Showing papers on "Counterintuitive published in 2015"

When Younger Learners Can Be Better (or at Least More Open-Minded) Than Older Ones

Abstract: We describe a surprising developmental pattern we found in studies involving three different kinds of problems and age ranges. Younger learners are better than older ones at learning unusual abstract causal principles from evidence. We explore two factors that might contribute to this counterintuitive result. The first is that as our knowledge grows, we become less open to new ideas. The second is that younger minds and brains are intrinsically more flexible and exploratory, although they are also less efficient as a result.

The Roles of Intuition and Informants' Expertise in Children's Epistemic Trust.

Abstract: This study examined how children's intuitions and informants’ expertise influence children's trust in informants’ claims. Three- to 8-year-olds (N = 192) watched videos in which experts (animal/biology experts or artifact/physics experts) made either intuitively plausible or counterintuitive claims about obscure animals or artifacts. Claims fell either within or beyond experts’ domains of expertise. Children of all ages were more trusting of claims made by informants with relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, expertise. Children also showed greater acceptance of intuitive rather than counterintuitive claims, a differentiation that increased with age as they developed firmer intuitions about what can ordinarily happen. In summary, children's trust in testimony depends on whether informants have the relevant expertise as well as on children's own developing intuitions.

Understanding the harms and benefits of cancer screening: A model of factors that shape informed decision making

Abstract: Objective. Decisions about cancer screenings often involve the consideration of complex and counterintuitive evidence. We investigated psychological factors that promote the comprehension of benefi...

Social dominance in childhood and its evolutionary underpinnings: why it matters and what we can do

Abstract: Bullying is a common and familiar manifestation of power differentials and social hierarchy. Much has been written lately about bullying in schools, in the workplace, and even in the National Football League. Such hierarchies are pervasive in nature. They can be subtly, almost imperceptibly, managed (by glances, gestures, or implicit cultural expectations), brutally enforced (authoritarian rule, vicious attacks, or explicit edicts), or anything in between. These power differentials affect our daily behavior and thought processes, are a large source of our psychosocial stress, and influence our health and well-being. As an evolutionary developmental psychologist focusing on aggression and peer relationships in childhood, I present for this article an evolutionary view to children’s social functioning as it relates to power differentials. First, 3 common errors in thinking about dominance are dispelled. The discussion next focuses on social dominance in childhood, including how humans appear to be prepared to think about and navigate these relationships, how aggression plays a starring role, and the unfortunate costs associated with competitive losses. (Bullying is a case in point.) The more positive side to power is then introduced; namely, the counterintuitive role of prosocial (other-oriented, friendly) behavior. Finally, in closing, some thoughts about remediation are offered. ### Error #1: Because Hierarchies Are Natural (ie, Pervasive in Nature), They Must Be Good In this context, “good” can have at least 2 distinct meanings: “morally correct” or “good for us” (as in bestowing well-being benefits). It is both fallacious and dangerous, however, to equate what is natural with what is good in either sense of the word. There are at least 2 classes of argument, 1 philosophical and 1 practical, which show why this assumption is incorrect. #### The Naturalistic Fallacy The philosophical angle involves the naturalistic fallacy (as compared with appeal to nature); it is fallacious to conclude that simply because something is found in nature, it must also be inherently good. The flipside is also … Address correspondence to Patricia H. Hawley, PhD, 3008 18th St, Box 41071, Lubbock, TX 79409-41071. E-mail: patricia.hawley{at}ttu.edu

Effects of text structure, reading goals and epistemic beliefs on conceptual change

Abstract: We investigated the online and offline effects of learner and instructional characteristicson conceptual change of a robust misconception in science. Fifty-nine undergraduateuniversity students with misconceptions about evolution were identified as espousingevaluativist or non-evaluativist epistemic beliefs in science. Participants were randomlyassigned to receive a traditional or refutational text that discussed a misconception inevolution and a general comprehension or elaborative interrogation reading goal.Participants’ cognitive and metacognitive processes while readingwere measured usinga think-aloud protocol. Postreading, participants’ correct and incorrect conceptualknowledge were separately assessed with a transference essay. Results showed that textstructure and reading goals affected cognitive conflict, coherence-building andelaborative processing while reading and promoted correct conceptual knowledgeincluded in essays but failed to affect the inclusion of misconceptions. Further,participants with evaluativist epistemic beliefs engaged in fewer comprehensionmonitoring processes and were more likely to adapt their coherence-building processesaccording to reading goals than their non-evaluativist counterparts, but epistemic beliefgroups did not differ in the content of the posttest essay. Theoretical and educationalimplications of these findings are discussed.Students encounter and study complex and often counterintuitive science concepts throughouttheir educational careers. Increasingly, such science concepts such as evolutionary medicineand the global carbon cycle are playing a signi ficant role in students’ reasoning about personaland global issues. Therefore, how students manage the complexity of these concepts and theiroften inaccurate prior knowledge is unquestionably vital. Often, to successfully learn thesescience concepts requires students to undertake a challenging process: revising intuitive butinaccurateknowledgetowardsscientificallyvalidknowledge,referredtoasconceptualchange.We examine the possibility of conceptual change occurring on robust misconceptionsabout biological evolution, a foundational yet difficult science concept, within the contextof text-based instruction. As Sinatra and others have described (Dole & Sinatra, 1998;Limon, 2001; Sinatra, 2005; Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003), the traditional approach to text-based conceptual change research has been to induce cognitive conflict, which is viewedas a necessary but insufficient step to achieve change. Sinatra and Pintrich (2003) haveargued that conceptual change remains an unlikely outcome of instruction even whenenvironments are designed to promote knowledge restructuring. Therefore, in the currentstudy, we examine additional variables that theoretically support other cognitive and

Challenging Students’ Intuitions—the Influence of a Tangible Model of Virus Assembly on Students’ Conceptual Reasoning About the Process of Self-Assembly

Abstract: A well-ordered biological complex can be formed by the random motion of its components, i.e. self-assemble. This is a concept that incorporates issues that may contradict students’ everyday experiences and intuitions. In previous studies, we have shown that a tangible model of virus self-assembly, used in a group exercise, helps students to grasp the process of self-assembly and in particular the facet “random molecular collision”. The present study investigates how and why the model and the group exercise facilitate students’ learning of this particular facet. The data analysed consist of audio recordings of six group exercises (n = 35 university students) and individual semi-structured interviews (n = 5 university students). The analysis is based on constructivist perspectives of learning, a combination of conceptual change theory and learning with external representations. Qualitative analysis indicates that perceived counterintuitive aspects of the process created a cognitive conflict within learners. The tangible model used in the group exercises facilitated a conceptual change in their understanding of the process. In particular, the tangible model appeared to provide cues and possible explanations and functioned as an “eye-opener” and a “thinking tool”. Lastly, the results show signs of emotions also being important elements for successful accommodation.

Challenging a Common Assumption of Hands-on Exhibits

Abstract: Some of the most intriguing science museum exhibits start with a counterintuitive outcome: a result that runs counter to visitors' expectations. Although counterintuitive events often succeed in captivating visitors, they rarely lead to visitor-driven inquiry. I argue that this is primarily due to two factors. First, for the counterintuitive effect to be presented reliably and repeatedly, the visitor's interaction must be limited to a narrow set of options. Without multiple options for visitors to explore, extended inquiry is nearly impossible. Second, counterintuitive outcomes beg the question “why did the outcome occur?”. Answering such a “why” question through experimentation alone is too challenging for most visitors; they either leave the exhibit or turn to an explanatory label. In either case, the potential for inquiry is unrealized. Three strategies that both motivate visitor inquiry and allow for open-ended exhibit designs are presented: revealing beautiful aesthetics, supporting creativit...

Neighborhood Crime and Transit Station Access Mode Choice - Phase III of Neighborhood Crime and Travel Behavior

Abstract: This report provides the findings from the third phase of a three-part study about the influences of neighborhood crime on travel mode choice. While previous phases found evidence that high levels of neighborhood crime discourage people from choosing to walk, bicycle and ride transit, they also produced counterintuitive findings suggesting that in some cases, high crime neighborhoods encourage transit ridership at the expense of driving—the opposite of what common sense would suggest. Phase 3 tested possible explanations for these counterintuitive findings with a series of methodological improvements. These yielded strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that high-crime neighborhoods encourage driving, and they generated none of the counterintuitive findings from previous phases.

Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?

Abstract: Adjudication is fundamentally about information, usually concerning individuals’ previous or proposed behavior. Legal system design is challenging because information ordinarily is costly and imperfect. This Article analyzes a broad array of system features, asking throughout whether design should aim at the truth or at consequences, how these approaches may differ, and what general lessons may be drawn from the comparison. It will emerge that the differences in approach are often large and their character is sometimes counterintuitive. Accordingly, system engineers concerned with social welfare need to aim explicitly at consequences. This message is not one opposed to truth per se but rather a strong admonition: it is dangerous to be attached to the alluring view that adjudication is primarily about generating results most in accord with the truth of the matter at hand.

Who Has the Capacity to Participate as a Rearee in a Person-Rearing Relationship?*

Abstract: We discuss applications of our account of moral status grounded in person-rearing relationships: which individuals have higher moral status or not, and why? We cover three classes of cases: (1) cases involving incomplete realization of the capacity to care, including whether infants or fetuses have this incomplete capacity; (2) cases in which higher moral status rests in part on what is required for the being to flourish; (3) hypothetical cases in which cognitive enhancements could, for example, help dogs achieve humanlike cognitive capacities. We thereby show that our account does not have the counterintuitive implications alleged by DeGrazia and other critics.

Acting Rightly for the Right Reasons: An Amendment to Wolf's Reason View

Abstract: Critics of Wolf’s “asymmetry thesis” argue that it is counterintuitive to praise agents for performing right actions, even if this is something these agents were “psychologically determined” to do, while at the same time not blaming such agents for acting wrongly. I defend Wolf by exploring what it means “to do the right thing for the right reasons.” Acting rightly for the right reasons amounts to having subjected oneself to certain deliberative procedures. The right reasons, that one chooses and acts upon, express a capacity for self-determination, the normative features of which are themselves constitutive parts of the True and the Good.

Some Thoughts on Samapatti

Abstract: In the Yoga tradition, buddhi is consciousness in its own right and has been defined by some writers as acognitive knowing. My view is that acognitive knowing means knowing without the mind, and of course that is what Samapatti provides to the seer. And what this means in our seeking to understand consciousness is precisely what I referred to. There are possibly a number of models we could posit to accommodate this position, all of which would be counterintuitive for science. I will simply offer one which arises from the acognitive model.

Mediated Pedagogy in a Blended Environment: Impact of Processes and Settings During Environmental Monitoring of Dam Removal

Abstract: Previous attempts by other investigators (Young and Kinner 2008) who focused on middle school students’ performance on tasks that were associated with knowledge in the outdoors, found it difficult to demonstrate strong results of any learning measures. Their efforts, and earlier results from a pilot study that this author carried out in the same vicinity (O’Mahony 2008), helped refine ways to test the effects of different kinds of “expert mediation” for linking school–based and experiential learning methods and to test the effects of these methods on students’ thinking and motivation. A philosophical framework that encompassed ecojustice ideals and sustainability of environmental habitats served as a backdrop to the study. A quasi-experimental two-group design was used to test whether different mediating tools would affect student-learning outcomes. Quantitative and qualitative tools were used in a mixed methods approach to collect and interpret data during a pedagogical intervention that posited better learning outcomes for students where mediation tools aligned teaching processes and settings in a purposeful way. We discuss how tools and contextual artifacts help learners notice key dimensions of their experiences (in the natural world) that “make visible” entrenched preconceptions; enable a process of conceptual change, and foster an emergent comprehension of everyday knowledge. Further, this study demonstrates how intentional alignment of instructional “processes” with “settings” facilitates student learning by linking counterintuitive concepts in the natural world to very real aspects of their culture and lives. But, more importantly, through energizing a sense of students personal agency and deep-seated engagement around their sense of place, the outdoor learning experience appeared to activate not only joy in learning in situ, it went a long way to enhancing a preparation for future learning.

On the Probabilistic Notion of Causality: Models and Metalanguages

Abstract: We present some formal, interpreted languages, which are based on propositional logic, but have each a new connective with a semantics based on (conditional) probabilities, which is related to the notion of causality. The first one is well-known as meta-language of Bayesian networks; the other two are new and seem to match better our intuition of a causal connective. We provide definitions of truth and validity, as well as some elementary model theory, in particular focussing on the questions: which properties of probability spaces can be axiomatized by formulas of the new languages, and which not? In particular, we can show that desirable properties of expressive power come at the cost of counterintuitive features.