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Showing papers on "Philosophy of biology published in 1971"



Book
01 Jan 1971

55 citations




Journal ArticleDOI

42 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Robert Olby1

29 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The origins of molecular biology are numerous and diverse, however, three major routes stand out in having attracted its contemporary practitioners and may be characterized as the genetic, the structural, and the philosophic origins.
Abstract: The origins of molecular biology are numerous and diverse. Three major routes, however, stand out in having attracted its contemporary practitioners. These may be characterized as the genetic, the structural, and the philosophic origins of molecular biology.' In 1953 all these approaches were united in a single world-view through the double helix model of DNA.2 Genetics, like the later founding of molecular biology, also cannot be associated with a single origin. The nineteenth-century history of genetics consisted of the independent activities of plant breeders, cytologists, and evolutionists, and it was not until 1915 that the theory of the gene (then called the factorial

16 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is suggested that the importance of deviation-amplifying networks for the evolution of major systematic groups indicates that the changes leading to the origin of these groups progressed within a single genetic pool.
Abstract: The importance of deviation-amplifying processes for the emergence of major evolutionary novelties is discussed by exemplifying the evolution of birds and the term ‘chain evolution’ is proposed.

11 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors showed that Hempel's reconstruction of functional explanations is inadequate on pragmatic grounds and that there is no reason for allotting functional explanations a special logical status, and that such explanations are necessarily weak.
Abstract: Functional explanations are regarded as a special type of explanation by many biologists. Philosophers of science tend to agree that they are weak forms of the common modes of explanation, although the elucidation of the logical structure involved is difficult. The present paper shows that Hempel's reconstruction of functional explanations is inadequate on pragmatic grounds. Thus his conclusion that such explanations are necessarily weak is also objectionable. There is no reason for allotting functional explanations a special logical status.

Book ChapterDOI
Tom Settle1
01 Jan 1971
TL;DR: The majority view is either a deliberate rejection of philosophy, especially metaphysics, as false (or meaningless or irrelevant), or a simple ignoring of the problems of which philosophy has traditionally been the study as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: My thesis, that philosophy is relevant to physics, is unfashionable, to say the least. This minority view gives me some strange bedfellows: for example, some people with particular regions views who are anxious to make science agree with theology (although primarily their interest is in geology and biology, rather than in physics) [32]. I prefer the company of those philosophers who have been influenced by Sir KARL POPPER’S almost lone defence of the meaningfulness of non-scientific statements — lone, in the sense that POPPER fought in the interests of science [2,10,13, 34, 35]. By contrast, the majority view is either a deliberate rejection of philosophy, especially metaphysics, as false (or meaningless or irrelevant), or a simple ignoring of the problems of which philosophy has traditionally been the study. Nevertheless, neither rejecting philosophy nor ignoring it imphes that solutions to philosophical problems are not adopted. On the contrary, it is customary for the majority to adopt a stance which is a mixture of various solutions to a number of still puzzling philosophical problems but which interferes as little as possible with scientific work [39]. Furthermore, it is customary to fend off all attempts at serious discussion of those problems in case such discussion should have mischievous effects on the progress of science.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In his famous dialogue, entitled "The Plurality of Worlds," he made the discoveries of physical science clear, intelligible, and amusing to the general public, and could stand as a model for modem scientific popularization.
Abstract: Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757) was considered by French literary critics a witty, elegant writer, an influential philosopher, and an excellent popularizer of science. His reputation is based primarily on works that were published before 1700.1 Among his later works, Eloges des Academiciens has been highly praised. However, the importance of his Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Sciences.2 seems to have been ignored or very little written about, and yet it might be the most important source for us to find out about Fontenelle's scientific ideas. Fontenelle, under the influence of his two uncles, Pierre and Thomas Corneille, tried his hand at writing, but failed as a poet and dramatist. He then turned to science, and his main contribution before 1700 was to popularize the scientific achievements of the seventeenth century. In his famous dialogue, entitled "The Plurality of Worlds," he made the discoveries of physical science clear, intelligible, and amusing to the general public. In many respects this book could stand as a model for modem scientific popularization. However, Fontenelle did not merely popularize the scientific