget, and facilitate cuts in executive proposals when the institutional interests of the legislature are at stake but not under conditions of coalitional conflict. We present a simple spatial model of bargaining over spending decisions between the executive and Congress that facilitates comparisons between the Chilean budget procedure and that of other presidential systems. The model suggests that, relative to other regimes, Chile's budget process should constrain spending and favor the president's preferences over the legislature's. Comparative fiscal data from twelve other presidential democracies and from the first eight Chilean budgets since the transition to democracy, as well as interviews with key legislators and executive officials, all support our hypotheses.

Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru

Abstract: As it has in the past, Peruvian politics defied regional trends in the 1990s. Whereas democracy either took hold (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay) or at least survived (Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua) throughout most of Latin America, it collapsed in Peru. That collapse took place on 5 April 1992, when President Alberto Fujimori, in a military-backed autogolpe (self-coup), closed the Congress, suspended the constitution, and purged the judiciary.1 After ruling by decree for seven months, the Fujimori government held elections for a constituent assembly in November 1992; in 1993, it secured the approval, via referendum, of a new constitution. Two years later, Fujimori, who had originally been elected president in 1990, was reelected by an over-whelming margin. These developments led many observers to place Peru back in the camp of democratic (or at least "delegative democratic") regimes.2 Such a characterization is misleading, however. Although the restoration of formal constitutional rule and elections represented an important step away from full-fledged authoritarianism, it was accompanied by a systematic assault on a range of democratic institutions that has left contemporary Peru with a regime that is best described as "semidemocratic."

Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia

Abstract: In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its long-awaited judgment on the status of Aboriginal title under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The decision was regarded as highly significant because it seemed to fundamentally alter the law of Aboriginal rights. This article suggests that while the case has somewhat positively changed the law to protect Aboriginal title, it has also simultaneously sustained a legal framework that undermines Aboriginal land rights. In particular, the decision's unreflective acceptance of Crown sovereignty places Aboriginal title in a subordinate position relative to other legal rights. This article examines how this result defeats the Court's own requirements for a just settlement with Aboriginal peoples. This review proceeds through exploring the Supreme Court's treatment of Aboriginal pleadings, evidence, content and proof of title, Aboriginal self-government, and the extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the Delgamuukw case. In investigating these issues, this article concludes by illustrating how a more rigorous application of the rule of law to the Crown in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples could generate greater equality and justice for Aboriginal peoples in their relations with the Canadian state.

Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process

Abstract: The Lewinsky affair played out under ground rules shaped in the Watergate affair, an earlier episode involving misconduct by a President. A predicate of the impeachment of President Clinton was the President's involvement in a private civil lawsuit. A sitting President's exposure to compulsory judicial process has been accepted almost without demur among academic commentators since the 1974 case of United States v. Nixon. As for impeachment, the academic consensus is that the Constitution defines impeachable offenses as "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," the latter terms describing an imprecisely bounded category of serious offenses. This paper contends that both of these views are misconceived. The prevailing view of impeachment and presidential immunity slights both the terms of the Constitution and history. The scope of impeachment, based on a straightforward reading of the constitutional provisions concerning it, is demonstrably different from the academic consensus. The text of the Constitution and relevant history reveal that 1) impeachable offenses are not defined in the Constitution; 2) "high crimes and misdemeanors" are an historically well-defined category of offenses aimed specifically against the state, for which removal from office is mandatory upon conviction by the Senate; 3) Congress has the power to impeach and remove civil officers for a range of offenses other than high crimes and misdemeanors; and 4) the Senate can impose sanctions less severe than removal from office--censure, for example--on civil officers convicted of such other offenses. The textual and historical support for these propositions is powerful, if not overwhelming. When impeachment is correctly understood, the question of the President's immunity from judicial process takes on a different light. There is neither a constitutional basis nor a sound footing in policy for any official action against a sitting President other than impeachment.

Law and politics: the Ministério Público and the defense of collective rights

Abstract: The article analyzes the recent process of institutional reconstruction of the Brazilian Ministerio Publico (MP). The first part deals with the main legal texts which, in the last two decades, have redefined the activities of the MP. Three main elements are considered: the regulation of disperse and collective rights, public civil action and the new legal and constitutional attributions of the MP. The author explains how the 1988 Constitution, in consolidating previous isolated norms, produced an institutional arrangement that has brought about an extensive judicialization of collective conflicts and a politicization of the judicial institutions, especially the MP. The second part, based on a survey, approaches the reconstruction of the institutional role of the MP, seen through the eyes of its own members. Of equal or even greater importance than the new institutional picture is the doctrinal and ideological renewal that has taken place among procuradores e promotoresin recent years. Observation of their discourse provides us with an understanding of the identity that this doctrinal and ideological renewal seeks to stamp on the institution. In its final part, the article points out the limits and contradictions in this process of institutional reconstruction.

Small Business as a Supplement in the People's Republic of China (PRC)

Abstract: During the past 20 years, several nations that formerly embraced communism, including those with centrally-planned economies, have totally rejected that ideology. They have allowed market forces to transform the economy and have allowed independent small business owners to become major economic players. In the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) developed policies of reform that opened it up to the world. Numerous new programs directed the people of China toward a prosperous entrepreneurial sector, especially in the townships and villages. These programs, however, did not abandon the socialist ideology inherent to the PRC, but sought to maintain it as the basis for its policies, with small business as a supplement to the socialist market economy. This article will consider the nature of the integration of socialism and small business in China. Recent History of Business in China On October 1, 1949, the Communist Party of China (CPC) declared the inauguration of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and all private enterprises were absorbed into the state sector of the economy. Small shops were converted into retail outlets for state-produced goods. At first the retailers were entitled to earn a profit, but it soon became obligatory to join a cooperative. No major changes in this policy occurred until 1978, when the nation adopted its third constitution, which led to the legalization of small business. The fourth constitution followed in 1982, placing China's modernization within the guidelines of socialism. The nation's fundamental laws specify four central principles: (1) adherence to the path of socialism; (2) adherence to the dictatorship; (3) adherence to the leadership of the Communist Party of China; and (4) adherence to Marxist-Leninism and to the ideology of Mao Zedong. One article of the constitution stipulates that the private economy in both urban and rural areas should supplement the socialist economy of public ownership. Another article allows the National People's Congress to amend the constitution, and in March 1993, such an amendment proclaimed that China will practice a "socialist market economy." Since this amendment, a siying quiyejia (private enterprise) is defined by the state as a firm owned by individuals and providing jobs for eight or more employees. Under this definition, over 200,000 owner-managers, partners, and shareholders are proprietors of 100,000 private enterprises in China, employing almost 2 million people. Enterprises employing fewer than eight employees are called geteihu, literally "one-man businesses." In rural areas, the xiangzhen qiye evolved, operated by members of an extended family. Chinese Culture and Small Business To understand the current Chinese attitude toward small business, it is important to understand some of the underlying cultural influences on it. One very important influence is Confucianism, the major religion in China. Although Confucianism does not encourage small business per se (Jones and Sakong 1980), it does value hard work, diligence, and frugality (Petersen 1971), qualities that Weber (1904-1905) linked to small business . Wu (1983) suggested that Chinese cultural values also include: (1) a high propensity to save and reinvest business earnings; (2) a universally strong desire to secure a better education for their children, who would then be expected to carry on the business and often do; and (3) a strong sense of loyalty and mutual obligation within the Chinese extended family. Shapero (1984) observed that overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia value small business more than do people from other cultural groups, and Dana (1986-1987) noted the success of Chinese small business owners in Singapore, Vietnam (Dana 1994), and Laos (Dana 1995). The Return of Small Business Without abandoning its ideology, the PRC initiated its program of reform in 1978, and in the following year the State Council of China officially endorsed the policy of encouraging small business owners as a supplement to the socialist economy. …

Tribes, treaties, and constitutional tribulations

Abstract: Introduction Chapter I. Europeans and the New World Chapter II. The Articles of Confederation Chapter III. The Constitution and American Indian Tribes The Federalist Papers Explicit Clauses Dealing with Indians Implicit Clauses Dealing with Indians Chapter IV. The Relationship of Indian Tribes to the Three Branches of the Federal Government Indians and the Executive Branch Indians and the Legislative Branch Indians and the Judicial Branch Chapter V. The Historical Development of Constitutional Clauses The Treaty-making Power The Power to Regulate Commerce The Property Clause Miscellaneous Constitutional Clauses Chapter VI. The Constitutional Amendments The Bill of Rights The First Amendment: The Establishment of Religion The First Amendment: The Free Exercise Clause The Lyng Decision The Smith Decision The First Amendment: Freedoms of Speech and Assembly The Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure The Fifth Amendment: Double Jeopardy The Fifth Amendment: Due Process The Fifth Amendment: Just Compensation The Sixth Amendment: Legal Counsel Chapter VII. The Later Constitutional Amendments The Thirteenth Amendment The Fourteenth Amendment: Citizenship and Due Process The Fifteenth Amendment The Sixteenth Amendment The Prohibition Amendments The Twenty-sixth Amendment Chapter VIII. The Status of Indian Tribes and the Constitution Notes References Index of Cases Ceneral Index

Constitutional Change in Colombia Policy Adjustment Through Institutional Reform

Abstract: By the late 1980s the Colombian constitution had come under severe pressure for reform as the population shifted markedly from a rural to an urban majority. The president had repeatedly tried to provide policy to court the median Colombian voter, who was urban. The congress was strongly tied to rural interests. Congress consistently thwarted presidential efforts at policy reform. Different presidents again and again proposed constitutional reform as a way of achieving eventual policy aims, only to have the proposed reforms soundly rejected in the legislature. The Colombian congress solely possessed the authority to make constitutional revisions. This article tells the story of how this institutional impasse was overcome. In the wake of severe social strife and conflict a national referendum on constitutional reform was passed by popular vote and upheld by judicial action. This article argues that such constitutional conflict might only be overcome through extraconstitutional—although still democratic—means.

Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State

Abstract: The Transition Period, 1991-1995 The EPRDF Comes to Power The Importance of Political Definitions Squelching the UDN - Previews of Coming Attractions 1992 Elections Early Signs of Autocracy in the TGE Human Rights Abuses by the TGE The Strategy of the EPRDF Drafting and Approving a New Constitution An Analysis of the Constitution of the FDRE Organizing Revolutionary Democracy The Kitab of the TGE - Final Reckoning The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995- Government of the FDRE Human Rights in the FDRE Freedom of Association in the FDRE The Mischief of Ethnic Factions in the FDRE The Economy of "Revolutionary Democracy" The Political Theory of the EPRDF Next Steps Towards Democracy Appendix.

The Constitution of the Roman Republic

Abstract: (1999). The Constitution of the Roman Republic. History: Reviews of New Books: Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 38-39.