Showing papers on "Pyrrhonism published in 2015"

Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement

Abstract: This paper argues for the following three claims. First, the Agrippan mode from disagreement does not play a secondary role in inducing suspension of judgment. Second, the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the criteria of justification underlying the Five Modes of Agrippa, which nonetheless does not prevent him from non-doxastically assenting to them. And third, some recent objections to Agrippan Pyrrhonism raised by analytic epistemologists and experimental philosophers fail to appreciate the Pyrrhonist’s ad hominem style of argumentation and the real challenge posed by the mode from disagreement.

Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia

Abstract: Preface vii Acknowledgements xv On Transcription, Transliteration, and Texts xix Abbreviations xxi Prologue: Scythian Philosophy: Pyrrho, the Persian Empire, and India 1 Chapter 1 Pyrrho's Thought: Beyond Humanity 22 Chapter 2 No Differentiations: The Earliest Attested Forms of Buddhism 61 Chapter 3 Jade Yoga and Heavenly Dharma: Buddhist Thought in Classical Age China and India 110 Chapter 4 Greek Enlightenment: What the Buddha, Pyrrho, and Hume Argue Against 138 Epilogue: Pyrrho's Teacher: The Buddha and His Awakening 160 Appendix A The Classical Testimonies of Pyrrho's Thought 180 Appendix B Are Pyrrhonism and Buddhism Both Greek in Origin? 218 Appendix C On the Early Indian Inscriptions 226 Endnotes 251 References 257 Index 269

The Agrippan Problem, Then and Now

Abstract: Skeptical arguments (or problems) fall into two categories: “Agrippan” and “Cartesian.” The former revolve around what is commonly thought of today as the problem of the regress of justification; the latter make essential use of skeptical hypotheses. Cartesian arguments have no place in Pyrrhonian skepticism. By contrast, the Agrippan Problem seems to play a vital role. Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that Sextus and contemporary epistemologists understand the problem in very different ways. Whereas, in contemporary discussions, the Agrippan argument is taken to lie at the heart of a fully general “problem of knowledge,” it is questionable whether Sextus even considers such a problem. In explaining and defending this claim, I bring out some vital limitations and shortcomings of the Pyrrhonian stance—in particular, Sextus’s radical epistemic quietism—and their implications for the tenability of the Pyrrhonian stance in both Sextus’s time and ours.

The Multiplicity of Agreeable Consciousness

Abstract: Samuel Johnson's life was troubled by diverse physical diseases and - one year be- fore his death - he experienced a stroke. Moreover, he suffered from recurring fits of depression. But Johnson was also merry, loved witty conversations, good food and his nightly tours through London pubs. Johnson maintained that pleasure and pain were closely connected with each oth- er. In both his dialogues with James Boswell and in his comprehensive literary works, Johnson reveals a philosophy of happiness characterized by a radical skepticism reminiscent of Michel de Montaigne's Pyrrhonism. Influenced by Richard Burton, Thomas Browne and Francis Bacon, Johnson developed his specific doctrine of eudaemonic idols: as an idiosyncratic representative of Enlightenment philosophy he examined and questioned traditional clichs of happiness such as Stoicism, natural philosophy, learning, and marriage. Though not completely denying the pos- sibility of earthly happiness, which he defined as the «multiplicity of agreeable consciousness», he was convinced that all earthly pleasures were doomed to fade away. As «a gloomy gazer on a world» to which he had «little relation», Johnson gave up any hope of attaining happiness on earth and exclusively trusted in felicity beyond the grave.

Realism and Anti-Realism about Science: A Pyrrhonian Stance

Abstract: Pyrrhonists provide a way of investigating the world in which conflicting views about a given topic are critically compared, assessed, and juxtaposed. Since Pyrrhonists are ultimately unable to decide between these views, they end up suspending judgment about the issues under examination. In this paper, I consider the question of whether Pyrrhonists can be realists or anti-realists about science, focusing, in particular, on contemporary philosophical discussions about it. Although prima facie the answer seems to be negative, I argue that if realism and anti-realism are understood as philosophical stances rather than particular doctrines—that is, if they are conceptualized in terms of a mode of engagement, a style of reasoning, and some propositional attitudes—the apparent tension between Pyrrhonism, realism, and anti-realism vanishes. The result is a first step in the direction of bringing Pyrrhonism to bear on contemporary debates in the philosophy of science.

Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief

Abstract: According to Sextus Empiricus, the Skeptic suspends judgment in response to equipollence. This fact has two significant implications. First, the Skeptic has at most indirect control over his suspension of judgment and so does not suspend judgment at will. Second, the skeptic accepts the norm of truth for belief. This is a norm according to which one ought to believe that p only if p is true. However, there are passages in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism that imply the Skeptic accepts the norm of utility for belief. This is a norm according to which one ought to believe that p only if the belief that p promotes one’s tranquility. I first argue that if the Skeptic suspends judgment in response to equipollence, then a pragmatic reason can’t be the reason for which the Skeptic suspends judgment. I then argue that the norms of truth and utility for belief are incompatible just in the sense that the acceptance of the one precludes the acceptance of the other. If Sextus describes the Skeptic as accepting both of these norms for belief, as I argue he does, his conception of Skepticism in the Outlines is not coherent.

On Pyrrhonism, Stances, and Believing What You Want

Abstract: The paper considers the relations between the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus and epistemological voluntarism, as applied both to epistemic stances and to individual beliefs. In the first part, the main question is whether ancient skepticism is congenial to the idea of alternative epistemic stances (and hence, potentially, to voluntarism about them). The answer proposed is that skepticism does not in fact recognize this possibility. However, this is not due to any essential features of skepticism itself; rather, it is because, like ancient Greek philosophy in general, the stance skepticism in fact unquestioningly assumes is that of realism. In the second part, the focus is more directly on voluntarism and its compatibility with skepticism. The difficulty with bringing these two together, it is argued, is that, while voluntarism gives one license to hold either of two opposing beliefs, skepticism is in the business of subverting beliefs; in this respect their orientations are in opposite directions. A closing suggestion is that if there is any place where ancient skepticism and voluntarism might meet, it is not in the Pyrrhonist tradition, but in the mitigated skepticism of the late Academy, which allowed the holding of (albeit tentative) beliefs.

12) Tradução: Sexto Empírico, “ Contra os gramáticos ” 176 - 218

Abstract: Ingles: Translation: Sextus Empiricus, “Against the Grammarians”176-218. Translation of Sextus Empiricus (c.II-III d.C.), “Against the Grammarians” (Adv. Gram. 176-218 = M I, 176-218). It was done using the Bekker’s textual fixation (BEKKER, I. Sextus Empiricus [opera omnia]. Berlin: Typis et Imprensis Ge. Reimeri, 1842). In this extract, the skeptic philosopher/physician inveighs against the grammar, as an art of hellenism. He opposes the “good Greek” –as engendered by the grammatical analogy–to the ordinary use of language, the speaker’s ultimate criterion. This ordinary use does not molest the conventions established within the own communities of speakers, and it is also useful, since it is based on experience. Keywords: Sextus Empiricus; Against the Grammarians 176-218; translation; pyrrhonism; ancient grammar. Traducao: Traducao de Sexto Empirico (c. II- III d.C.), Contra os gramaticos (Adv. Gram. 176-218 = M I, 176-218), feita a partir da fixacao textual de Bekker (BEKKER, I. Sextus Empiricus [opera omnia]. Berlim: Typis et Imprensis Ge. Reimeri, 1842). Neste extrato, o filosofo/medico cetico investe contra a gramatica enquanto arte do helenismo, opondo o "bom grego" engendrado pela analogia gramatical ao uso ordinario da linguagem, para Sexto, o derradeiro criterio dos falantes, uma vez que e util, nao molesta as convencoes estabelecidas dentro das proprias comunidades de falantes e se baseia na experiencia. Palavras-chave: Sexto Empirico; Contra os gramaticos 176-218; traducao; pirronismo; gramatica antiga.