Showing papers on "Loss aversion published in 1993"

Modeling Loss Aversion and Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice

Abstract: Based upon a recently developed multiattribute generalization of prospect theory's value function (Tversky and Kahneman 1991), we argue that consumer choice is influenced by the position of brands relative to multiattribute reference points, and that consumers weigh losses from a reference point more than equivalent sized gains (loss aversion). We sketch implications of this model for understanding brand choice. We develop a multinomial logit formulation of a reference-dependent choice model, calibrating it using scanner data. In addition to providing better fit in both estimation and forecast periods than a standard multinomial logit model, the model's coefficients demonstrate significant loss aversion, as hypothesized. We also discuss the implications of a reference-dependent view of consumer choice for modeling brand choice, demonstrate that loss aversion can account for asymmetric responses to changes in product characteristics, and examine other implications for competitive strategy.

Modeling Loss Aversion and Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice

Abstract: Based upon a recently developed multiattribute generalization of prospect theory's value function Tversky and Kahneman 1991, we argue that consumer choice is influenced by the position of brands relative to multiattribute reference points, and that consumers weigh losses from a reference point more than equivalent sized gains loss aversion. We sketch implications of this model for understanding brand choice. We develop a multinomial logit formulation of a reference-dependent choice model, calibrating it using scanner data. In addition to providing better fit in both estimation and forecast periods than a standard multinomial logit model, the model's coefficients demonstrate significant loss aversion, as hypothesized. We also discuss the implications of a reference-dependent view of consumer choice for modeling brand choice, demonstrate that loss aversion can account for asymmetric responses to changes in product characteristics, and examine other implications for competitive strategy.

Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Abstract: The equity premium puzzle, first documented by Mehra and Prescott, refers to the empirical fact that stocks have greatly outperformed bonds over the last century. As Mehra and Prescott point out, it appears difficult to explain the magnitude of the equity premium within the usual economics paradigm because the level of risk aversion necessary to justify such a large premium is implausibly large. We offer a new explanation based on Kahneman and Tversky's 'prospect theory'. The explanation has two components. First, investors are assumed to be 'loss averse' meaning they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently, even if they have long-term investment goals such as saving for retirement or managing a pension plan. We dub this combination 'myopic loss aversion'. Using simulations we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually. That is, investors appear to choose portfolios as if they were operating with a time horizon of about one year. The same approach is then used to study the size effect. Preliminary results suggest that myopic loss aversion may also have some explanatory power for this anomaly.

Loss Aversion in a Savings Model

Abstract: Psychological evidence indicates that a person's well-being depends not only on his current consumption of goods, but on a reference level determined by his past consumption. According to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, people care much more about losses relative to their reference points than about gains, are risk-averse over gains, and risk-loving over losses. We define these characteristics as loss aversion. We incorporate an extended form of loss aversion into a simple two-period savings model. Our main conclusion is that, when there is sufficient income uncertainty, a person resists lowering consumption in response to bad news about future income, and this resistance is greater than the resistance to increasing consumption in response to good news. We discuss some recent empirical research that confirms this predicted asymmetry in behavior, which seems inconsistent with other models of consumption.

Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Abstract: The equity premium puzzle, first documented by Mehra and Prescott, refers to the empirical fact that stocks have greatly outperformed bonds over the last century. As Mehra and Prescott point out, it appears difficult to explain the magnitude of the equity premium within the usual economics paradigm because the level of risk aversion necessary to justify such a large premium is implausibly large. We offer a new explanation based on Kahneman and Tversky's 'prospect theory'. The explanation has two components. First, investors are assumed to be 'loss averse' meaning they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently, even if they have long-term investment goals such as saving for retirement or managing a pension plan. We dub this combination 'myopic loss aversion'. Using simulations we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually. That is, investors appear to choose portfolios as if they were operating with a time horizon of about one year. The same approach is then used to study the size effect. Preliminary results suggest that myopic loss aversion may also have some explanatory power for this anomaly.

On the Value of Incumbency Managerial Reference Point and loss Aversion

Abstract: In discussing the market entry decision and the strategic interaction between an incumbent firm and an entrant the focus in the literature is on the different asymmetries that exist between the incumbent and the entrant. These asymmetries can be cost asymmetries, capacity asymmetries, information asymmetries or any other factor that affect the cash flow. In this paper we claim that there is also a great importance to the fact that one fir is in the industry and it is the incumbent while the other firm is outside the industry and that even without any other asymmetries between the firms we should expect a different behavior from the two types of firms. Making use of the existing literature on decision making under uncertainty the paper focus on reference dependent preferences and on loss aversion. The paper demonstrates that having different reference point affect the post entry game equilibrium and gives an advantage to the incumbent firm. We define this advantage as the value of incumbency. The paper demonstrates that the firms' reference points and loss aversions affect the self selecion of entrants and the type of industry that will emerge.