Showing papers on "Happiness published in 1984"

Subjective Well-Being

Abstract: The literature on subjective well-being (SWB), including happiness, life satisfaction, and positive affect, is reviewed in three areas: measurement, causal factors, and theory. Psychometric data on single-item and multi-item subjective well-being scales are presented, and the measures are compared. Measuring various components of subjective well-being is discussed. In terms of causal influences, research findings on the demographic correlates of SWB are evaluated, as well as the findings on other influences such as health, social contact, activity, and personality. A number of theoretical approaches to happiness are presented and discussed: telic theories, associationistic models, activity theories, judgment approaches, and top-down versus bottom-up conceptions.

Subjective Well-being

Abstract: The literature on subjective well-being (SWB), including happiness, life satisfaction, and positive affect, is reviewed in three areas: measurement, causal factors, and theory. Psychometric data on single-item and multi-item subjective well-being scales are presented, and the measures are compared. Measuring various components of subjective well-being is discussed. In terms of causal influences, research findings on the demographic correlates of SWB are evaluated, as well as the findings on other influences such as health, social contact, activity, and personality. A number of theoretical approaches to happiness are presented and discussed: telic theories, associationistic models, activity theories, judgment approaches, and top-down versus bottom-up conceptions.

Conditions of Happiness

Abstract: 1 Introduction.- 2 The Concept of Happiness.- 2/1 The various meanings of the word happiness.- 2/2 Happiness defined.- 2/3 Components of happiness.- 2/4 Adjacent concepts.- 2/5 Synonyms of happiness.- 2/6 Summary.- 3 Can Happiness be Measured?.- 3/1 Validity problems.- 3/2 Reliability problems.- 3/3 Problems of comparison.- 3/4 Summary.- 4 Indicators of Happiness.- 4/1 Indicators of overall happiness.- 4/1.1 Direct questions.- 4/1.2 Indirect questions.- 4/1.3 Ratings by others.- 4/2 Indicators of hedonic level of affect.- 4/2.1 Direct questions.- 4/2.2 Indirect questions.- 4/2.3 Ratings by others.- 4/3 Indicators of contentment.- 4/4 Composites.- 4/5 Do the three kinds of indicators tap different phenomena?.- 4/6 Summary.- 5 Gathering the Available Data.- 5/1 Searching empirical happiness studies.- 5/2 The studies found.- 5/3 Presenting the findings.- 5/4 Limitations of the data.- 5/5 Summary.- 6 Happiness and Living Conditions.- 6/1 Happiness and society.- 6/1.1 Economic conditions.- 6/1.2 Political conditions.- 6/1.3 Peace and war.- 6/1.4 Some regional differences in happiness.- 6/2 Happiness and one's place in society.- 6/2.1 Gender.- 6/2.2 Age-differences.- 6/2.3 Minority status.- 6/2.4 Income.- 6/2.5 Education.- 6/2.6 Occupational prestige.- 6/2.7 Global social rank.- 6/3 Happiness and work.- 6/3.1 Having a job or not.- 6/3.2 Occupation.- 6/3.3 Voluntary work.- 6/4 Happiness and intimate ties.- 6/4.1 Marriage.- 6/4.2 Children.- 6/4.3 Friends and relatives.- 6/5 Summary.- 7 Happiness and Individual Characteristics.- 7/1 Happiness and personal resources.- 7/1.1 Physical health.- 7/1.2 General mental effectiveness.- 7/1.3 Specific abilities.- 7/1.4 Activity level.- 7/1.5 Richness of mental life.- 7/2 Happiness and some personality traits.- 7/2.1 Perceived fate control.- 7/2.2 Defensive strategies.- 7/2.3 Tendencies to like things.- 7/2.4 Time orientation.- 7/3 Happiness and lifestyle.- 7/4 Happiness and longings.- 7/5 Happiness and convictions.- 7/5.1 Happiness and ethical values.- 7/5.2 Religion.- 7/5.3 (Un)-conventionality of outlook.- 7/5.4 Views on happiness.- 7/6 Happiness and appreciations.- 7/6.1 Appreciation of oneself.- 7/6.2 Appreciation of other people.- 7/6.3 Appreciation of society.- 7/6.4 Appreciation of one's social position.- 7/6.5 Appreciation of one's work.- 7/6.6 Appreciation of leisure.- 7/6.7 Appreciation of one's living environment.- 7/6.8 Appreciation of one's health.- 7/6.9 Which global life-aspect-satisfactions are most closely related to happiness?.- 7/7 Summary.- 8 Antecedents of Happiness.- 8/1 Happiness and earlier living conditions.- 8/1.1 Conditions in youth.- 8/1.2 Earlier conditions in adulthood.- 8/2 Happiness and earlier personal characteristics.- 8/3 Summary.- 9 Conclusions.- 9/1 Conditions of happiness.- 9/1.1 Which correlates represent causes?.- 9/1.2 Variations in correlations.- 9/1.3 The correlates in context.- 9/1.4 Some lines for further research.- 9/2 Myths about happiness.- 9/2.1 The myth that modern western society is a sink of unhappiness.- 9/2.2 Myths about things that make for happiness in western societies.- 9/2.3 The myth that living conditions do not matter.- 9/2.4 The myth that happiness is not a significant matter.- References.- Author index.

Mood influences on helping: Direct effects or side effects?

Abstract: A review of the literature concerning the promotive influence of experimentally generated happiness and sadness on helping suggested that (a) increased helping among saddened subjects is an instrumental response designed to dispel the helper's negative mood state, and (b) increased helping among elated subjects is not an instrumental response to (maintain) the heightened effect but is a concomitant of elevated mood. A derivation from this hypothesis—that enhanced helping is a direct effect of induced sadness but a side effect of induced happiness—was tested in an experiment that placed subjects in a happy, neutral, or sad mood. Through a placebo drug manipulation, half of the subjects in each group were led to believe that their induced moods were temporarily fixed, that is, temporarily resistant to change from normal events. The other subjects believed that their moods were labile and, therefore, manageable. As expected, saddened subjects showed enhanced helping only when they believed their moods to be changeable, whereas elated subjects showed comparable increases in helping whether they believed their moods to be labile or fixed. An impressively large body of experimental work indicates that adult benevolence is increased by a variety of mood-inducing procedures. Interestingly, such procedures have been shown to enhance helping when they have led either to the temporary mood state of happiness or sadness (cf. Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; Krebs, 1970; Rosenhan, Karylowski, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981). One general interpretive account of this pattern is that helping occurs as an active response designed to manage the temporary mood state. That is, individuals help so as to relieve their own sadness and maintain happiness. A presumption of this instrumental view of mood-based benevolence is that adult altruism possesses a self-gratifyin g quality that allows it to influence mood state favorably. Evidence that altruists find prosocial action rewarding comes from several sources. Weiss and his coworkers (Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, & Stitch, 1973; Weiss, Buchanan, Alstatt, & Lombardo,

Consequences of Retirement

Abstract: Six longitudinal data sets were used to examine the consequences of retirement controlling for preretirement characteristics. Results show (a) about one-half to three-fourths of income differences between retired and working men was caused by retirement; (b) little, if any, of the health differences are caused by retirement; (c) there are few effects of retirement on social activity; and (d) there are few effects on attitudes such as life satisfaction and happiness. Early retirement, however, has stronger effects than retirement at normal ages. The results show that retirement has different effects depending on type of outcome and timing of retirement.

The analysis and measurement of happiness as a sense of well-being

Abstract: General happiness is philosophically construed as a sense of well-being which in turn has been defined either as a complete and lasting satisfaction with life-as-a-whole or as a preponderance of positive over negative feelings. A factor analysis of thirteen well-being scales shows that these two definitions coalesce into a single general well-being factor which is distinguishable only from an independent stress/worries factor. Further evidence shows that familiar scales of neuroticism, depression and trait anxiety measure the same well-being dimension if only in the negative half-range. So does a list of somatic complaints. Various two-factor models of well-being that treat positive and negative affect as independent processes, or that distinguish between affective and cognitive components, are challenged on the grounds that they depend on the properties of Bradburn’s affect scales which are found to be highly dependent on methodological parameters. Attention is drawn here to the role of test method effects and curvilinearities as factors influencing inter-scale correlations and structural models. It is concluded that well-being is a robust, primary dimension of human experience and that happiness research is alive and well in psychology.

Value Judgments: Toward a Relational Theory of Happiness

Abstract: This chapter presents a theory of happiness. Its basic premise is that the experienced value of any event depends upon comparisons with other events. Values are relative. This is a theory about what they are relative to.

New money, and old man/lady and ‘Two's company’: Subjective Welfare in the NORC General Social Surveys, 1972–1982

Abstract: The nine surveys, dozens of variables, and more than ten thousand cases in the NORC General Social Surveys, 1972–1982, allow one to test a variety of cross-sectional and over-time hypotheses about Subjective Welfare (Happiness). I used discrete multivariate analyses to test five hypotheses: (1) the Economist's prediction that Happiness is a function of income; the Sociologist's hypotheses that Happiness is a function of (2) rank on various evaluated dimensions and (3) number of social ties; and the Psychologist's hypotheses that Happiness is affected by (4) social comparisons and (5) adaptation. None of the five is supported impressively, but three variables emerge as good cross-sectional predictors — Race (Blacks are less Happy, but not necessarily because of discrimination), Marital Status (all categories of nonmarried are less happy) and Financial Change (those whose finances are improving are happier, those who finances have turned for the worse are less happy). When Marital Status and Recent Financial Change are used in a year-to-year social indicator model, fluctuations in the predictors produce significant but small changes in Happiness.

The Concept of Happiness

Abstract: The term ‘happiness’ has a long history. It has figured in Western thought ever since antiquity. Over the years the term has been endowed with many different meanings. Its history is in fact characterized by a continuous debate about what it constitutes.

Ideals of the Good Life: A Longitudinal/Cross-Sectional Study of Evaluative Reasoning in Children and Adults

Abstract: This four-year, longitudinal/cross-sectional study investigates the plausibility of a structural model of evaluative reasoning about ideals of the good life and justice reasoning with subjects ranging in age from 5 to 72 The construct of evaluative reasoning, which includes both moral and non-moral components, is specified both psychologically and philosophically and distinguished from other developmental constructs such as justice reasoning It is claimed that the model is normative Support is found for this claim in an analysis of five schools of thought from traditional ethical theory that results in a minimal conception of the good life upon which the differing ethical theories might agree A scoring manual for evaluative reasoning in the domains of good life, good work, good friendship, and the good person is presented with high reliability and internal validity It is shown that, with the findings to date, the stage sequence constructed meets the general Piagetian criteria for a structural stage model It is also shown that much of the meaningful content of evaluative reasoning can be classified according to categories derived from traditional ethics and metaethics Particular analyses are focused on adult structural development It is shown that a significant percentage of individuals over 20 years old continue their development in both evaluative and justice reasoning and that the post-conventional stages that are postulated in both models are restricted to members of this age group It is also shown that advanced education beyond the baccalaureate level is a significant factor in the development of post-conventional reasoning It has been a central tenet of structural-developmental psychology to focus on the consistent and universal, rather than the anomalous and unique aspects of human development (Piaget, 1968; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981) With this guiding principle, research has consisted of investigations of those human activities that share a universal function, for example, logical thinking (Piaget, 1954) and certain forms of moral, social, and epistemological reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Selman, 1980; Broughton, 1978) Following this paradigm, it is the purpose of this study to show that aspects of both moral and non-moral evaluative reasoning, conceived of here under the general construct "ideals of the good life," also conform to a universal human function and, as such, are appropriate for structural-developmental investigation and analysis Drawing from both developmental psychology and ethical philosophy, this work defines a structural, hierarchical model of evaluative reasoning about the good life Its general conclusions are that, although such reasoning varies across persons, it does not vary randomly On the contrary, evidence will be presented here to show that value reasoning has underlying structural components that fall into a sequential pattern of developmental stages, the highest of which, it will be claimed, meets philosophical criteria of adequacy Thus, parallel to Kohlberg's (1981; 1973a) model of justice reasoning, the normative aspect of this constructed model of evaluative reasoning about the good life relies on a philosophically justified articulation of the highest stage In addition to categorizing structures into developmental stages, it will be shown that the content of ethical reasoning can be categorized in a meaningful way, that is supported both empirically and theoretically These categories represent "philosophical orientations," defined not in terms of the underlying structure of value reasoning, but in terms of the actual ultimate values that cohere an individual's philosophy of the good life Thus, in conjunction with a theory of structural development, a content analysis model will also be presented The term "ideals of the good life" may bring to mind many different concepts It represents the general construct of the present study and is constructed from both traditional ethics and structuraldevelopmental psychology The operational definition of the good life that will be used in this study is, first, the combined set of human ideals that persons affirm in normative evaluative judgments about the good life, in general, and about good work, good friendship or relationship, and the good person, in particular Second, it is the sets of reasons individuals give in support of these judgments Thus, operationally, ideals of the good life consist of two major components The first is a description of what traits of character, objects, actions, or experiences are truly good The second concerns the justification of this description It is these ideals that are structurally represented in the sequential stage model The psychological approach to ethics has been to describe the phenomena and/or the development of human valuing This approach interprets observable behavior and reasoning involved in the processes and consequences of ethical reasoning The aim is to explain, rather than to prescribe, the development and expression of values or moral principles In the present work, psychology is coupled with philosophy to form a philosophically supported psychological theory There are two main reasons for the necessity of philosophy in a study of evaluative reasoning about the good life The first and most obvious reason is that ideas concerning value or the good are ethical in nature To say something is good is to make an ethical claim and ethics is a philosophical domain In this study, ethical theory provides not only a systematic analysis of morality and value, but also a philosophical conception of the person and of "the good life" For example, the present conception of stages of evaluative reasoning is dependent on a philosophical conception of the person as a rational human being capable of making and acting upon autonomous life choices (Rawls, 1971) In accordance with Rawls, it is assumed that, to one degree or another, persons formulate rational life plans that are organized by their conceptions of the good These conceptions are comprised of ideals and virtues, the fulfillment of which leads to happiness In order for one to have a rational life plan based on the good, the organization of the plan must form a structure that is generally consistent across domains of experience; that is, each individual must construct a consistent philosophy of what is good Generally, the structure of the good is viewed as an organization of values and ideals that provide individuals with both motivation and meaningfulness in life Specifically, the structure of the good provides a consistent set of criteria that the individual uses in making evaluative decisions and judgments It is this very philosophical conception that guides the present study of ideals of the good life and that has a significant impact on both its psychological theory and its methodology The second reason for the necessity of philosophy is that the present developmental model is a normative one; that is, it is claimed that the highest stage is most adequate Such a claim requires a philosophical as well as a psychological conception of adequacy Although the fundamental scheme of this study is psychological and, thus, primarily descriptive, part of any developmental analysis includes an explanation of where development leads Typically, such psychological analyses blur the boundaries between descriptive and prescriptive work

Social Stressors as Antecedents of Change

Abstract: The potential importance of social stressors as shapers of long-term change in adult functioning has been recognized in recent theoretical work. This paper evaluated the impact of several types of stressors, including life events, transitions, hassles, and societal problems such as war or economic depression on happiness and symptoms. The role of selected social and psychological characteristics also was explored. Respondents included 62 men and 72 women who were interviewed four times over an 11-year period. Life stage, symptoms, and self-criticism at baseline were found to predict subsequent stress history, and the stress measures themselves were intercorrelated over time. In the prediction phase of the study, the stress measures made the greatest contribution to the prediction of happiness for both men and women, whereas both initial symptom level and social stressors contributed to the prediction of symptoms manifest at the 11-year follow up.

Class, housework, and happiness: Women's work and life satisfaction

Abstract: Large-sample surveys often fail to find a difference in self-reported satisfaction between housewives and employed women. Several explanations that have been offered for this failure are explored here in greater detail. The suggestion that the ease of housewives' lives is experienced as a benefit compensating for fewer satisfactions in other areas is rejected; greater time pressure is associated with greater satisfaction for housewives. The suggestion that working-class women are happier at home, while middle-class women prefer careers is also not supported; working-class women appear to be less satisfied with their lives and no more satisfied with their work whether the comparison group is working-class women with jobs or middle-class housewives. Social desirability, on the other hand, is found to be a major factor predicting the self-reported happiness of housewives, and the general issue of the role of social expectations in evaluating satisfaction is raised.

Autonomy and Utility

Abstract: Does the value of the good which utilitarians would maximize depend on the autonomy of those who experience it? In pursuing this question, I shall take account of two versions of utilitarianism, mental-state utilitarianism and want utilitarianism. The first identifies intrinsic good with pleasure; the second, with preference satisfaction. Later in the paper it will be important to distinguish between the two, but at the start the term "happiness" will refer to both indiscriminately. The utilitarian holds that actions should be evaluated by looking to their likelihood of maximizing happiness. No feature of an action is relevant to its rightness unless it affects the action's capability of increasing happiness. In particular, the fact that an action expresses autonomy, or is likely to increase the autonomy of the agent or others, is in itself of no special moral interest. Since as a rule people capable of autonomy want opportunities to live autonomously and find satisfaction in living autonomously, there is on utilitarian grounds abundant reason for increasing people's opportunity to live in that way. But the final reason for doing so is that people will be happier, not that autonomous life is worth promoting for its own sake. The bite in the utilitarian position is its exclusiveness. No one doubts that an action's effect of making people happy counts in its favor. But for many it is just perverse to suppose that happiness is the only proper final end of action. The idea that there is something more to pursue than happiness can be understood in two ways.

Purpose of the Study

Abstract: Since Classical times philosophers have been fascinated by the question of how happiness can effectively and lastingly be promoted. In that context many have wondered why all people are not equally happy, even not when living in identical conditions. I here is now a vast amount of literature on the matter. However, we are little wiser.

The "Sweet Life" in Toni Morrison's Fiction

Abstract: N each of her novels, The Bluest Eye (I970), Sula (I973), Song of Solomon (I 97 7), and Tar Baby (i 98 I), Toni Morrison juxtaposes two categories of people's dreams and aspirations, visions of how life should be lived. The first dreamtypes are idyllic, for their proponents' chief aims are to live in concord with people and nature while remaining true to their own heritage. In contrast, dreams in the second category advocate not brotherhood but the competitive acquisition of power or money. Based on values of an American society which cherishes outward "success," these secondcategory dreams teach that happiness lies in attaining power, that personal worth comes from being "number one." Throughout all four books, Morrison affirms the superiority of idyllic values over competitive-success ones; she clearly details the negative consequences of valuing power or wealth more than other people. Yet she also acknowledges the difficulty of being altruistic in twentieth-century America, the milieu which influences most of her characters. Morrison's first three novels take place in small, black American communities, and, while Tar Baby's setting is international, its main characters also grow up in the United States. As American youngsters in these novels mature, many simply have no role model from whom to learn the selfless dream of living in harmony with others. And, unfortunately, even those who do see idyllic values being lived are strongly attracted to glittery possibilities which "success" offers. Some of Morrison's characters do embrace idyllic values. More often, though, they opt to pursue competitive success, a choice which dooms them to lesser lives than they might otherwise have had. Showing differences between these two modes of living is one of the author's major themes. In several interviews, Morrison comments on her use of metaphors. For example, in a New Republic piece she discloses, "There

Family background and perceived marital happiness: a comparison of voluntary childless couples and parents.

Abstract: The purpose of theis paper is to examine the previously reported relationships between family background marital happiness and voluntary childlessness in light of data collected from samples of intentionally childless couples and parents in Winnipeg. The findings show that contrary to earlier assertions family background factors such as birth order size of family of orientation mothers employment and perceived parental happiness do not predispose individuals to voluntary childlessness. Further while the reported level of marital happiness is higher among childless couples the sources of marital dissatisfaction among parents are not always children. (authors)

Spiritual well-being and the consequential dimension of religiosity*

Abstract: Previous studies utilizing the consequential dimension of religiosity have had mixed results, with no clear conclusion about the worth of including this dimension in studies of religious behavior. We argue for a distinction between the correlates of religiosity and the consequences of religion. To study the consequential dimension, we mailed a questionnaire to a national sample of members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and obtained 1384 usable returns. Factor analysis identified seven religiosity factors, including three factors frequently studied in the past (public and private devotion and belief) and four possibly new consequential factors which we called the Beatitudes, integrity, loving service, and spiritual well-being factors. The consequential factors, especially the Beatitudes factor, are as influential as other religiosity factors in determining marital satisfaction and global happiness. Interrelationships among factors were explored. Our findings suggest a weak relationship between several measures of intrinsic religiosity, especially between the prayer factor and the consequential factors. Spiritual well-being is more closely related to extrinsic than to intrinsic religiosit~.

Happiness and Virtue in Socrates'Moral Theory

Abstract: I Άρeτή, eὐδαιμονία: their translationThe key terms in my title pose problems of translation with which I can only deal in the most cursory manner. On ‘virtue’ for ἀρeτἡ I need not linger at all, for whatever may be the general usage of ἀρeτἡ, Socrates' use of it is fixed beyond doubt by the fact that whenever he brings the general concept under scrutiny – as when he debates its teachability in the Protagoras and the Meno – he assumes without argument that its sole constituents or ‘parts’ (μόρια μέρη) are five qualities which are, incontestably, the Greek terms of moral commendation par excellence: ἀνδρeία, σωφρούνη, δικαιοσύνη, ὁσιότης, σοφία. ‘Happiness’ for eὐδαιμονία is a more contentious matter. Leading Aristotelians, Ross and Ackrill, have claimed that ‘well-being’ would be a better translation. But in their own translations of the E. N. both stick to ‘happiness’ all the same. It is not hard to see why they would and should. ‘Well-being’ has no adjectival or adverbial forms. This may seem a small matter to armchair translators – philosophers dogmatizing on how others should do the job. Not so if one is struggling with its nitty gritty, trying for clause-by-clause English counterparts that might be faithful to the sentence-structure, no less than the sense, of the Greek original. And ‘well-being’ suffers from a further liability: it is a stiff, bookish phrase, bereft of the ease and grace with which the living words of a natural language perform in a wide diversity of contexts. Eὐδαιμονία perfectly fits street-Greek and Aristophanic slapstick, yet also, no less perfectly, the most exalted passages of tragedy.

Between Feeling and Fact: Listening to Children

Abstract: Brenda Engel believes that parents and teachers can learn a great deal about young children's attitudes and fears about nuclear weapons by closely attending to their behavior. Here she analyzes a discussion that took place in a class of kindergarten through second-graders who were responding to the theme, "If I Were Boss of the World" The children's conversation reveals their attitudes toward war toys and war play as well as their inner distinctions between play and reality. Engel's commentary illuminates the way imaginative invention helps children sort out feelings, not only about war and nuclear weapons but about many aspects of their happiness and security in the world.

Feminism and the wish for a child

Abstract: The present study investigated the relationship between feminism and the intensity of the wish for a child, as well as the costs and benefits of having children in a sample of 184 female undergraduates. Feminism was negatively related to motivation for motherhood, and the perceived costs of child raising rather than perceived benefits accounted for this finding. Perceptions of mother's—not father's—level of nurturance and happiness of childhood seemed to influence eagerness to assume the role of mother in profeminist women.