Showing papers on "Economic Justice published in 1973"

A History of American Law

Abstract: "A History of American Law" has become a classic for students of law, American history and sociology across the country. In this brilliant and immensely readable book, Lawrence M. Friedman tells the whole fascinating story of American law from its beginnings in the colonies to the present day. By showing how close the life of the law is to the economic and political life of the country, he makes a complex subject understandable and engrossing. "A History of American Law" presents the achievements and failures of the American legal system in the context of America's commercial and working world, family practices and attitudes toward property, slavery, government, crime and justice. Now Professor Friedman has completely revised and enlarged his landmark work, incorporating a great deal of new material. The book contains newly expanded notes, a bibliography and a bibliographical essay.

Rules and order

Abstract: This volume represents This volume represents the first section of Friedrich A Hayek's comprehensive three-part study of the relations between law and liberty "Rules and Order" constructs the framework necessary for a critical analysis of prevailing theories of justice and of the conditions which a constitution securing personal liberty would have to satisfy

After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force†

Abstract: In the Bangladesh crisis, two important objectives of international law appeared to be in conflict: that of peace and that of justice. The former objective is set out in the rules of the U.N. Charter against the use of force by states except in self-defense against an armed attack. The second is found in the provisions of the Charter and in various resolutions, declarations, and covenants pertaining to fundamental human rights and self determination.

John Rawls: A Theory of Justice

Abstract: It may be helpful to those who are not familiar with Rawls to plot his position against a better-known moral theory, namely utilitarianism. At any rate, on this side of the Atlantic, where no modern charter contains the compact under which we consent to be governed, the defence of truth and justice has most often in the last hundred years appeared to be in the hands of the utilitarians. This raises two immediate questions: first, is justice a "special department" of morality? And second, do we by this mean to commit ourselves further to the position that the province of justice is not (whatever be the case for the rest of morality) governed by the principles of utility? After looking at these questions, we can go on to assess the particular solution proposed by Rawls. It is perfectly possible to be, broadly, an utilitarian and yet to give the principles of justice a special status. For instance, in The Concept of Law, Professor Hart carefully distinguishes "fairness" (which roughly covers justice) from morality in general.1 And Hart, I suppose, is a modern utilitarian. Why should the two ever have been confused? The explanation can be found by looking at Mill's chapter on the connection between justice and utility.2 Mill rightly saw the idea of justice as an obstacle to the simple test of utility in assessing right and wrong. People, that is, went on referring to this rather old fashioned notion, and seemed remarkably attached to it, despite being urged to look to expediency instead. But to Mill, this notion of justice had to be either irrational or the reflection of the operation of a perhaps concealed principle of utility.

Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System

Abstract: ministration of justice has long been of theoretical and empirical interest to criminologists. Although many theoretical works assume that such discrimination exists, Terry has pointed out that this assumption has been made ".. . even though empirical research dealing with these issues is relatively sparse and poorly conceived." 1 For example, Lemert states that "Members of minority groups, migrants, and persons with limited economic means are often the. .. scapegoats of the frustrated police in our local communities." 2 Clinard makes a similar assumption: "It is a generally established fact that the Negroes, as well as Spanish speaking peoples, on the whole, are arrested, tried, convicted, and returned to prison more often than others who commit comparable offenses." 3 Sutherland and Cressey, without data, assert:

Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority

Abstract: No book of political philosophy since I read the great classics of the subject has stirred my thoughts as deeply as John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. But I shall not in this article offer a general assessment of this important and most interesting work. I shall be concerned with only one of its themes, namely, Rawls's account of the relationship between justice and liberty, and in particular with his conception that justice requires that liberty may only be limited for the sake of liberty and not for the sake of other social and economic advantages. I have chosen this theme partly because of its obvious importance to lawyers who are, as it were, professionally concerned with limitations of liberty and with the justice or injustice of such limitations. I choose this theme also because this part of Rawls's book has not, I think, so far received, in any of the vast number of articles on and reviews of the book which have been published, the detailed attention which it deserves. Yet, as Sidgwick found when he considered a somewhat similar doctrine ascribing priority to liberty over other values, such a conception of liberty, though undoubtedly striking a responsive chord in the heart of any liberal, has its baffling as well as its attractive aspect,' which becomes apparent when we consider, as Rawls intends that we should, what the application of this doctrine would require in practice. Part of what follows is concerned with a major question of interpretation of Rawls's doctrine and the rest is critical. But I am very conscious that I may have failed to keep constantly in view or in proper perspective all the arguments which Rawls, at different places in this long and complex work, concentrates on the points which I find unconvincing. I would not therefore be surprised if my iinterpretation could be corrected and my criticisms answered by some further explanation which the author could supply. Indeed I do not write to confute, but mainly in the hope that in some of the innumerable future

In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice

Abstract: A Theory of Justice' is a remarkable book. It is learned and ambitious, deep (though multileveled), subtle (though lucid), rich and complex. It has been received with favor and fanfare by distinguished philosophical critics.2 Its topic can hardly be disdained by devotees of the law. Some books are like cathedrals. Depth, subtlety, richness and complexity may retard comprehension however much they reward it ultimately. It is impossible to grasp and absorb this book's architectonic, hence its meaning, by simply reading it through no matter how studiously. Some sort of focused interrogative strategy may help one come to grips with Professor Rawls' monumental utterance. I have chosen to seek understanding through this not-so-philosophical question: How does the book bear upon the work of legal investigators concerned or curious about recognition, through legal processes, of claimed affirmative rights (let us call them \"welfare rights\") to education, shelter, subsistence, health care and the like, or to the money these things cost? 3 On the face of it, the bearing would appear to be direct and profound. An apparent main purpose of Rawls' book is to advance and clarify discourse about claims respecting distribution, transfer, and provision of social goods including material social goods-income, wealth, and what you can buy with them. Opinion abounds (Rawls evidently shares it)4 that our society is marked by evident and severe distributive injustice. Followers of the law may fairly worry about seeming disconnection between our ingrained notions of a legal order and these urgent, if debatable,5 questions of distributive justice-at least insofar as we mean by \"distributive justice\" an outcome-oriented

Taxation of Wage Income for Economic Justice

Abstract: The conception of distributive justice advocated by John Rawls, most comprehensively in A Theory of Justice , appears to be the first complete principle of social choice to command wide and serious interest since the time of sum-of-satisfactions utilitarianism. This chapter discusses the implications of the Rawls' criterion for the graduated taxation of wage incomes within the context of two simple models of household earning decisions. It describes the criterion and Rawls' defense of this principle. Rawls refers to the general concept of justice as the notion of a standard by which the distribution of the burdens and benefits from cooperation by the individuals in society is to be determined. The particular conception of justice, the specific distribution criterion, argued for in Justice is what he calls the difference principle: in the just economy, the welfare of the worst-off is as large as is feasible. The principle does not imply the obliteration of all inequalities in well-being. Differences in liberty and opportunity, income, and other primary social goods are justifiable insofar as they benefit the least well-off. It is the modern-day analogue of Aquinas: everything for the greater utility of the poor.

Morocco Under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas 1912-1956

Abstract: Lyautey and "la politique indigene" the pacification of the tribes the Berber policy the sultan and tribal policy Pachas and Caids the great Caids use of religious leaders in tribal areas officiers des affaires indigenes and controleurs civils land policy of the protectorate agricultural and other developments in tribal areas education in tribal areas health policy in tribal areas justice in tribal areas the Jemaas Moroccans as soldiers and workers the effect of French rule upon the tribes appendices.

Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods

Abstract: In this paper, I shall consider the use of the concept of primary goods in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. I will aim to cast doubt on two claims which Rawls makes on behalf of his theory. I will argue that justice as fairness is more of a teleological ethical theory than Rawls would like to admit. I will also argue that Rawls's "original position" is not significantly more "minimal" than the initial situations of other contract theories. On this basis, I will suggest that, if one's most strongly held ethical judgments do not come close to those of a liberal democrat,' one may have very little reason for accepting Rawls's theory of justice.

Black Police in America

Abstract: ducted in the past have any merit, the average police officer is aggressive, has a strong sense of right and wrong, a distaste of moral turpitude in others, an inquisitive nature, the inclination to serve as an arbiter of morals, little fear, and a cynicism based on "every one has his price." Left out of these characteristics are feelings of compassion, understanding, sensitivity, restraint, impartiality, justice, and, most important, the courage to take actions and positions that are unpopular at a particular time but are, in fact, based on logic and compassion. There are many more characteristics, but these, perhaps, are the most important. At this point we may develop a divergency. The divergency is one based on color and the results this difference will have on the

The Common Good as Reason for Political Action

Abstract: "The common good," under one name or another, has had an important place in traditional political philosophy. Aristotle used the concept of "the common interest" (to koinei sympheron) as the basis for his distinction between "right" constitutions, which are in the common interest, and"wrong" constitutions, which are in the interest of the rulers; at one point he seems to equate "the common interest" with "justice."' Saint Thomas Aquinas declared "the common good" (bonum commune) to be the end of law and government.2 Locke maintained that "the peace, safety, and public good of the people" are the ends of political society, and went on to say that "the well being of the people shall be the supreme law."3 Hume argued that "social conventions" are both adopted and are given moral support because they serve the "public" or "common" interest.4 Madison spoke of the "public," "common," or "general" good together with justice, and said that justice is the end of government and civil society.5 Rousseau took "the common good" (le bien common) to be the object of the general will and the end of the state.6 Although these philosophers held quite particular views of what the common good consists in, and of what government should do to promote it, they nevertheless agreed that it is the end of government, that it is a good of all the citizens, and that no government should become the perverted servant of special interests, whether these special interests be conceived on the pattern of Aristotle's "interest of the rulers," or Locke's "private good," or Hume's and Madison's "interested factions,"

Social efficiency: A concise introduction to welfare economics

Abstract: PREFACE In this book, the main elements of welfare economics are presented in concise form. Welfare economics is that part of economics that, among other things, attempts to explain how to identify and arrive at socially efficient solutions to the resource allocation problems of the national (or local) economy. Expressed in another way, welfare economics tries to reduce the set of alternatives containing the 'best' solution for the economy by eliminating such solutions as can be shown to be inferior to other feasible solutions. The next step - choosing the 'best' or 'optimum' among the alternatives in this reduced set - is a question of subjective values and hence, not within the province of scientific analysis. The book is primarily intended as a university text for the 'advanced beginner' I believe that large parts of it, however, are accessible to other readers who have a serious interest in the efficiency problems of the economy. It should be observed that Chapters 2, 3 and 4 can each be read independently of the preceding parts of the book. It is difficult, however, to obtain a firm grasp of the contents of the book- and of Chapter 1 in particular - without prior elementary knowledge of microeconomic theory: the theory of the economic behaviour of firms and households. (See the list of literature

Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified

Abstract: All discrimination is wrong prima facie because it violates justice, and that goes for reverse discrimination, too. The practice of reverse discrimination undermines the foundation of the very ideal in whose name it is advocated; it destroys justice, law, equality, and citizenship itself, and replaces them with power struggles and popularity contests. Each works to catch the public eye and political popularity by whatever means of advertising and power politics lend them to the effort, to capitalize as much as possible on temporary popularity until the restless mob picks another group to feel sorry for. In a political context, equality is specified as “equal rights”—equal access to the public realm, public goods and offices, equal treatment under the law—in brief, the equality of citizenship. Just as the discrimination did, the reverse discrimination violates the public equality which defines citizenship and destroys the rule of law for the areas in which the favors are granted.

Aesthetic Welfare, Aesthetic Justice, and Educational Policy.

Abstract: The concept of aesthetic welfare if it can be framed clearly and concretely-ought to be useful in our thinking about some broad and fundamental problems. It could identify a distinguishable area of concern as a subject of public policy, in terms of which a basic educational goal might be defined. It could contribute to our understanding of what is involved in some difficult political choices and help to make these choices more rational.1

Max Weber's Politics and Political Education

Abstract: In December, 1915, Max Weber published an article on "Bismarck's Foreign Policy and the Present" in the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung, inaugurating more than twenty political tracts written in the closing years of his life. During the same period the conceptual introduction to his monumental scientific treatise, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, was being written, as were the later parts of the Religionssoziologie dealing with China, India, and the ancient Hebrew community. With the possible exception of "Politics as a Vocation"-a brilliant summation of what was being said elsewhere in his work'-it is remarkable that our knowledge of Weber has been based almost exclusively on the scholarly volumes. By uncritically accepting the common distinction between "scholarship" and "partisanship," to cite the terms employed in a recent study, we have failed to do justice to the political concerns connecting the sociological analyses with the so-called "political writings."2 Since these writings contained a major theoretical critique of contemporary politics and addressed an extensive national audience in addition to the scientific community, they had considerable importance for Weber himself. Through them we begin to perceive the fundamental political nature of his thought, even in its more detached scientific expressions. This fact alone should give pause to those who still wish to see Weber as only a "pure scientist" quietly pursuing "value-free" inquiry. This latter onesided image of Weber, which has found its home in American social science, can be explained in part by the needs of the new science of society to develop and integrate

The 1973 Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers: The Economic Role of Women

Abstract: The 1973 Economic Report of the President devotes an entire chapter (ch. 4) to the economic role of women in the United States. In this chapter, the Report recognizes that economic discrimination against women exists and, by the length and thoroughness of the analysis describing its dimensions and consequences, implies that such discrimination constitutes a serious economic (and social) problem. The Report does not attempt to minimize the extent to which job segregation, earnings differentials, higher unemployment rates exist, and the lack of improvement in each component over the last few decades. As economists, we are particularly pleased to have the official imprimatur of an Economic Report on the view that discrimination does indeed exist. Some economists have the tendency to minimize the importance of nonpecuniary forces in influencing decisions made within the firm, and have been reluctant to admit the possibility of discrimination unrelated to real or perceived productivity differences. We believe that a proper analysis of discrimination is yet to come; such an analysis will have to fuse elements of economics, sociology, psychology, and history. Employers do refuse to hire women for certain occupations. Instead they hire men exclusively and pay them more than they would have to pay women of equal ability. The court records are now full of such cases,' but such data will never be explained on the basis of a model which includes in the objective function of the employer only monetary profits. Nor can models which assume that employers' decisions about hiring are based on inborn, unchanging, unexplained "tastes" do justice to the social forces, both internal and external to the firm, which bear on such decisions. Specifically, it is well known that the average woman college graduate who works full time all year ends up with about the same income as the average male high school dropout. The gross earnings differential works out to be between 35 and 57 percent, depending on the data base used to make the calculation. The Report puts the differential due to discrimination at about 20 percent, but this seems low. In a recent article, Isabel Sawhill reviewed seven econometric studies of male-female earnings patterns. In six of them,2 the differences which could be attributed to discrimination were above 29 percent and ranged up to 43 percent. The seventh study3 estimated the difference which might be attributable to discrimination as 12 percent, but arrived at this figure by classifying as nondiscriminatory the differences in the distribution of men and women among detailed occupations. Since

Aequabilitas in Cicero's Political Theory, and the Greek Tradition of Proportional Justice

Abstract: This inquiry starts from two passages in book 1 of Cicero's de Re Publica, both concerned with the failings of democracy as a political form. The first occurs in Scipio Aemilianus' opening criticism of the three unmixed constitutions. The weakness of democracy is that (1. 43)cum omnia per populum geruntur quamvis iustum atque moderatum, tamen ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis:

Three Patterns of Social Mobility in Medieval History

Abstract: Three Patterns of Social Mobility in Medieval History Medieval rulers and philosophers repeatedly affirmed that the divine will had established social inequality, and that the good Christian should be content with his station in life. "Let everyone," Charlemagne instructed his subjects in the early 8oos, "serve God faithfully in that order in which he is placed."' In an oft-quoted poem written about the year I000, Adalbero, Bishop of Laon, described the Christian community, which appeared to be one, as divided into those who prayed, those who fought, and those who labored; all functional groups had to fulfill their lawful duties, to assure for the people peace, justice, and salvation.2 "The dispensation of divine providence," Pope Gregory VII declared in I079, "ordered that there should be distinct grades and orders."3 He went on to state that the community could not exist without a diversity of social ranks, and without the subordination of the lesser orders to the greater. In I302 Pope Boniface VIII reiterated: "According to the law of the universe, all things are not reduced to order equally and immediately; but the lowest through the intermediate and the intermediate through the superior."4 The members of each order should not aspire to the prerogatives and honors allotted to those in other social positions. Nor should Christians seek to surpass their peers in wealth or dignity. "He who has enough to satisfy his wants," the scholastic philosopher Henry of Langenstein concluded in the fourteenth century, "and nevertheless ceaselessly labors to acquire riches, either in order to obtain a higher social position or that subsequently he may have

A Critique of John Rawls's Principles of Justice

Abstract: In a well-known series of articles, beginning with "Justice as Fairness" in 1957, John Rawls has expounded a contractualist theory of justice as it applies to institutions and practices. It is based on the notions of fairness and reciprocity and is taken by Rawls as an improvement over utilitarian accounts of justice as maximum welfare. Where the latter allegedly treat society as a collective person and aim at maximizing its satisfactions without regard for the gains and losses of actual persons, Rawls's conception treats society distributively, taking into account the autonomy and right to satisfaction of each of its members. While I have some comments to make on this rationale for his theory, my main purpose in this paper is to show that Rawls's derivation of his principles of justice does not succeed. Although Rawls has not supplied us with a rigorous derivation, I think it is important to show that, in principle, such a derivation is impossible. Rawls has developed the following principles of justice, which are by now familiar: I. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Ila. Social and economic inequalities are arbitrary unless they are reasonably expected to be to the advantage of the representative man in each income class. Ilb. Inequalities are to attach to positions and offices equally open to all. Rawls's position is that these principles will be accepted freely by rational egoists in a contractual 'state of nature' or 'contract situation': "I think of these principles as those that would be chosen, at least in preference to other traditional alternatives, by rational persons in an original position of equality as their common conception of justice."' Contract doctrines tread a narrow path between empirical fact and theoretical construction. While used ostensibly to illustrate the logic of a concept,