Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 2010"

Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan

Abstract: : This paper, written by the senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan and by a company-grade officer and a senior executive with the Defense Intelligence Agency, critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Based on discussions with hundreds of people inside and outside the intelligence community, it recommends sweeping changes to the way the intelligence community thinks about itself -- from a focus on the enemy to a focus on the people of Afghanistan. The paper argues that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade. This problem or its consequences exist at every level of the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, and pivotal information is not making it to those who need it. To quote General Stanley McChrystal in a recent meeting, "Our senior leaders -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States -- are not getting the right information to make decisions with... The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers." This is a need that spans the 44 nations involved with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This paper is the blueprint for that process. It describes the problem, details the changes and illuminates examples of units that are "getting it right." It is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals, in Afghanistan and in the United States and Europe.

Designing for collective intelligence

Abstract: A collective intelligence application is one that harnesses the knowledge and work of its users to provide the data for the application and to improve its usefulness. The most hyped examples of collective intelligence applications have been labeled as "Web 2.0" applications. Web 2.0 is an amorphous term used to define a computing paradigm that uses the Web as the application platform and facilitates collaboration and information sharing between users. Classic examples of Web 2.0 applications include: wikis, blogs (or Weblogs), social network services, and social bookmarking. Collective intelligence is not a new concept. As long ago as 1968, computer visionaries foresaw the ability of computers to be applied to cooperation in creative endeavors by allowing people capable of solving specific problems to share their ideas. However, collective intelligence has been gaining momentum as new tools supporting collaboration have become available. The concept of collective intelligence is now being explored by businesses interested in using it for collaborative innovation and by researchers interested in addressing systemic problems like climate change. Collective intelligence is a fundamentally different way of viewing how applications can support human interaction and decision making. Most traditional applications have focused in improving the productivity or decision making of the individual user. The emphasis has been on providing the tools and data necessary to fulfill a specific job function. Under the collective intelligence paradigm, the focus is on harnessing the intelligence of groups of people to enable greater productivity and better decisions than are possible by individuals working in isolation. The shift to a collective intelligence paradigm requires software developers to have different ways of thinking about how their how software might be used and what features would enable better visualization and use of information among groups of people. The new breed of collective intelligence applications needs to center around user defined data that can be reused to support decision making, team building, or to improve understanding of the world around us. The users of these systems should play a central role in defining what data is important and how the data is used. The essential features of collective intelligence applications are similar to the design patterns for Web 2.0 applications except that collective intelligence applications can be custom applications designed for small highly specialized domains instead of the larger Web audience served by most Web 2.0 applications. The seven principle collective intelligence application requirements are (adapted from O'Reilly): 1. Task specific representations: Domain specific collective intelligence applications should support views of the task that are tailored to the particular domain. 2. Data is the key: Collective intelligence applications are data centric and should be designed to collect and share data among users. 3. Users add value: Users of collective intelligence applications know the most about the value of the information it contains. The application should provide mechanisms for them to add to, modify, or otherwise enhance the data to improve its usefulness. 4. Facilitate data aggregation: The ability to aggregate data adds value. Collective intelligence applications should be designed such that data aggregation occurs naturally through regular use. 5. Facilitate data access: The data in collective intelligence applications can have use beyond the boundaries of the application. Collective intelligence applications should offer Web services interfaces and other mechanisms to facilitate the re-use of data. 6. Facilitate access for all devices: The PC is no longer the only access device for internet applications. Collective intelligence applications need to be designed to integrate services across handheld devices, PCs, and internet servers. 7. The perpetual beta: Collective intelligence applications are ongoing services provided to its users thus new features should be added on a regular basis based on the changing needs of the user community. The processes involved in designing and implementing specialized collective intelligence applications are discussed below in the context of DDtrac, a Web-based application that allows for the easy collection and summary of special education data.

The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939

Abstract: How realistically did the British government assess the threat from Nazi Germany during the 1930s? How accurate was British intelligence's understanding of Hitler's aims and Germany's military and industrial capabilities? In The Ultimate Enemy, Wesley K. Wark catalogues the many misperceptions about Nazi Germany that were often fostered by British intelligence. This book, the product of exhaustive archival research, first looks at the goals of British intelligence in the 1930s. He explains the various views of German power held by the principal Whitehall authorities-including the various military intelligence directorates and the semi-clandestine Industrial Intelligence Centre-and he describes the efforts of senior officials to fit their perceptions of German power into the framework of British military and diplomatic policy. Identifying the four phases through which the British intelligence effort evolved, he assesses its shortcomings and successes, and he calls into question the underlying premises of British intelligence doctrine. Wark shows that faulty intelligence assessments were crucial in shaping the British policy of appeasement up to the outbreak of World War II. His book offers a new perspective on British policy in the interwar period and also contributes a fascinating case study in the workings of intelligence services during a period of worldwide crisis.

Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Abstract: : The national security of the United States, our economic prosperity, and the daily functioning of our government are dependent on a dynamic public and private information infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer networks and systems, and the information residing within This critical infrastructure is severely threatened This cyber domain is exponentially expanding our ability to create and share knowledge, but it is also enabling those who would steal, corrupt, harm or destroy the public and private assets vital to our national interests The recent intrusions reported by Google are a stark reminder of the importance of these cyber assets, and a wake-up call to those who have not taken this problem seriously Companies who promptly report cyber intrusions to government authorities greatly help us to understand and address the range of cyber threats that face us all I am here today to stress that, acting independently, neither the US Government nor the private sector can fully control or protect the country's information infrastructure Yet, with increased national attention and investment in cyber security initiatives, I am confident the United States can implement measures to mitigate this negative situation

Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Abstract: : STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer the Intelligence Community's assessment of threats to US national security. I am pleased to be accompanied today by the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. The strategic landscape has changed considerably for US interests over the past year. We see some improvements, but also several entrenched problems and slow progress in some areas for the foreseeable future. Several large-scale threats to fundamental US interests will require increased attention, and it is on one of these threats that I will focus our initial discussion. The national security of the United States, our economic prosperity, and the daily functioning of our government are dependent on a dynamic public and private information infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer networks and systems, and the information residing within. This critical infrastructure is severely threatened. This cyber domain is exponentially expanding our ability to create and share knowledge, but it is also enabling those who would steal, corrupt, harm or destroy the public and private assets vital to our national interests. The recent intrusions reported by Google are a stark reminder of the importance of these cyber assets, and a wake-up call to those who have not taken this problem seriously. Companies who promptly report cyber intrusions to government authorities greatly help us to understand and address the range of cyber threats that face us all.

The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis

Abstract: 1. Definitions: what is intelligence, and intelligence analysis? 2. Intelligence Failure, and Success 3. From 3rd Reich to Al Qaeda: changing intelligence targets, evolving challenge 4. The Intelligence Environment: Political, cultural and ethical influences on intelligence analysis 5. Analytical Theory: The Art of Analysis 6. Analytical Theory: The Science of Analysis 7. Meeting the skills and training challenges 8. Conclusions: Art or Science?

Complaints are a firm's best friend

Abstract: The strategic intelligence literature includes many studies on the use of sales forces and exhibitions; however, customer complaints are generally sidestepped in the strategic intelligence context. This article takes a theoretical approach to the interaction between strategic intelligence and complaint management. From our literature review, we draw an exploratory model of the link between the two processes and emphasize the most important complaint handling initiatives for strategic intelligence, both for its gathering and protection aspects. An analytical presentation of the intelligence that can be collected from complaints is proposed. The research should be helpful to managers who want to understand better or design a complaint management system that is ‘strategic intelligence oriented’.

Colombia's FARC: A Portrait of Insurgent Intelligence

Abstract: The literature on intelligence little describes or comparatively analyzes the intelligence services of insurgent groups. This article partially fills the gap by assessing the intelligence activities of FARC – the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. FARC intelligence displays similarities to, as well as sharp differences from, the intelligence activities of other insurgent groups and established states. Like FARC as a whole, FARC intelligence is decentralized. Its strength is its focus on tactical military intelligence. Collection on strategic political issues, analysis, and counterintelligence are relatively weak. FARC's intelligence weaknesses limit its prospects for strategic success and its intelligence-related vulnerabilities offer the Colombian government opportunities to exploit.

Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance

Abstract: After major intelligence failures it is often asked why intelligence and security officials failed to heed the many ‘wake-up calls’ that had been provided by earlier failures and surprises. This article addresses this question by examining intelligence failures as ‘focusing events’, which is a concept used in the literature on government policy making to explain how disasters and crises can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn. It argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance – to be a true wake-up call – that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to increased intelligence collection and greater receptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers.

The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress

Abstract: This report provides an overview of Department of Homeland Security Intelligence (DHSI) both at headquarters and within the components. It examines how DHSI is organized and supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning; border security; critical infrastructure protection; and support to, and the sharing of information with, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It also discusses several oversight challenges and options that Congress may consider on certain issues.

Information Sharing Exploring the Intersection of Policing with National and Military Intelligence

Abstract: This article explores the intersection of (1) policing and police intelligence with (2) national intelligence and military intelligence. The premise is that for more than 150 years, prior to the events of September 11, 2001, police intelligence had little connection to national or military intelligence. Basically, national intelligence focused on serious world-wide political and economic threats to the nation's well-being; military intelligence focused specifically on military threats to the national security; the police focused their intelligence work on criminals who posed threats to individuals and local communities. A fairly clear division of labor was in place, based largely on the type and scale of threats.Since 9/11, however, it has become plausible that a small group of non-state actors, such as terrorists, could launch a serious attack against the nation using weapons of mass destruction, or even small arms, as in Mumbai. These individuals might live in a local U.S. community or halfway across the world, yet plan and execute a massive and violent attack against a local U.S. community. They might also commit ordinary crimes to help finance their larger intentions. In this new context of terrorism and asymmetric threats, a local police department might develop intelligence of significant interest to national and military intelligence, or vice versa.Important historical, conceptual, and policy issues associated with the intersection of national, military, and police intelligence are discussed more fully elsewhere. 1 This article presents the results of a small-scale study in which subject matter experts were asked to respond to several scenarios related to intelligence and information sharing, asking both what should happen and what would actually happen.U.S. POLICINGPolicing in the United States is civilian (non-military), predominantly local (funded and directed by local governments), and extremely fragmented. It is not just that police are distributed all around the country 2 - they mostly answer to local elected officials. The U.S. has almost 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies, roughly 16,000 of which are local. Of the remaining 2,000 agencies, the vast majority represent special jurisdictions (university police, transit police, park police, etc.), followed by state agencies, and lastly by federal non-military agencies. Out of 837,000 full-time sworn police personnel (armed with arrest authority), 74 percent work for local agencies, 13 percent work for federal law enforcement, and 13 percent work for state or special jurisdiction law enforcement agencies. 3The two largest components of U.S. policing are both local: municipal police departments (cities, towns, townships, boroughs, villages) and county sheriff's offices. 4 Two characteristics of these types of law enforcement agencies are absolutely essential for understanding their capabilities and contexts: most are small (77 percent have fewer than twenty-five full-time sworn officers), 5 and they are all independent of each other. There is no chain of command in the police industry - within individual agencies, yes, but among and between the 18,000 agencies, no. 6Along with industry structure, it is important to note a thing or two about police work and police culture. Particularly at the local and state levels, police officers in the field frequently act alone and without immediate supervision. Much of their work involves making "low visibility decisions" - especially when an officer's decision does not result in a report or an arrest (and most police actions and decisions do not), it is rarely subject to review. If an officer's decision does not result in a report or arrest, it probably will not produce any official information for later analysis. As Peter Manning notes, "information in police departments can best be characterized as systematically decentralized. …

Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence Community

Abstract: The article deals with the role and benefit added by the use of horizon scanning in intelligence analysis in the UK. It asserts that horizon scanning as a technique, while not entirely akin to the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, has much to contribute to its success. Specifically, is asserts that a horizon scanning function in the JIO and the Cabinet Office should be made permanent, as bureaucratic tumult in the wake of the 2010 SDSR have left the capability un-staffed, though still established. Within the UK intelligence community, such an organization may have positive roles to play in the processes of challenge, the setting of collection priorities, and overall long-term UK intelligence assessment at the national level.

The Technical Collection of Intelligence

Abstract: Technical collection represents the largest asymmetric edge that technologically advanced countries such as the United States and its allies have in the intelligence business. Intelligence veteran Robert M. Clark's new book offers a succinct, logically organized, and well written overview of technical collection, explained at a non technical level for those new to the field. Filling a void in the literature, "The Technical Collection of Intelligence" is the only book that comprehensively examines the collection, processing, and exploitation of non-literal intelligence information, including laser, acoustic, and infrared signals; non-imaging optical intelligence sources; and, radar tracking and measurement of aerospace vehicles. A compelling final chapter addresses the substantial challenges that come with managing technical collection. A stunning full-color interior design features high quality graphics while a handy 'tabs' feature keeps content at the ready. A useful list of recommended books and reports, a glossary of terms, and a list of acronyms make this guide a go-to resource. "Technical Collection" will prove invaluable to all source analysts, managers of technical collection, customers of intelligence, and recruiters for the intelligence community.

Creating Intelligence Communities

Abstract: This article analyses the factors bearing upon achieving organizational change in the world of secret intelligence in the US and the UK, identifying for success the need for a convincing narrative, adequate budgetary control and understanding of the special psycho-dynamics to be expected in secret organizations. The article examines in that light the different paths of development of the concept of a single national intelligence community in the US and in the UK, and identifies common reasons for renewed pressure in the light of the experiences of international terrorism and the pre-war failures of intelligence over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Both US and UK intelligence communities, for different reasons, are seen to be some way short of where they need to be to face the challenges of future intelligence work against global threats that span the domestic and overseas spaces.

Net-Centric Approaches to Intelligence and National Security

Abstract: This volume considers the web architectures and recent developments that make net-centric approaches for intelligence and national security possible.The development of net-centric approaches for intelligence, national and homelandsecurity applications has become a major concern in many areas such as defense intelligence and national and international law enforcement agencies, especially sincethe terrorist attacks of 9/11. Net-Centric Approaches to Intelligence and National Security presents developments in information integration and recent advances in web services including the concept of the semantic web. Discovery analysis and management of web-available data poses a number of interesting challenges for research in web-based management systems. Intelligent agents and data mining are among the techniques employed. A number of specific systems that are net-centric based in various areas of military applications, intelligence and law enforcement are presented utilizing one or more of such techniques.

On uncertainty and the limits of intelligence

Abstract: The Handbook discusses national security intelligence within a political and historical context, explaining how intelligence agencies operate and how they collect information from around the world. It examines the problems that come with transforming raw information into credible analysis, and the difficulties involved in disseminating intelligence to policymakers. This chapter focuses on uncertainty and the limits of intelligence.

Studies in Intelligence

Abstract: : The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger's desire to create within CIA an organization that could "think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems." The center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past activities, to explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and to stimulate serious debate about current and future intelligence challenges. To carry out this mission, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence, as well as numerous books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency's Historical Intelligence Collection of published literature on intelligence.

Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel

Abstract: Although Israel constitutes an interesting case for the study of civil—military relations, the role played by its Directory of Military Intelligence (AMAN) has rarely been discussed in this context. This role is of special interest, since Israel is the only liberal democracy today in which a military intelligence service functions as the leading national estimator not only in military but also in civilian affairs. The unique Israeli model is usually justified by Israel’s security concerns—primarily the threat of a sudden conventional attack. To test this model’s validity, this article (1) traces and elucidates its historical development; (2) employs five crucial mini case studies to test its practical success or failure; and (3) explains how, in light of the fact that AMAN failed in four of the five cases, its military characteristics create inherent weaknesses that hamper its ability to serve as a high-quality national intelligence estimator.

Agility and Interoperability for 21st Century Command and Control

Abstract: It is intended that this article be a contribution to the current Command and Control (C2) focus on power to edge principles, and the search for agility through self-synchronization. It adopts a social constructivist approach, drawing a great deal of input from political science for its theoretical foundation. In this regard, the article recognizes the fundamental ontological shift from our previous understanding of strategic interaction based primarily on calculations from the physical domain, to modern warfare that depicts two interacting domains for strategic reference, one physical and the other cognitive (or ideational). It sees the skills of battlespace intelligence analyst as the key to sense-making agility in fighting complex conflicts. Then drawing on a constructivist understanding and examples from a complex battlespace, it will suggest three mutually supporting analytical skill-sets for further experiment and research to promote analytical agility: Network philosophy; hypotheses generation and evaluation; and iterative model generation. It suggests that developing these generic skills in our military intelligence analysts will contribute greatly to building a more agile sense-making capacity within our warfighting organizations.

Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges: Insights from the Experiences of China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel

Abstract: : The RAND Corporation was asked to analyze how China, France, the UK, India, and Israel approach training for full-spectrum operations and deployments. This monograph should be of interest to those concerned with military training requirements. Material in the text was current as of October 2008, when research for the study was completed. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

‘Masters of today’: military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990–2009

Abstract: Military intelligence forms a vital element of counter-insurgency operations. When the Colombian military suffered setbacks at the hands of the FARC in the 1990s, military intelligence received much of the blame. It was also accused of human rights violations. With the help of US. financed Plan Colombia, military intelligence has been reorganized, expanded, strengthened with upgraded technical capabilities, constrained to operate within defined legal boundaries, and refocused to match the government's strategic priorities. Human intelligence has laid the groundwork for impressive tactical and operational results since 2006. Nevertheless, like all intelligence services, that of the Colombian military continues to experience problems of structure and political outlook.

Intelligence after Intellipedia: Improving the Push Pull Balance with a Social Networking Utility

Abstract: : In response to the terror threat following September 11, 2001, the United States set up an intelligence hub to aggregate and analyze data and intelligence produced by the 16 agencies and departments that make up the Intelligence Community. The hub, first called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and succeeded by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), collaborates with foreign allies and draws on at least 30 databases to track threats and determine the credibility of intelligence. There is now no shortage of data and information to be turned into intelligence; the new challenge lies in convincing agencies to truly cooperate to reach national security goals. This paper seeks to study various approaches for increasing cooperative problem solving by examining existing tools. It proposes better knowledge management through the implementation of database comparison tools within an online social network to encourage new, dynamic intelligence cooperation that connects the dots between isolated items of intelligence and thus makes intelligence more timely and actionable.

Intelligence Information and the 1909 Naval Scare: The Secret Foundations of a Public Panic:

Abstract: Many contemporary historians, echoing the views of the radical critics of the day, believe that the 1909 naval scare was a fabricated panic designed to bounce Asquith’s government into ordering extra battleships for the Royal Navy. By examining the intelligence information that lay behind the Admiralty’s claims that Germany had secretly ordered warships in advance of its programme and was covertly collecting materials for their rapid construction, this article contests this view. It demonstrates that the Admiralty really was in receipt of information on these points, that much of this information was accurate, and that the members of the Board were not, therefore, acting disingenuously when pressing the claim for a strong response. In proving this, the article also demonstrates that British intelligence-gathering activities in the era before the foundation of the Secret Service Bureau were more extensive and more successful than had previously been believed.

FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress

Abstract: : The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of 9/11. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism and 9/11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence; and share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. The Joint Inquiry concluded that the FBI was seriously deficient in identifying, reporting on, and defending against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. The FBI is responding by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is a restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He also has established an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); an Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements; and field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. This report identifies five options for Congress to consider: the creation of a domestic intelligence agency like Great Britain's MI-5, maintaining the status quo, transferring such responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security or to the Director of Central Intelligence, or creating a national security intelligence service within the FBI.

Issues in Intelligence Production: Summary of Interviews with Canadian Managers of Intelligence Analysts

Abstract: : Intelligence analysis provides important informational support to civilian and military decision makers. Recent intelligence failures of Canada's allies have been attributed mostly to cognitive, social, and organizational deficits and biases of individual analysts and intelligence agencies. Such attributions call for a comprehensive examination of the intelligence production from the socio-psychological perspective. The present report discusses findings from the interviews conducted with Canadian managers of intelligence analysts. The interviewed managers identified a number of pertinent issues in the intelligence production process that may be explicated through the application of the behavioural sciences' accumulated knowledge and methodology. The identified issues are discussed in light of the intelligence studies and behavioural sciences literature, and a roadmap for the behavioural sciences research program in support of the intelligence function is outlined.

The Unique Challenges of Terrorism Prosecutions: Towards a Workable Relation between Intelligence and Evidence

Abstract: The focus in this study isle on the unique challenges presented by terrorism prosecutions especially those relating to the disclosure of otherwise secret intelligence.. The first part of this paper will provide an historical outline of thinking about the distinction between security intelligence and evidence. The second part of this paper will outline some of the competing goals that should inform the relationship between security intelligence and evidence. The third part of this paper will examine issues related to the use of information collected by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as evidence while intelligence is generally collected under less demanding standards than evidence. The fourth part of this paper will examine disclosure requirements as they may be applied to intelligence. The fifth part of this paper will examine possible legislative restrictions on disclosure and through the expansion or creation of evidentiary privileges that shield information from disclosure. The sixth part of this paper will examine existing means to secure nondisclosure orders to protect the secrecy of intelligence in particular prosecutions. The seventh part of this paper will examine the procedures used in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia to resolve claims of national security confidentiality, with a view to understanding how the approaches used in those countries differ from those used in Canada and whether they provide a sounder basis for maintaining a workable and reliable relationship between security intelligence and evidence. The conclusion of this paper will assess strategies for making the relationship between intelligence and evidence workable. The strategies include both front-end strategies that will affect the collection of intelligence and back-end strategies relating to partial non-disclosure of intelligence that is not used as evidence. All of these issues are united by the need to establish a reliable, workable and fair relationship between intelligence and evidence. They raise fundamental questions about the viability of criminal prosecutions as a response to the threats of, and to acts of, international terrorism such as that which resulted in the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

A Knowledge Taxonomy for Army Intelligence Training: An Assessment of the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leaders Course Using Lundvall’s Knowledge Taxonomy

Abstract: Purpose: The events of September 11, 2001 and the succeeding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan changed intelligence requirements from those of the Vietnam era and the cold war. As a result, intelligence training was modified to keep up with matters such as globalization and counterinsurgency operations. This dynamic operational environment thus necessitates constant evaluation of intelligence training practices. This research has two purposes. First, it explores the different types of knowledge involved in military intelligence training. Second, it uses Lundvall’s Knowledge Taxonomy to assess the types of knowledge acquired through intelligence training at the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leader’s Course (MIBOLC). The four evaluated knowledge categories are know-what, know-how, know-who and know-why. Method: In conjunction with Lundvall’s knowledge taxonomy, this research uses four working hypotheses to explore the different types of knowledge that intelligence training provides to company-grade Army intelligence officers. While initially based on the taxonomy, the working hypotheses contain intelligence-related topics found in the literature supporting the postulated knowledge categories. Each working hypothesis contains sub-hypotheses that are used to supplement or reinforce their corresponding expectation. A case study methodology is used to assess the types of knowledge acquired at the MIBOLC. The data-collection techniques used in this research are document analysis, structured interviews, and direct observations. Findings: The results strongly support the existence of know-what and know-how knowledge training at the MIBOLC. Know-who and know-why knowledge training is also present but only in limited to adequate amounts. While the course provides a foundation for conducting intelligence analysis, two areas of instruction need improvement: fostering interpersonal relations and developing higher order thought processes. These findings are in line with Major General Flynn’s 2010 assessment of intelligence operations in Afghanistan, where populationcentric information gathering and adaptive thinking better support counterinsurgency operations (2010, 5,15). Improving the areas of know-who and know-why will support current operations by placing more emphasis on people and on how to think critically and adaptively. These findings apply to intelligence leaders at the United States Intelligence Center and to Brigade Combat Team commanders and intelligence officials. Improving know-who and know-why knowledge at the school-house and tactical levels will provide junior officers the ability to critically analyze the central intelligence aspect of counterinsurgencies, the people. Not improving know-who and know-why knowledge will limit an intelligence officer’s abilities and therefore perpetuate a reluctance to view counterinsurgency operations in a holistic manner.

Project 1946: Phase II

Abstract: : In 1946, a team of US Army historians and intelligence officers established a long-term exchange with a select group of former members of the German General Staff, enabling a "red-team" understanding of WWII and expanding strategic insight into potential enemies on the "new Eastern Front." Sixty years later, the US Government was given another rare chance to examine doctrine, intelligence, operations, and strategy through the lens of a recent military opponent. An exchange with former Iraqi Generals Ra'ad Hamdani, Mizher Tarfa, Aladdin Makki, Abid Mohammed Kabi, and Alwan Abousi opened up a wealth of knowledge of and operational experience in: the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as intelligence capabilities during the Iran-Iraq War. This new knowledge provides valuable insights into the political, strategic, military, and cultural dynamics of the Middle East. The report includes a series of oral histories taken from interviews of former Iraqi military personnel, places them in historical context, and provides a summary and analysis of the information revealed in the interviews.