Showing papers on "Enterprise software published in 1984"

The Public Enterprise Game

Abstract: In the theoretical literature of public enterprise economics, the almost exclusive concern is with normative propositions such as welfare-optimal pricing and investment rules.1 It is however quite clear that public enterprises do not voluntarily adopt these rules and they do not constitute a description of how public enterprises actually behave. It would appear useful and interesting to try to develop positive models of public enterprise behaviour, for three main reasons. First, public enterprises as a group are a significant part of the resource allocation process in the economy of the United Kingdom and several other countries, and we should be able to explain and predict their behaviour. Secondly, such models may throw light on the vexed question of the control of the nationalised industries, a problem which seems no nearer solution more than thirty years after the main nationalised industries were created. Finally, a rigorous study of the likely behaviour of public enterprises should help in discussion of the case for nationalisation itself, vis-a-vis other institutional structures, such as regulation, as ways of coping with market failure. A previous paper2 developed a positive model of the public enterprise by taking it to be an entity which maximises utility subject to constraints. The enterprise is assumed to act in the interests of those who operate it, its managers and workers. Managers prefer more output to less. Workers prefer higher employment and wages to lower. The constraints are of two kinds: the usual demand and production functions of standard economic analysis (though subject to uncertainty); and control constraints imposed by government, comprising a profit target and capital ration. This rather straightforward model yields equilibrium predictions which accord well with certain stylised facts of public enterprises, and so provides an explanation of these facts. Some results of that analysis will be used in the present paper. In analysing public enterprise behaviour, it is however too simplistic to take the control constraints as given. They are not simply imposed by government, but rather are the outcomes of a process of discussion and negotiation. Both the profit target and capital allocation will depend on information supplied to government by the enterprise and, de facto, have to be agreed to by both sides.3 The main purpose of this paper is to present a formal model of this process and consider its implications for resource allocation.

Toward an Enterprise Information System Design Methodology

Abstract: During the past decade, the growth of enterprise information systems based on large, integrated databases has focused attention on the need to develop structured guidelines for the design of such databases. This need is underscored by the demand for increased productivity on the part of information system developers, the fact that database design responsibility often falls on inexperienced individuals and the increased expense for maintaining complex databases. Despite considerable research efforts focused on developing design guidelines, the concept of logical database design remains a distant, elusive, and poorly understood art for many in applications development. As a result, the quality of database design varies from one individual to another based on their experience, knowledge of the application, etc. Design methodologies are clearly needed which are effective, easily learned and based on sound engineering principles.