Showing papers on "Philosophy of mind published in 2022"

The US Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022 vs. The EU Artificial Intelligence Act: what can they learn from each other?

Abstract: Abstract On the whole, the US Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022 (US AAA) is a pragmatic approach to balancing the benefits and risks of automated decision systems. Yet there is still room for improvement. This commentary highlights how the US AAA can both inform and learn from the European Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AIA).

A Rylean mental fictionalism

Abstract: Ryle was wrong in holding that mental statements ascribe merely behavioral dispositions, because any explication of a particular mental state in terms of behavior must presuppose a background of normal mental states of other types. Mental states are internal states that are intentional in Brentano’s sense. But Ryle was right in insisting that all there really is to mentality is behavioral dispositions, and the only intentionality there is, is that of behavior. Metaphysically, there are no mental states. Yet, (1) the public world is exactly as if mental ascriptions were literally true, and (2) they are indispensable to the description and explanation of action; we cannot do without mental talk. Hence, mental fictionalism. The rest of the chapter addresses three further objections to Ryle, the first two of which Ryle himself simply did not confront. The second and third, respectively, from phenomenal consciousness and from introspection, succeed against Ryle’s own realist theory, but Rylean fictionalism avoids them.

A Cultural Species and its Cognitive Phenotypes: Implications for Philosophy

Abstract: After introducing the new field of cultural evolution, we review a growing body of empirical evidence suggesting that culture shapes what people attend to, perceive and remember as well as how they think, feel and reason. Focusing on perception, spatial navigation, mentalizing, thinking styles, reasoning (epistemic norms) and language, we discuss not only important variation in these domains, but emphasize that most researchers (including philosophers) and research participants are psychologically peculiar within a global and historical context. This rising tide of evidence recommends caution in relying on one’s intuitions or even in generalizing from reliable psychological findings to the species, Homo sapiens. Our evolutionary approach suggests that humans have evolved a suite of reliably developing cognitive abilities that adapt our minds, information-processing abilities and emotions ontogenetically to the diverse culturally-constructed worlds we confront.

From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology

Abstract: This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (e.g., the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.). The first section presents a brief review of the overall project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and evaluates philosophical objections to that project and situates our version of computational phenomenology with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The final section presents our approach in detail. We conclude by discussing how our approach differs from previous attempts to use generative modelling to help understand consciousness. In summary, we describe a version of computational phenomenology which uses generative modelling to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive processes that best explain this or that kind of lived experience.

Defining Explanation and Explanatory Depth in XAI

Abstract: Abstract Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to help people understand black box algorithms, particularly of their outputs. But what are these explanations and when is one explanation better than another? The manipulationist definition of explanation from the philosophy of science offers good answers to these questions, holding that an explanation consists of a generalization that shows what happens in counterfactual cases. Furthermore, when it comes to explanatory depth this account holds that a generalization that has more abstract variables, is broader in scope and/or more accurate is better. By applying these definitions and contrasting them with alternative definitions in the XAI literature I hope to help clarify what a good explanation is for AI.

Health, consciousness, and the evolution of subjects

Abstract: The goal of this programmatic paper is to highlight a close connection between the core problem in the philosophy of medicine, i.e. the concept of health, and the core problem of the philosophy of mind, i.e. the concept of consciousness. I show when we look at these phenomena together, taking the evolutionary perspective of modern state-based behavioural and life-history theory used as the teleonomic tool to Darwinize the agent- and subject-side of organisms, we will be in a better position to make sense of them both as natural phenomena.

Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias

Abstract: Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias.

Topics of Thought

Abstract: This book concerns mental states such as thinking that Obama is tall, imagining that there will be a climate change catastrophe, knowing that one is not a brain in a vat, or believing that Martina Navratilova is the greatest tennis player ever. Such states are usually understood as having intentionality, that is, as being about things or situations to which the mind is directed. The contents of such states are often taken to be propositions. The book presents a new framework for the logic of thought, so understood—an answer to the question: Given that one thinks (believes, knows, etc.) something, what else must one think (ditto) as a matter of logic? This should depend on the propositions which make for the contents of the relevant thoughts. And the book defends the idea that propositions should be individuated hyperintensionally, i.e. not just by the sets of worlds at which they are true (as in standard ‘intensional’ possible worlds semantics), but also by what they are about: their topic or subject matter. Thus, the logic of thought should be ‘topic-sensitive’. After the philosophical foundations have been presented in Chapters 1−2, Chapter 3 develops a theory of Topic-Sensitive Intentional Modals (TSIMs): modal operators representing attitude ascriptions, which embed a topicality or subject matter constraint. Subsequent chapters explore applications ranging from mainstream epistemology (dogmatism, scepticism, fallibilism: Chapter 4), to the nature of suppositional thinking and imagination (Chapter 5), conditional belief and belief revision (Chapter 6), framing effects (Chapter 7), probabilities and indicative conditionals (Chapter 8).

Understanding as explaining: how motives can become causes

Abstract: Abstract The distinction of „understanding“ and „explaining“, formulated by Karl Jaspers in his „General Psychopathology“, has had a lasting effect on psychiatry. As a result, phenomenological, hermeneutic, or psychodynamic approaches have often been accorded only descriptive or epiphenomenal status, while the actual causes of mental illness have been sought in neurobiologically or genetically based explanations. In contrast, this paper defends the explanatory role of understanding and phenomenological approaches. To this end, two levels of explanation are distinguished and shown to be equally justified in principle, namely, motivational explanation at the macro-level and physical explanation at the micro-level. The actual causal role of motivational, i.e., understandable connections is then demonstrated by means of a conception of circular causality, which includes downward causality. Finally, the explanatory role of phenomenological analyses is also shown in psychotic disorders that refuse motivational understanding, using the example of schizophrenic delusion.

Enactivism and the Hegelian Stance on Intrinsic Purposiveness

Abstract: Abstract We characterize Hegel’s stance on biological purposiveness as consisting in a twofold move, which conceives organisms as intrinsically purposive natural systems and focuses on their behavioral and cognitive abilities. We submit that a Hegelian stance is at play in enactivism, the branch of the contemporary theory of biological autonomy devoted to the study of cognition and the mind. What is at stake in the Hegelian stance is the elaboration of a naturalized, although non-reductive, understanding of natural purposiveness.

The Grave Resolution to the Gamer’s Dilemma: an Argument for a Moral Distinction Between Virtual Murder and Virtual Child Molestation

Abstract: In this paper a new resolution to the gamer’s dilemma (a paradox concerning the moral permissibility of virtual wrongdoings) is presented. The first part of the paper is devoted to strictly formulating the dilemma, and the second to establishing its resolution. The proposed resolution, the grave resolution, aims to resolve not only the gamer’s dilemma, but also a wider set of analogous paradoxes – which together make up the paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly.

Halfway proportionality

Abstract: Abstract According to the so-called ‘proportionality principle’, causes should be proportional to their effects: they should be both enough and not too much for the occurrence of their effects. This principle is the subject of an ongoing debate. On the one hand, many maintain that it is required to address the problem of causal exclusion and take it to capture a crucial aspect of causation. On the other hand, many object that it renders accounts of causation implausibly restrictive and often reject the principle wholesale. I argue that there is exaggeration on both sides. While one half of the principle is overly demanding, the other half is unobjectionable. And while the unobjectionable half does not block exclusion arguments on its own, it provides a nuanced picture of higher-level causation, fits with recent developments in philosophy of causation, and motivates adjustments to standard difference-making accounts of causation. I conclude that at least half of the proportionality principle is worth taking seriously.

A Defense of Inner Awareness: The Memory Argument Revisited

Abstract: The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally been a central element of philosophy of consciousness, from Aristotle, to Descartes, Brentano, the phenomenological tradition, and early and contemporary analytic philosophy. Its existence, however, has recently been called into question, especially by defenders of so-called transparency of experience and first-order representationalists about phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I put forward a defense of inner awareness based on an argument from memory. Roughly, the idea is that since we can only recall something if we were aware of it at the time of its occurrence, and since we can recall our own experiences, we must be aware of our own experiences at the time of their occurrence. The argument is far from new: it goes back to the Buddhist tradition and has been revived more recently in Buddhist Scholarship but also in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, in particular by Uriah Kriegel. However, I believe that, since it is the best extant argument for inner awareness, it deserves more extensive treatment. My goal is to strengthen the memory argument by (i) making some conceptual distinctions as to the exact thesis about inner awareness that the argument is supposed to support, (ii) considering different ways the argument may be reconstructed depending on the exact thesis to be supported, and (iii) defending the argument from a new objection, raised very recently by Daniel Stoljar.

Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology

Abstract: Abstract Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.

Putting down the revolt: Enactivism as a philosophy of nature

Abstract: Enactivists frequently argue their account heralds a revolution in cognitive science: enactivism will unseat cognitivism as the dominant paradigm. We examine the lines of reasoning enactivists employ in stirring revolt, but show that none of these prove compelling reasons for cognitivism to be replaced by enactivism. First, we examine the hard sell of enactivism: enactivism reveals a critical explanatory gap at the heart of cognitivism. We show that enactivism does not meet the requirements to incite a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense—there is no internal crisis in cognitivism. Nor does it provide inherently better explanations of cognition as some have claimed. Second, we consider the soft sell of enactivism: enactivism provides a more attractive, parsimonious, or clear-eyed lens on cognition. This move proves to boil down to a misunderstanding of how theories are selected in science. Instead we lend support to a broader and more desirable way to conceive of enactivism, the recent proposal that enactivism is a philosophy of nature. We explain how a philosophy of nature does more than support a single research paradigm by integrating scientific questions into a cohesive picture.

Expecting some action: Predictive Processing and the construction of conscious experience

Abstract: Abstract Predictive processing has begun to offer new insights into the nature of conscious experience—but the link is not straightforward. A wide variety of systems may be described as predictive machines, raising the question: what differentiates those for which it makes sense to talk about conscious experience? One possible answer lies in the involvement of a higher-order form of prediction error, termed expected free energy. In this paper we explore under what conditions the minimization of this new quantity might underpin conscious experience. Our suggestion is that the minimisation of Expected Free Energy is not in itself sufficient for the occurrence of conscious experience. Instead, it is relevant only insofar as it helps deliver what Ward et al. (2011) have previously described as a sense of our own poise over an action space . Perceptual experience, we will argue, is nothing other than the process that puts current actions in contact with goals and intentions, enabling some creatures to know the space of options that their current situation makes available. This proposal fits with recent work suggesting a deep link between conscious contents and contents computed at an ‘intermediate’ level of processing, apt for controlling action.

The Grave Resolution to the Gamer’s Dilemma: an Argument for a Moral Distinction Between Virtual Murder and Virtual Child Molestation

Abstract: In this paper a new resolution to the gamer’s dilemma (a paradox concerning the moral permissibility of virtual wrongdoings) is presented. The first part of the paper is devoted to strictly formulating the dilemma, and the second to establishing its resolution. The proposed resolution, the grave resolution, aims to resolve not only the gamer’s dilemma, but also a wider set of analogous paradoxes – which together make up the paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly.

Getting real about pretense

Abstract: Abstract This paper argues that radical enactivism (RE) offers a framework with the required nuance needed for understanding of the full range of the various forms of pretense. In particular, its multi-storey account of cognition, which holds that psychological attitudes can be both contentless and contentful, enables it to appropriately account for both the most basic and most advanced varieties of pretense. By comparison with other existing accounts of pretense, RE is shown to avoid the pitfalls of representationalist theories while also allowing us to combine the best elements of the praxeological enactivist (Weichold & Rucińska, 2021) and Langland-Hassan’s (2020, 2021) proposals about pretense, while avoiding their key shortcomings.

A Hybrid Account of Concepts Within the Predictive Processing Paradigm

Abstract: Abstract We seem to learn and use concepts in a variety of heterogenous “formats”, including exemplars, prototypes, and theories. Different strategies have been proposed to account for this diversity. Hybridists consider instances in different formats to be instances of a single concept. Pluralists think that each instance in a different format is a different concept. Eliminativists deny that the different instances in different formats pertain to a scientifically fruitful kind and recommend eliminating the notion of a “concept” entirely. In recent years, hybridism has received the most attention and support. However, we are still lacking a cognitive-computational model for concept representation and processing that would underpin hybridism. The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of concepts by grounding hybridism in a neuroscientific model within the Predictive Processing framework. In the suggested view, the different formats are not distinct parts of a concept but arise from different ways of processing a functionally unified representational structure.

Lemos on the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection

Abstract: I recently argued that reductive physicalist versions of libertarian free will face a physical indeterminism luck objection. John Lemos claims that one potential advocate of reductive physicalist libertarianism, Robert Kane, avoids this physical indeterminism luck objection. I here show how the problem remains.

Talking About

Abstract: The book develops and argues for a new intentionalist theory of the speech act of singular reference. Specifically, it proposes a Gricean theory of pragmatic competence within which referential competence can be identified and explained. It argues that combining insights from theories of mechanistic explanation in cognitive science and intentionalist theories of speech acts affords a completely new perspective on old questions about reference and speaker meaning. The resulting theory is called edenic intentionalism and it is based on the idea that referential competence is explained by a dedicated cognitive mechanism with a specific function, namely the function of enabling the production of edenic or optimal referential speech acts. Importantly, the author shows how this theory dissolves traditional puzzles in the philosophy of language and mind, puzzles arising from cases where the speaker is confused about the identity of the object of intended reference. The author develops an original account of the mental state of confusion, based on a detailed examination of the distinction between representational actions and representational states, which allows for a satisfying answer to familiar questions about attitude ascription and Frege’s puzzle about identity.

The Bare Past

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I first introduce one of the most prominent objections against the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), the so-called ‘epistemic objection’, according to which GBT provides no way of knowing that our time is the objective present and, therefore, leads at best to absolute skepticism about our temporal location, at worst to the quasi-certainty that we are located in the objective past. Secondly, I express my dissatisfaction regarding the various traditional attempts to address this objection, especially Merricks (2006), Forrest (2004) and Correia and Rosenkranz (2018). Thirdly, I show that the passage of time leads to an anti-essentialist picture of natural kinds. Finally, I develop my own solution to the epistemic objection, based on the continued existence of bare particulars.

A New Mark of the Cognitive? Predictive Processing and Extended Cognition

Abstract: Abstract There is a longstanding debate between those who think that cognition extends into the external environment (extend cognition) and those who think it is located squarely within the individual (internalism). Recently, a new actor has emerged on the scene, one that looks to play kingmaker. Predictive processing (PP) says that the mind/brain is fundamentally engaged in a process of minimising the difference between what is predicted about the world and how the world actually is, what is known as ‘prediction error minimisation’ (PEM). The goal of this paper is to articulate a novel approach to extended cognition using the resources of PP. After outlining two recent proposals from Constant et al. (2020) and Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019), I argue that the case for extended cognition can be further developed by interpreting certain elements of the PP story (namely, PEM) as a “mark of the cognitive”. The suggestion is that when construed at an ‘algorithmic level’ PEM offers a direct route to thinking about extended systems as genuine cognitive systems. On route to articulating the proposal, I lay out the core argument, defend the proposal’s novelty, and point to several of the advantages of the formulation. Finally, I conclude by taking up two challenges raised by Hohwy (2016, 2018) about the prospects of using PEM to argue for extended cognition.

Pluralities, counterparts, and groups

Abstract: I formulate a theory of groups based on pluralities and counterparts: roughly put, a group is a plurality of entities at a time. This theory comes with counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and temporal sentences about groups. So this theory of groups is akin to the stage theory of material objects: both take the items they analyze to exist at a single time, and both use counterparts to satisfy certain conditions relating to the modal properties, temporal properties, and coincidence properties of those items.