Showing papers on "Delegation published in 1983"

A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues

Abstract: Develops a theory for the demand for the advising and distribution services of investment banks when there is information asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and the investment bankers. The advising services of the investment banker are valuable when the banker has better information about the capital market, while the distribution services are useful when the banker is able to create demand for the issue. This analysis considers the delegation contract between the issuer and the banker in a negotiated, fixed price offering. The delegation contract exists when the issuer enlists the banker to both advise on the offering price and distribute the securities. In this case, the banker's decision as to whether the contract should be accepted is based on the banker's private information. Given these conditions, a model is presented, and an example is provided to illustrate the optimal delegation contract. Also examined are the situation in which the issuer only utilizes the distribution services of the banker and the situation in which the investment banker is not engaged at all. Results show that when the banker is better informed than the issuer, the new issues are underpriced. Further, those issuers of unseasoned securities who are less informed about the capital market than the issuers of seasoned securities are more likely to seek the advice of investment bankers. (SRD)

A view of human-machine communication and co-operation

Abstract: Nowadays computers are increasingly used for communication purposes and less for mere calculation. Userfriendly dialog design for non-computer professicial users is becoming an important research issue. The discussion has already shown that human-machine systems have to be studied as a whole: apart from the machine and its users they include the designers and those persons responsible for the system's application, as well. Computers just play a special role as one element in a highly complex communication network with several human agents linked in space and time. In order to characterize communication between humans and machines the concept of formal communication is introduced and related to natural communication. Communicating behaviour and its determining factors are represented by a model which is based on psycholinguistic concepts of communication and which uses high-level Petri net interpretations. Formal communication can be observed among humans as well as with machines; of ten it is caused by delegation. Programming of computer systems can be conceived as a special form of delegation. The view of computer systems as communication media with formal communicating behaviour permits an explanation of problems arising from computer applications, especially at the human-machine interface, and shows directions for future research.

The Washington State Dental Auxiliary Project: Delegating Expanded Functions in General Practice

Abstract: When extensive delegation of auxiliary duties is possible, how do dentists actually use their personnel and capital to increase their productivity?

Summary Results of the Kentucky Dental Practice Demonstration: A Cooperative Project with Practicing General Dentists

Abstract: Documentation of the experience of 14 general practices with expanded function auxiliaries from 1978 to 1982 clearly shows the clinical and economic feasibility of increasing delegation. But what if a lack of patient supply exists?

Design Liability in the Construction Industry

Abstract: The problems of design Principles of law Professional negligence and designer's general duties Detailed duties and liabilities of designers Delegation of design duties Negligent inspection Liability to contractor and third parties Design and build contracts Damages and contribution Professional indemnity insurance Limitation of liability Limitation of actions Arbitration or litigation.

Why supervisors don't delegate and employees won't accept responsibility.

Abstract: Factors that cause supervisors not to delegate and employees not to accept responsibility are discussed. Delegation spreads responsibility for tasks and authority. Supervisors who won't delegate are usually insecure in their jobs, lack confidence in employees, are afraid of mistakes, and don't communicate task requirements. Additional characteristics include confusion about their roles/responsibilities, poor overall management effectiveness, excessive attention to detail, inability to see a larger picture, and fear of their subordinates' capabilities. Factors that cause subordinates to resist accepting responsibility include letting the manager make the decisions because its easier that way, lack of knowledge or understanding of their authority or that of the supervisor, fear of making a mistake, lack of information, inappropriate training or skills to succeed, and perceived absence of a sufficient personal reward for accepting additional responsibility. The supervisor must set the climate for delegation by establishing clear objectives and communicating them to other workers. A plan of action is required in order to implement objectives. A 15-question self-analysis can help a supervisor evaluate his ability to delegate. (kbc)

How to delegate--a guide to getting things done

Abstract: This volume explains which delegation techniques work and when, and it shows why some that ought to succeed can bear undesireable results. Numerous examples and illustrative cases, drawn from experience, are cited.

Measurement of effects of a state dental practice act on potential delegation and production in general dental private practice.

Abstract: Detailed treatment information was obtained on every procedure performed for all patients seen during a two-year period in 14 private dental practices in Kentucky. This information permitted the investigation of the effect of Kentucky's State Dental Practice Act on the amount of production that could have been legally delegated in the 14 practices. The development of a new measure called the Standard Production Minute (SPM) allowed for the examination of the relations between delegation and production by measuring the two variables in the same time-based units. Results of the study indicated: In 14 private dental practices in Kentucky, 58.7 percent of all production was legally delegable under the State Dental Practice Act. The three areas of operative, hygiene/prevention, and exam/diagnostic data accounted for 74.8 percent of overall production and 67 percent of the production in these areas was legally delegable to auxiliaries in Kentucky. Within individual areas of dentistry, the greatest potential delegation rates were found in these three areas. Given the procedure-mix for the 14 practices, 31 percent of all potential delegation was restricted to hygienists and 18 percent of all production was delegable only to the hygienist under the Kentucky State Dental Practice Act. If the delegation of placing and finishing restorations was restricted by the Kentucky State Dental Practice Act, the percentage of production that could be delegated in the operative area would have decreased from 53.1 percent to 20 percent. However, the percent of production that could be delegated across all areas would have decreased from 58.7 percent to 46 percent.

Managing Program Headquarters Units: The Importance of Matrixing

Abstract: In their classic work on matrix organizations, Davis and Lawrence expressed skepticism about the utility of matrix structures for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental programs.' They suggested that rigidities of structure and process that inevitably develop around the expenditure of public funds greatly inhibit the use of flexible organizational designs in the public sector. This article argues that the use of matrix designs, in fact, may be a key to effective performance for an important class of public sector organizations, namely the headquarters units of federal or state programs. These are not the units that actually provide services or conduct operations. Rather, they are the units that are responsible for allocating funds to program operators at the state or local levels, developing program policies and regulations, designing service delivery models or operational techniques, conducting system-wide planning, providing technical assistance or training for operating personnel, and monitoring field operations. Over the course of three recent research projects, the author and his colleagues interviewed nearly three dozen national and state directors of job placement, training, social services, energy assistance, and welfareemployment programs.2 Each of these individuals was simultaneously the director of a dispersed service delivery network and the supervisor of a program headquarters unit. Our interviews indicated that many of them had clear ideas about the design and management of their service delivery systems, but only a few had a similarly coherent doctrine for the organization and management of their program headquarters units. Their efforts to describe such a doctrine often laid heavy emphasis on compliance with conventional bureaucratic norms (functional departmentation, formally specified roles for individuals and subunits, delegation down the chain of command, unit of command). Their descriptions of actual events, however, often yielded a substantially different picture. Ad hoc groupings, special assignments, and informal procedures abounded. Functional boundaries were violated. Intervening supervisory layers within the unit were often by-passed. Individuals frequently worked outside their formal roles. Directors and unit members characterized the reality as "fire fighting," "ad hoc" or "ad hominen" management, or "muddling through." These descriptions suggested that the program directors are being pulled3 in three different directions. First,

The Budget-Limit Effect on the Delegation of the Capital Budgeting Authority: The Case of Sequential and Frequent Investment Decisions

Abstract: Publishing houses, Savings & Loans and other business firms make frequent long-term investment decisions, and in sequence. Typically they encounter more short-lived investment opportunities than their budget can accommodate. Some will even go out of their way to broaden their horizon of choices. As a result, one will find some organizations which satisfy their needs by choosing opportunities from a relatively narrow horizon, and others which are engaged in an extensive evaluation process whose objective is to gradually narrow down the options available. The latter effort typically covers various layers in the organizations, both at the division branch and headquarters HQ. Common sense may suggest that the more limited capital resources are, the larger should be the set of explored opportunities, and the more careful centralized should the decision making process be. A quantitative approach to the problem is presented here, which captures the relationships between investment-opportunities-horizon "size" and "quality," the value of funds to be invested, the cost of narrowing the options down, and the limits to centralization/decentralization, all under a limited budget. It demonstrates that under certain conditions the intuitively optimal mode of centralization becomes less than optimal, and decentralization is the rational and consistent mode. Other difficult questions such as "how broad is a broad enough horizon of choices?" are addressed.

Voting rules in international conferences and organizations

Abstract: This chapter describes the voting rules in international conferences and organizations. International governmental organizations are usually established on the principle of sovereign equality. This means that the size and population of member States are not relevant criteria, and the most important element is that they are sovereign entities with their own governments. As equals, all governments have the same voting power in international organizations. When a delegation would like a vote to be registered, it may request a roll call. In most international organizations, this request must be granted if it is supported by at least one other delegation. In some cases, no support is needed, while in other cases, two other delegations must express their support. In a roll call, the secretary of the meeting will read the names of all member States entitled to participate in the voting. Each delegation must reply with yes, no, or abstention. International organizations sometimes arrange for voting by post, thus freeing them from having to wait for a meeting to decide matters of some urgency.

Teamwork — delegated or shared?

Abstract: The acceptance of the primary care health team idea raises the issues of the various members of the team working together. Delegation implies hierarchical levels, leaders, directives and responsibilities. It raises sensitive interprofessional issues and decisions on who is ‘boss’. Sharing implies greater equality and democratic associations between colleagues who respect one another. It raises the same pertinent issues as to who should act as leader and whether his/her role will be accepted by the others.

Japan's Trade Mission to Moscow, February 1983: What did it Accomplish?

Abstract: The delegation of the Japanese Trade Mission to the Soviet Union headed by Shigeo Nagano, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, visited Moscow on February 22-26, 1983. Besides holding two days of general meetings, the Nagano Mission paid calls on and held talks with a number of Soviet government leaders, including Prime Minister Tikhonov, First Deputy Minister Arkhipov, Deputy Minister Baibakov, and Deputy Minister Marchuk as well as ministers and deputy government ministers.

A Non‐Market Demand‐Based Approach to the Selection of Financial Reporting Standards

Abstract: As Gonedes and Dopuch point out, there are many alternative approaches to the allocation of financial accounting information which might be viewed as competitors to ASC, FASB and other extant processes. Even if one begins with the ethical premise that “individual preferences are to count” and it is assumed that some sort of regulatory approach is needed, there are still at least three basic types of standards‐setting processes worthy of consideration: (1) “representative or expert body” processes; (2) “voting” processes; and (3) “demand‐based” (i.e. “willingness‐to‐pay”) processes. While the first type relies on the delegation of decision making authority to a body of “representative” or “expert” parties, the latter two types base their respective decisions on ordinal preference and demand information elicited directly from the affected parties themselves.

Recovery Through War, 1936–46

Abstract: For many of those who had survived the First World War the rise of fascism in Germany was an ominous prelude to another conflict. Several officers from that war had in the 1920s bought farms in the Marandellas district and they now became vociferous in their call for action. Foremost among these was Major A. H. Macllwaine, DSO, MC. He had been in Britain during the Munich crisis and had been horrified by the unpreparedness of that country at the time, especially since he was convinced that the lack of overt planning to restrain the Germans before 1914 had encouraged them to instigate the war. On the very day that the Rhodesia Herald carried a report that Neville Chamberlain might be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the paper published a letter from Major Macllwaine filling two whole columns and demanding governmental action, together with a reply from Robert Tredgold, the Minister of Defence.1 Macllwaine had many supporters in the district and a small delegation travelled to Salisbury to interview the Prime Minister.

Structure, environment, and organizational governance in manufacturing*

Abstract: The paper compares theories of organizational governance that explain delegation in decision making in terms of administrative rationality on the parts of top corporate officials with theories that emphasize lower-level actors mobilizing resources to gain control over organizational outcomes These two alternative theories are developed and extended to apply to the relationship between manufacturing plants and parent companies A general model is introduced to compare these theories which includes characteristics of parent companies and site environments, site resources, and delegation The model is then tested on a sample of manufacturing plants