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Showing papers on "East Asia published in 1973"


DOI
20 Feb 1973
TL;DR: The world climate during the historical times fluctuated. as discussed by the authors showed that during Yin-Hsu at Anyang, the ammal temperature was about 2℃ higher than that of the, present in most of the time.
Abstract: The world climate during the historical times fluctuated. The numerous Chinese historical writings provide us excellent references in studying the ancient climate of China. The present author testifies, by the materials got from the histories and excavations, that during Yin-Hsu at Anyang, the ammal temperature was about 2℃ higher than that of the, present in most of the time. After that came a series of up and down swings of 2—3℃ with minimum temperatures occurring at approximately 100 B. C. (about the end of the Yin Dynasty and the beginning of the Chou Dynasty), 400 A. D. (the Six Dynasties), 1200 A. D. (the South Snug Dynasty), and 1700 A. D. (abont the end of the Ming Dynasty and the beginning of the Ching Dynasty). In the Han and the Tang Dynasties (200 B. C.—220 A. D. and 600—900 A. D.) the climate was rather warm. When the world climate turned colder than usual, it tended to begin at the Pacific coast of Eastern Asia, propagating as a wave westward, through Japan and China, to the Atlantic coast of Europe and Africa. When the world temperature recovered, it tended to propagate eastward from the west. A fuller knowledge of lhe climatic fluctuations in historical times and a good grasp of their laws would render better service to the long-range forecasting in climate.

104 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The most important data for the reconstruction of Mesozoic cliseres are the life-form statistics, the phytosociological criteria and the dynamic criteria (i.e., the displacements of isoflores, the altitudinal migrations, etc.).

46 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jun 1973

23 citations






Book
22 Feb 1973

8 citations


Book
01 Jan 1973

7 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A/D/C East Asian Regional Workshop on Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Mechanization, 23-31 Aug. 1971, Tokyo, JP as mentioned in this paper, Tokyo, Japan
Abstract: Meeting: A/D/C East Asian Regional Workshop on Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Mechanization, 23-31 Aug. 1971, Tokyo, JP

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors argued that U.S. Asian policy sought to use the southern half of the Korean peninsula and Japan to create a configuration of military and economic power which would enable the United...
Abstract: Ever since the late 1940s, U.S. Asian policy sought to use the southern half of the Korean peninsula and Japan to create a configuration of military and economic power which would enable the United...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, had a three-hour talk with Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik of South Korea as discussed by the authors, who had come from Tokyo as a special envoy of Nixon and was accompanied by John H. Holdridge, a member of the National Security Council who was also among Nixon's party to China.
Abstract: Marshall Green, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, had a three-hour talk with Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik of South Korea. Green briefed Kim on President Nixon's meetings with Chinese leaders and reassured him of America's support for South Korea. Green had come from Tokyo as a special envoy of Nixon, and was accompanied by John H. Holdridge, a member of the National Security Council who was also among Nixon's party to China.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The memories of the Imperlalist period of the Japanese Empire are still over-shadowing the relations of these countries with Japan as discussed by the authors, and the governments of countries in South East Asia have observed with close attention, and in some cases with deep mistrust and concern, recent developments of Japan's foreign and foreign trade policies.
Abstract: Practically all the governments of countries in South East Asia have observed with close attention, and in some cases with deep mistrust and concern, recent developments of Japan’s foreign and foreign trade policies. Memories of the Imperlalist period of the Japanese Empire are still over-shadowing the relations of these countries with Japan.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Tanaka as mentioned in this paper was the first Japanese prime minister to visit China, where he made a five-day visit to China and turned Japan's China policy completely around, with a policy of "resolution and action."
Abstract: IN July 1972, amid mounting public clamor for "a change in the political current," Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Min ister of Japan. He pledged a policy of "resolution and action." Two months later, in the course of a five-day visit to China, Tanaka turned Japan's China policy completely around. This dramatic shift, with the earlier visits of President Nixon to Peking and Moscow, has prompted Japanese observers to pose a host of questions. Have we witnessed simply an agreement to open diplomatic relations between the governments of the two big powers in Asia, or are we looking at the still dim outline of a new "Tokyo-Peking axis"? Should not Japan now review com pletely her other foreign policies, which have been excessively dependent on the United States, and go her own way hereafter amid a general easing of tensions in East Asia? With rapproche ment in the air, why does Japan need a special security relation ship with the United States? Can Japan achieve a successful, in dependent foreign policy without becoming a big military power? What sort of impact will Japan's rapprochement with China have on Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and the two Koreas? What effect will recent Japanese moves have on the Soviet-American-Chinese triangle and on the constraints which operate on each of these relationships? Has the fragile balance of power among these three been upset? Of all the Japanese national sports, judo is perhaps the best known throughout the world. In judo, beginners are first re quired to undergo thorough training in mastering the passive art of being "thrown down." This defensive technique is intended to enable one thrown by his opponent to fall without being hurt, so that he is ready for the next action. Only after one has attained sufficient adeptness at that art is he allowed to learn a full variety of offensive tactics. As if in compliance with this art, Japan's postwar diplomacy has always been passive, and has seldom played a positive role on its own in the arena of international politics. This was the result of Japan's loss of self-confidence through her defeat in World War II, and in a sense was inevitable and even natural. Even her policy toward China was no exception to the passive



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Kim's new proposal generated pressure from the South Korean people and world public opinion alike, thereby compelling "the South Korean authorities to propose -a North-South Red Cross talks for the purpose of locating separated families" as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: JULY 4TH COMMUNIQUE: THE VIEW FROM PYONGYANG As North Korea sees it, it was Premier Kim Il-song's speech on August 6, 1971 which provided a turning point in North-South Korean relations, ushering in an era of dialogue between the longtime adversaries. In that speech, delivered at a Pyongyang mass rally honoring the visit of Norodom Sihanouk, Kim stated for the first time that North Korea would be willing to talk with all political parties including the ruling Democratic-Republican party, social organizations, and individuals in South Korea. Kim's new proposal allegedly generated pressure from the South Korean people and world public opinion alike, thereby compelling "the South Korean authorities to propose -a North-South Red Cross talks for the purpose of locating separated families."' The combined pressure of the South Korean and world peoples, according to Kim Il-song, was also instrumental in inducing Seoul to seek secret, highlevel political contacts with Pyongyang, which "led to the adoption of the North-South joint communique embodying the three principles of reunification set forth by North Korea."2 The three principles call for (1) an independent solution of the reunification problem free from interference by "outside force" (oese), (2) a peaceful approach to the problem, and (3) the transcending of differences in ideas, ideology, and systems in order to achieve a national unity. Kim Il-song's version of the origins of the North-South dialogue, even if true, fails to explain why North Korea softened its attitude toward negotia-


Journal Article
TL;DR: Tanaka's policy of "resolution and action" as discussed by the authors turned Japan's China policy completely around, with the earlier visits of President Nixon to Peking and Moscow, has prompted Japanese observers to pose a host of questions, including: Why does Japan need a special security relation ship with the United States? Can Japan achieve a successful, in dependent foreign policy without becoming a big military power? What sort of impact will Japan's rapprochement with China have on Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and the two Koreas? What effect will recent Japanese moves have on the Soviet-
Abstract: IN July 1972, amid mounting public clamor for "a change in the political current," Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Min ister of Japan He pledged a policy of "resolution and action" Two months later, in the course of a five-day visit to China, Tanaka turned Japan's China policy completely around This dramatic shift, with the earlier visits of President Nixon to Peking and Moscow, has prompted Japanese observers to pose a host of questions Have we witnessed simply an agreement to open diplomatic relations between the governments of the two big powers in Asia, or are we looking at the still dim outline of a new "Tokyo-Peking axis"? Should not Japan now review com pletely her other foreign policies, which have been excessively dependent on the United States, and go her own way hereafter amid a general easing of tensions in East Asia? With rapproche ment in the air, why does Japan need a special security relation ship with the United States? Can Japan achieve a successful, in dependent foreign policy without becoming a big military power? What sort of impact will Japan's rapprochement with China have on Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and the two Koreas? What effect will recent Japanese moves have on the Soviet-American-Chinese triangle and on the constraints which operate on each of these relationships? Has the fragile balance of power among these three been upset? Of all the Japanese national sports, judo is perhaps the best known throughout the world In judo, beginners are first re quired to undergo thorough training in mastering the passive art of being "thrown down" This defensive technique is intended to enable one thrown by his opponent to fall without being hurt, so that he is ready for the next action Only after one has attained sufficient adeptness at that art is he allowed to learn a full variety of offensive tactics As if in compliance with this art, Japan's postwar diplomacy has always been passive, and has seldom played a positive role on its own in the arena of international politics This was the result of Japan's loss of self-confidence through her defeat in World War II, and in a sense was inevitable and even natural Even her policy toward China was no exception to the passive