Showing papers on "Morality published in 1972"

Morality: An Introduction to Ethics

Abstract: Bernard Williams's remarkable essay on morality confronts the problems of writing moral philosophy, and offers a stimulating alternative to more systematic accounts which seem nevertheless to have left all the important issues somewhere off the page. Williams explains, analyses and distinguishes a number of key positions, from the purely amoral to notions of subjective or relative morality, testing their coherence before going on to explore the nature of 'goodness' in relation to responsibilities and choice, roles, standards, and human nature. The final chapters make a fascinating enquiry into what morality is about, looking beyond happiness to other human aims and ideals. This re-issue of a classic in moral philosophy includes a new foreword by the author.

The Nature of the Gods

Abstract: Towards the end of his life, Cicero turned away from his oratorical and political career and looked instead to matters of philosophy and religion. The dialogue The Nature of the Gods both explores his own views on these subjects, as a monotheist and member of the Academic School, and considers the opinion of other philosophical schools of the Hellenistic age through the figures of Velleius the Epicurean and Balbus the Stoic. Eloquent, clearly argued and surprisingly modern, it focuses upon a series of fundamental religious questions including: is there a God? If so, does he answer prayers, or intervene in human affairs? Does he know the future? Does morality need the support of religion? Profoundly influential on later thinkers, such as Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, this is a fascinating consideration of fundamental issues of faith and philosophical thought.

Rawls' theory of justice

Abstract: R AWLS thinks that the fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness. And he regards the duty of fair play as a frimafacie duty, not an absolute duty: 'the duty of fair play stands beside other prima facie duties such as fidelity and gratitude as a basic moral notion; yet it is not to be confused with them' ('Justice as Fairness', Philosophical Review, 1958, p. 181). He says that justice represents 'but one of the many virtues of social institutions, for these may be antiquated, inefficient, degrading, or any number of other things, without being unjust. Justice is not to be confused with an all-inclusive vision of a good society .... There may well be inequalities which one considers are just, or at least not unjust, but which, nevertheless, one wishes on other grounds to do away with' (Philosophical Review, 1958, p. 165). Elsewhere he does imply that inequalities that are necessary in order to maximise the advantages of the worst off are just, and not merely not unjust (see his article 'Distributive Justice', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series, ed. by P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman). So Rawls allows that the claims of justice sometimes conflict with the claims of some other parts of morality. It can also be seen from the above paragraph (and from some of his other assertions) that when such conflicts take place, in some cases, according to Rawls, considerations of justice should (morally) be overridden by these other moral considerations, while in some other cases considerations of justice should (morally) get priority and not be overridden by these other moral considerations. It follows that Rawls allows for at least the following possibilities:

Mill on liberty and morality

Abstract: PARTS I and II of this paper set out Mill's theory of liberty in three main principles. Part I tries to establish the content of the leading principle of the theory, the Principle of Liberty, and to show from its form that it requires further principles to go with it. Part II supplies two further principles and comments on the application of the theory. Parts III and IV argue that there is a tension in Mill's theory of liberty as to what counts as conduct harmful to others, and that this tension is traceable to his conception of morality. In particular Mill needs to reconcile the Principle of Liberty with his belief in the enforceability of morality. The reconciliation he attempts imposes severe constraints on the content of morality and commits him to a more negative conception of morality than is commonly attributed to him. The relevant aspects of his view are embodied in two further principles. Parts V and VI consider the implications of Mill's conception of morality for the kind of utilitarianism which he could consistently hold, and argue that his ability to reconcile his secondary principles with the Principle of Utility reflects the fact that the Principle of Utility is not itself a moral principle. A short epilogue suggests that in arriving at a synthesis which embodies all five of the secondary principles referred to, together with some version of the Principle of Utility, Mill has achieved consistency at the cost of truth.

The Enforcement of Morality

Abstract: one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control .... That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.'

Against Moral Conservativism

Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that any consequentialist view of ethics has monstrous implications which make such a conception of morality untenable. What we must do-so the claim goes-is reject all forms of consequentialism and accept what has been labeled 'conservativism' or 'moral absolutism.' By 'conservativism' is meant, here, a normative ethical theory which maintains that there is a privileged moral principle or cluster of moral principles, prescribing determinate actions, with which it would always be wrong not to act in accordance no matter what the consequences. A key example of such a principle is the claim that it is always wrong to kill an innocent human, whatever the consequences of not doing so. I will argue that such moral conservativism is itself unjustified and, indeed, has morally unacceptable consequences, while consequentialism does not have implications which are morally monstrous and does not contain evident moral mistakes. A consequentialist maintains that actions, rules, policies, practices, and moral principles are ultimately to be judged by certain consequences: to wit (for a very influential kind of consequentialism), by whether doing them more than, or at least as much as doing anything else, or acting in accordance with them more than or at least as much as acting in accordance with alternative policies, practices, rules or principles, tends, on the whole, and for everyone involved, to maximize satisfaction and minimize dissatisfaction. The states of affairs to be sought are those which maximize these things to the greatest extent possible for all mankind. But while this all sounds very humane and humanitarian, when its implications are thought through, it has been forcefully argued, it will be seen actually to have inhumane and morally intolerable implications. Circumstances could arise in which one holding such a view would have to assert that one was justified in punishing, killing, torturing, or

The Morality of Killing; Sanctity of Life, Abortion, and Euthanasia.

Abstract: Marvin Kohl, Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New, uses the tool of analysis and reasoning to cut through the prejudice that normally surrounds any discussion of the controversial subjects of abortion and euthanasia.

Enforcing a Shared Morality

Abstract: If we accept Mill's "self-protection" principle as the basis of criminal legislation, then we get the thesis that the law may only interfere with the conduct of individuals where there is harm to other individuals. Various types of objections have been raised against this thesis. First, it is argued that the concept of "harm" is ambiguous. If "harm" is interpreted in some suitably wide sense, it would justify legal intervention with all sorts of conduct, and this would be quite contrary to the spirit of Mill's essay On Liberty. But if, on the other hand, we use a narrow notion of "harm" such that it is synonymous with physical injury, then Mill's principle would not justify intervention with conduct which even Millian liberals would wish to exclude, such as public sexual intercourse. Again, it has been argued that the concept of harm is dependent on the prevailing moral standards of a society, so that the principle is not capable of picking out a definite area of human conduct which must at all times remain free from legal intervention. A second set of objections maintains that legal intervention is justified not merely to prevent harm to other individuals but also to prevent the agent from harming himself. This, of course, is the doctrine of paternalism which Mill detested.' The third type of objection is the only one which I shall discuss in this paper. It centers around Mill's individualism. Mill, it is claimed, fails to recognize that there are certain important social structures and institutions in any society which the law should uphold. So, quite apart from protecting individuals from harm, the law has also the function of enforcing the generally shared morality associated with these structures and institutions. Recently two notable attempts have been made to support this point of view, one by Devlin in The Enforcement of Morals and the other by Mitchell in Law, Morality and Re-

Morality and the Politics of Practice

Abstract: It is crucial for social workers to develop and support practice principles that will instill trust in the helping relationships associated with their services

Individual Conduct and Social Norms: A Utilitarian Account

Abstract: In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that a widely held account of morality radically distorts our understanding of what morality is and, more importantly, on the prescriptive level, of what morality may and should be. The view which I wish to undermine, while it acknowledges the possibility of either an individualistic or a social conception of morality, treats these as incompatible alternatives. According to this view, an individual's morality, or a given moral theory, can be either individualistic or social, hut it cannot in any strong sense be both. Most generally, I shall argue that one can consistently hold to an individualistic moral principle of a kind which bases the rightness or wrongness of any given act solely upon its satisfying certain criteria which are to be applied by the agent, whilc it the same time, and on the basis of the very same criteria, ogle can par.icipate in the support of a system of social norms which prohibit the application of these criteria in determining the rightness or wrongness of at [east some kinds of acts. In particular, I shall attempt to show how one can accommodate some of the considerations which have been taken to render the move to various forms of rule utilitarianism initially plausible within the framework of a sufficiently elaborated act-utilitarian theory.' What

Game rules and morality

Abstract: This study investigated the premise that game rules can be used as instruments for teaching morality. Gowin's philosophic method of inquiry was utilized. It consists of the development of major hypotheses and their attendent sub-hypotheses. Major hypotheses were developed concerning the concept of morality, the nature of moral rules, the essence of games, the nature of game rules, the relationship of moral rules to game rules, and the use of games as a vehicle for teaching morality. Concepts which emerged as a result of investigating the hypotheses suggested that all cultures have games and systems of morality of which rules are an essential part. However, game rules and moral rules are not philosophically congruent in either the play domain or the real world. Evidence suggested instead, that moral rules are analogous to implicit game rules, that morality is analogous to the spirit of the game, and that official game rules are congruent with real life laws. Although the official rules were not found to be the instruments through which games could be used to teach morality, games do contain moral elements in the form of implicit rules. It was therefore concluded that games could be instruments for teaching morality

Morality and Individual Development: A Basis for Value Education.

Abstract: This paper presents a comprehensive theory of the development of morality in childhood. It is intended to serve as a basis for understanding the dynamics of value acquisition and preparing suitable educational strategies. Characteristics of morality at various stages of development are discussed. It is argued that, to be effective, educational techniques must complement the dynamics of moral experience at each stage of development. Generalizations are made concerning major considerations for an effective program of value education. The model is intended to have particular application to sex and family life education since this is a major source of controversy in the contemporary crisis of values in American education.

Morality and Moral Reasoning

Abstract: FiVE essays have been put together as a collection representative of the work that is being done on ethics by younger philosophers in Cambridge. 1 The contributors are Bernard Williams (24 pages), Roger Scruton (75 pages), S. W. Blackburn (24 pages), J. E. J. Altham (29 pages) and John Casey (50 pages). Professor Williams' essay, which is on Morality and the Emotions, is the only one to have been published before, having appeared originally as his Inaugural Lecture at Bedford College in 1965. Its theme is the neglect of the emotions in recent moral philosophy. After offering a diagnosis of the reason for the neglect, Williams turns to the Emotive Theory of Ethics, with the idea that we might learn something from it without reinstating it. The classical version of the theory made it out to be a necessary condition of any judgement's being a moral judgement that it should express the emotions of the speaker and influence the emotions of the hearer-a position that may be seen to be erroneous by a consideration of (inter alia) judgements in the hypothetical mode. Williams is not concerned to tilt against this error on the part of emotivism but takes as his target an error committed by anti-emotivists under the influence, one would think, of the same basic conception of philosophical analysis-I mean the conception of it as a quest for fundamental ingredients or component factors, so that when the grammar of something is found hard to grasp this is conceived to be due to a logical complexity which must be dealt with by unearthing the basic, simple constituents. Thus it is reckoned that a person must consist of a body plus . .. or that an action must consist of a movement plus ... and that a moral judgement must consist of an empirical or descriptive part together with an expletive or goading element (choice-registering element, performatory element or whatnot). Nothing has contributed more to philosophy's industrial revolution in the English speaking world of our time than this conception of analysis in the methodological version which enables philosophical accounts to be rendered as by chartered actuaries in the form of a list: a list of the necessary and sufficient conditions of X. Since every one of the necessary conditions is thought equally essential and what is not essential forms no part of the account, the principle on which the method operates is that of essentialism. The idea is that the obtaining of all the necessary conditions would give sufficiency and thus logically 'bring into being' the X whose philosophical nature is under investigation, thereby completely accounting for it. Such is the kind of essentialistic error that the Emotivists were committing when they represented it to be a necessary condition of a judgement's being a moral judgement that it should be in part, i.e. in the very part that made it moral, the expression and projection of an emotion. And they took an essentialistic view of the emotion as well, in specifying it as approval. However, the repudiation of emotivism could readily be thought by critics of it who were also of an essentialistic turn of mind to amount to the thesis that any association between moral judgements and the emotions must therefore be purely adventitious. This is the error that Williams is out to combat and the brief observations I have made about analysis and essentialism may possibly serve to underline the point and importance of what he is doing, especially since the rest of the book, on which according to the editor Williams' essay has had consider-