Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 1982"

Deterrent and Experiential Effects: the Problem of Causal Order in Perceptual Deterrence Research

Abstract: This paper reports on the first longitudinal study to consider the relationship between perceptions of legal sanctions and self-reported criminality. The longitudinal design helps to address the problem of interpreting causal order that traditionally has troubled deterrence researchers using cross-sectional data. Self-reports of unlawful behavior (petty theft, marijuana use, payment using bad checks) over the past year are correlated both with perceptions of legal sanctions measured a year earlier (Time 1) and with perceptions of sanctions at the time of the self-reports (Time 2), for a random sample of 300 undergraduates at a large state university. The principal advantage of this method is that it affords a comparison of "deterrent" effects (perceived sanctions at Time 1 and subsequent reported behavior) with what are termed "experiential" effects (reported behavior and subsequent perceived sanctions at Time 2). The latter have been consistently treated as deterrent effects by prior researchers using cr...

Force and statecraft : diplomatic problems of our time

Abstract: The international system from the seventeenth century to the present: The emergence of the great powers Eighteenth-century diplomacy Balance of power, 1815-1914: three experiments System-building, 1919-1939 Public opinion and foreign policy Economics and foreign policy Totalitarian and democratic diplomacy, 1919-1939 A post-war system of security: great-power directorate or United Nations The cold war as international system Detente and its problems The evolving international system Maintaining the system: problems of force and diplomacy: Negotiation Deterrence Coercive diplomacy Crisis management War termination Ethical imperatives and foreign policy: U.S.-Soviet security co-perating in an evolving international system The Christian statesman: Bismarck and Gladstone The problem of ethical and moral constraints on the use of force in foreign policy.

Deterrence and Bargaining

Abstract: Recent disputes about whether nuclear superiority still has any meaning raise the question of what relation exists between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power. This article argues that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing that question. It has often focused exclusively on the defender's influence on the decision calculus of the aggressor or on the problem of avoiding a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.” When it has touched on the question of bargaining advantage, it has used inappropriate models and failed to draw correct conclusions from the models it has used. The article outlines the main ways in which deterrence theory must be corrected, focusing especially on the distinction between two kinds of threats whose implications for bargaining are quite different.

Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection

Abstract: I America's drift to counterforce nuclear strategies is neither perverse nor accidental. The emphasis on counterforce became a notable aspect of the nuclear strategy of the Carter Administration, at least in its promulgation of Presidential Directive 59 in July 1980 and its promotion of the MX intercontinental missile; and it continues in the strategy of the Reagan Administration, embodied in the weapons system decisions of October 2, 1981. To grasp the rationale of counterforce, it is necessary to understand the logic of extended deterrence. For ultimately it is its adherence to alliance commitments that skews the United States' strategy toward counterforce weapons and targeting and warps American doctrines of response toward the first use of nuclear weapons, prejudicing crisis stability and increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. Few realize how intertwined American weapons and strategies are with American commitments. And few understand how integral to the entire foreign policy stance of the United States has been the strategic paradigm of deterrence and alliance that the U.S. has maintained for thirty-five yearsand therefore, how much would have to change, if we set about to achieve an alternative, more stable, nuclear stance that might provide greater safety for Americans in an age of pervasive nuclear danger. But also, few see how much is actually changing, under the surface of the familiar strategic and diplomatic arrangements, precisely because the objective conditions that are the requisites of America's present stance are not being fulfilled.

Prenuclear-age leaders and the nuclear arms race.

Abstract: Nuclear arms are a phenomenon with no historical precedent, yet people—and their national leaders—confront the prospect of nuclear war with psychological attitudes from an earlier, simpler time. This paper considers the meaning of our image of the “enemy,” analyzes the appropriateness and effectiveness of a policy of deterrence, and considers approaches to doing away with war and to easing international antagonisms through the pursuit of mutually beneficial goals.

The market for offences and the public enforcement of laws: An equilibrium analysis

Abstract: The general proposition developed in this paper is that the frequency of offences of specific types is determined, by and large, not as the capricious outcome of biological or social idiosyncracies, but as the result of the equilibrating interplay of systematic 'supply and demand' forces. The role of public intervention via police, courts, correctional institutions, and economic policy in general, is then viewed in terms of its impact on the equilibrium level of activity in illegitimate markets, rather than in terms of its effect on either the supply or the demand sides of these markets separately. From a policy perspective the implication is that the efficacy of public intervention in the 'business of crime' must be assessed through the relevant comparative statics or dynamics of market equilibrium, rather than by reference to partial settings. For example, one would seek to know not just whether a rehabilitative project can enhance the likelihood that a group of known offenders will be successfully absorbed in legitimate or socially desirable pursuits, but whether the rehabilitative project, even if successful, would lead to a corresponding reduction in the overall volume of crime. Recognition of the existence and role of the 'market for offences' is shown to lead to important modifications in previous economic analyses of illegitimate activities concerning not only the efficacy of rehabilitation and other means of direct control of individual offenders, but of means of general deterrence as well. The paper states conditions under which individual control is efficacious and shows that it will be ineffective precisely whereas general deterrence is effective. Generally, the relatively efficacy of all means of public enforcement of laws is shown to be a function of both supply and demand elasticities rather than a function of supply elasticities alone. The analysis includes a brief discussion of what is meant by the supply and demand notions is crime, and, indeed, by the more provocative concept of the 'market for offences'.

Misconceptions in American Strategic Assessment

Abstract: Recent changes in American strategic doctrine not only have prompted shifts in the measures of strategic sufficiency but have also led to a heightened perception of these measures. Conceptions of the strategic balance currently in vogue are all based on estimates of relative residual military capability following a nuclear exchange. Informed views differ about how such estimates should be made. However, those of the two key institutions most concerned in generating such assessments -the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) employ approaches that divorce military conflict from the political context in which such conflict would occur. These approaches are, as a result, inaccurate, misleading, and even detrimental to the maintenance of peace. Strategic forces mean nothing in the abstract. They must be assessed in terms of the mission they are expected to perform. For the United States this mission has always been deterrence, although deterrence of what has never been altogether clear. From time to time, officials from various administrations have spoken of extended deterrence, supposing that American strategic forces could

An Optimizing Nuclear Exchange Model for the Analysis of Nuclear War and Deterrence

Abstract: A formulation of a two-strike nuclear exchange has enabled its global optimization by nonconvex programming. This formulation, together with a more detailed physical model involving four strategic weapon classes on both sides, is used to explore strategic war outcomes as a function of selected planning parameters.

Nuclear Strategy and World Order: The United States Imperative.

Abstract: This paper argues that current US nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war fighting The proponents of this counterforce strategy claim it is necessary to make US deterrence more credible The author rejects this claim and shows how US strategy actually degrades US security Moreover, the author contends that it actually encourages nuclear war because it is based on a number of implausible and contradictory assumptions After examining these assumptions in detail, the author proposes an alternative strategy for nuclear war avoidance and for improving the likelihood of nuclear disarmament This strategy involves a comprehensive test ban treaty, joint renunciation of first use, and the establishment of new and more extensive nuclear weapon free zones

Toward an Alternative Security System: Moving beyond the Balance of Power in the Search for World Security*

Abstract: Technological changes and their military consequences have outpaced the capacity of the international system to protect people's security and to meet basic needs. The balance of power system cannot prevent war for long, nor can it reduce to an acceptable level the prospect of nuclear catastrophe. Yet policy makers have excluded from their agendas policies that question this anachronistic system or the basic direction of time-honored diplomacy. Fundamental changes are needed but encounter psychological as well as political and economic resistance, including the belief that the present international order is more or less permanent. Building a more durable peace therefore requires identifying policies that will not jeopardize security in the short run but that will lead to a more effective security system in the long run. Examination of seven policy models—based respectively on a nuclear war-fighting capability, mutual assured destruction, minimum deterrence, conventional defensive weapons, a world peacekeep...

Soviet Civil Defense and the US Deterrent

Abstract: : The Soviet Union's civil defense program is more than 30 years old and is an important aspect of Soviet military planning. The strengths and weaknesses of the program have been the topic of extensive debate by many analysts. The specific structure, capabilities, and plans of Soviet civil defense bear some close examination. First, however, let us consider the possible dangerous impact that an effective Soviet program might have on the Soviet-American strategic nuclear balance and on deterrence.

Nuclear Weapons Policy, Planning and War Objectives: Toward a Theater-Oriented Deterrent Strategy,

Abstract: : The U.S. strategic nuclear policy debate has for years been marked by confusion and chaos. Despite the investment of considerable analytic effort, planners remain deeply divided on basic issues relating to budgets, force structure choices, employment strategies, arms control concepts, and the like. This basic dilemma is as follows. On the one hand, nuclear weapons cannot serve national objectives in the same ways that other military forces can. On the other hand, like it or not, both the United States and Soviet Union maintain large nuclear forces, and, for reasons I will list it is imperative to plan for their use.

The Nuclearization of the Middle East and the Subcontinent

Abstract: : The nature of conventional warfare in the Middle East is changing. Contrary to the model of previous regional conflicts war consists now of attritional contests between states the political goals of which are no longer self-evident. Not only is this changed mode of warfare less responsive to megapolicies but because of the potential economic importance of the contestants the ability of normally minor states to develop significant action capabilities in the global arena has been notably enhanced. The possibilities for nuclear proliferation have, therefore, increased proportionally. This study seeks to document the development of regional nuclear options in a changed environment and to demonstrate the impact which the nuclear status of states outside the Middle East has had on the nuclearization of the traditional belligerents. A model of peacetime horizontal proliferation for the Middle East will be proposed and an attempt to fit this model to the strategy and tactics of nuclear deterrence under conditions of conflict will be made. Thus, it can be shown that a nuclear deterrent strategy based on mutual assured destruction is theoretically possible and, in point of practical fact, may be necessary for the long-term stability of the region. Concluding with the assertion that the actual state of bilateral relations between the superpowers is inadequate for the management of regional nuclearization in the event of uncontrolled escalation, this study will suggest that a global approach to the problem must be reformulated before the hypothetical becomes the real.

Soviet Civil Defense and the Credibility of the US Deterrent: An End to this M.A.D.Ness.

Abstract: : This memorandum examines the impacts of the Soviet Union's civil defense programs upon deterrence and the strategic balance. The author describes the origins and nature of the Soviet civil defense capability. Soviet civil defense is then related operationally and conceptually to Soviet strategic doctrine. Upon evaluating the probable effectiveness of the Soviet Union's civil defense capability, the author concludes that it does not affect significantly the US-USSR strategic balance. (Author)

Special Import Measures Legislation: Deterring Dumping of Capital Goods

Abstract: Canada is in the process of changing its antidumping law which is to become part of a new Special Import Measures Act. The Act is expected to serve as Canada's central commercial policy mechanism in the next several decades. This paper focusses on certain proposals that would increase the deterrence effect of Canadian antidumping policy. The issue is especially important to domestic producers of capital goods who have made a concentrated lobbying effort to persuade the federal government to implement a'three-pronged deterrence approach'. While raising the deterrence level of antidumping procedures would aid domestic capital goods producers, it could be very costly in terms of national welfare.

Civil Defense: A Deterrent to Nuclear War.

Abstract: : Nuclear war has been feared by the entire world since the end of World War II. Since the early 1960s, the Soviet Union has been continually improving both its capability to wage nuclear war and, more important, to protect its population. Population protection or civil defense is the principal issue discussed, with emphasis on Soviet accomplishments and fluctuation of US policy. This issue is discussed from the viewpoint of many noted authors. The conclusion reached indicates that there can be deterrence to nuclear war through civil protection. This conclusion is reinforced with the efforts of the Soviets and the gains made by the US over the past three years.