Showing papers on "Pyrrhonism published in 1997"

The Original Sceptics: A Controversy

Abstract: The sceptics' beliefs can the sceptic live his scepticism? the beliefs of a Pyrrhonist the sceptic in his place and time the sceptic's two kinds of assent.

How to resolve the pyrrhonian problematic: a lesson from descartes

Abstract: Examinant les solutions fondationnalistes a la problematique pyrrhonienne de la justification de la croyance developpees par Aristote, Agrippa, Galien et les Stoiciens, l'A. montre que le scepticisme moderne de Descartes depasse la critique radicale du monde exterieur chez les Pyrrhoniens, en ce sens qu'il substitue a la notion aristotelicienne de cognitio non-reflechie l'idee d'une scientia reflexive fondee sur le principe fiabiliste du critere

O ceticismo pirrônico e os problemas filosóficos

Abstract: This paper develops two main themes: in the first place, one tries to make clear how, from the point of view of our contemporary philosophical ideas, a retrospective interpretation of Greek sceptic pyrrhonism allows us to read it, not only as a questioning of the theses and arguments of dogmatic philosophy, but as a questioning, too, of the very legitimity of the traditional plilosophical problems and philosophical language. But the second part of the text is a "positive" one, which proceeds to an analysis of the relation between a phenomenic and a dogmatic level of language and, then, explatrins how the idea of a philosophical investigation of problems formulated in the phenomenic level is plainly compatible with (neo)pyrrhonic philosophy. And a discussion is undertaken of the relation between problems formulated in one and another levels.

Against the ethicists : Adversus mathematicos XI

Abstract: About Sextus Sextus Empiricus is one of the most important ancient philosophical writers after Plato and Aristotle. His writings are our main source for the doctrines and arguments of Scepticism. He probably lived in the second century AD. Eleven books of his writings have survived, covering logic, physics, ethics, and numerous more specialized fields. About Against the Ethicists In this unjustly neglected and misunderstood work Sextus sets out a distinctive Sceptic position in ethics. He discusses the concepts good and bad, and puts forward the sceptical argument that nothing is either good or bad by nature or intrinsically or invariably, but only relatively to persons and/or to circumstances. He then argues that the sceptic is better off than the non-sceptic. In the latter part of the book, Sextus attacks the Stoic view that there is such a thing as a `skill for life'. About this edition This volume contains a translation of Against the Ethicists in clear modern English, together with an introduction and a detailed commentary. Those who have discussed this work in the past have tended to underestimate it, often regarding its main position as essentially the same as that of Sextus' better-known Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Richard Bett shows that Against the Ethicists represents quite a distinct and coherent philosophical outlook, associated with a phase of Scepticism earlier than Sextus himself, an outlook of which little other evidence survives.

Precis of Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification@@@Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification.

Abstract: Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (PR) is an examination of contemporary work in theory of knowledge, written from what I call a neo-Pyrrhonian standpoint. This work is Pyrrhonian because it echoes in many ways Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I call this standpoint neo-Pyrrhonism because I have tried to update the methods of Sextus Empiricus to make them applicable to contemporary debates. The fundamental question of PR is this: How would contemporary practitioners of epistemology fare if a Pyrrhonist is made a party to the discussion? The conclusion arrived at: Not at all well. The suitability of calling these reflections Pyrrhonian depends upon the correctness of a particular reading of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonists are often pictured as calling for a suspension of all beliefs whatsoever. Hume attributed such a view to them, as do such contemporary scholars as Jonathan Barnes and Miles Burnyeat.1 This reading is often presented as a prelude to dismissing Pyrrhonism on the grounds that, taken seriously, it would make life unlivable-a line taken explicitly by both Hume and Burnyeat. An alternative reading is that Pyrrhonists did not call for the suspension of belief in all areas, but targeted only dogmatic philosophy and other theoretical activities akin to dogmatic philosophy-where an attempt is made to transcend our customary modes of fixing beliefs in order to achieve something higher. On this reading, the Pyrrhonists imposed no standards of their own. They simply took dogmatists at their word and showed that, by their own standards, their projects failed. The call for suspension of belief had dogmatic philosophy as its primary target, theoretical activities akin to dogmatic philosophy as its secondary target, but was not concerned with common beliefs arrived at in customary ways. This reading has, it seems to me, been given decisive scholarly support

The Relativity of Skepticism

Abstract: Pyrrhonian skeptics oppose positive and negative dogmatism. They hold both that (a) for all we know, we do not know anything, and that (b) for all we know, we know many things, including things about the external world. What, however, is the epistemic status of theses (a) and (b)? In particular, what do Pyrrhonian skeptics claim regarding the epistemic status of (a)? Do they claim to know that (a) is true? If so, they claim both that (c) we do know something regarding our knowing (viz. (a)), and that (a) for all we know, we do not know anything. Such a claim would be pragmatically odd, at best. Perhaps, in keeping with general agnosticism, Pyrrhonian skeptics will disclaim knowledge that (a) is true. What, however, should they claim about the epistemic status of (a)? Specifically, is it epistemically mandatory that every epistemologist be a Pyrrhonian skeptic? If so, what epistemic considerations make Pyrrhonian skepticism universally mandatory? Let's pursue these issues in connection with Robert Fogelin's Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Regarding thesis (a), Fogelin comments: "The Pyrrhonian is content to point out that certain radical possibilities show that for all we know we do not know anything. Having apprised others of these radical possibilities and the consequences that flow from them, he then challenges others to justify their continued use of knowledge claims" (p. 66). Note Fogelin's use of 'show'. We are left wondering whether it aims to support a claim to know that (a). In any case, the "radical possibilities" central to Pyrrhonism are "remote defeating possibilities." Fogelin explains: