Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1970"

The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill

Abstract: Preface to the Second Edition Acknowledgements Introduction The Deductive Conception of Explanation 'Real' Inference Induction and Its Canons Tendencies and Uniformities Mathematics as an Inductive Science Mind and Matter Freedom in a Determined World False Steps in Social Science Mechanics as a Model for Sociology Social Astronomy Towards Rationality in Ethics Utility and Justice On Liberty: Beyond Duty to Personal Aesthetics Bibliography Bibliography of Works Cited in the Preface to the Second Edition Additional Select Bibliography Index

On the possibility of rational policy evaluation

Abstract: Arrow proved the inconsistency of a set of reasonable looking conditions on a social decision rule. These conditions are stated and their rationale explained. It is argued that the blame for the inconsistency must lie with Arrow's Collective Rationality condition. Arrow's abstract problem is generalized and interpreted in terms of individual as well as collective decision-making. His conditions are revised so that (1) cardinal - even interpersonal - utility comparisons are allowed and (2) the Collective Rationality condition - which formulates the traditional conception of rational choice as maximizing choice - is weakened to its bare bones. The revised set of conditions is still inconsistent. Once again the culprit is the Collective Rationality condition, now drastically weakened: even the bare bones of Arrow's conception of rational choice as maximizing choice is untenable. An alternative conception is proposed.

Towards an Assessment

Abstract: With a subject of this nature, it would be impracticable to attempt a summary and conclusion of the book in the customary way. The argument is much too condensed to allow a meaningful brief summary; so many conclusions could be drawn from it that any selected by the author may strike the readers as idiosyncratic and arbitrary. The task of forming conclusions as to the nature of the concept will then be left to the individual reader who can, if necessary, easily refresh his memory of the argument by looking again through the whole book which is, after all, quite short. This chapter will merely attempt to get the subject into a broader perspective by discussing the issues of the clarity of perception of national interest, of its rationality and of its relationship with inter- and supranational values. These should be helpful both when applying the scheme to the analysis of the national interest of a specific single state and when looking for some general conclusions.

Faith and philosophical enquiry

Abstract: The concern of this book is the nature of religious belief and the ways in which philosophical enquiry is related to it Six chapters present the positive arguments the author wishes to put forward to discusses religion and rationality, scepticism about religion, language-games, belief and the loss of belief The remaining chapters include criticisms of some contemporary philosophers of religion in the light of the earlier discussions, and the implications for more specific topics, such as religious education, are investigated The book ends with a general attempt to say something about the character of philosophical enquiry, and to show how important it is to realise this character in the philosophy of religion

Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three Person Game *

Abstract: A fundamental controversy in political theory from ancient times until the present concerns the rationality of political actors, what it is, if it exists at all, and whether or not humans display it in politics. Many political scientists are impatient with this controversy because it remains open after so much (apparently futile) discussion. But they ought not be. The problem of rationality is necessarily imbedded in even the simplest kinds of political research, where, if overlooked, it can occasion misinterpretation and even outright error. Suppose, for example, in an investigation of legislators one uses the notion of party loyalty as an independent variable to explain behavior. This notion seems simple and straightforward enough and not, therefore, likely to involve one in philosophical controversy. But in fact party loyalty can be interpreted in a variety of ways and the choice among them necessarily involves a choice on one side of the controversy over rationality. Loyalty can be thought of, for example, as a truly independent variable, as a product of political socialization, as an expression of affect, and hence as an essentially irrational motive. On the other hand, it may be thought of as itself dependent on bargains rationally satisfying the preferences of legislators. Such bargains may be either short term or long term so that a legislator's manifest party loyalty may result from a series of advantageous bargains with party leaders on particular bills or from an implied bargain with them on career advantage.

The Consistency of Rational Belief

Abstract: When are a man’s beliefs rational, and when are they irrational? A systematic answer to these questions constitutes a theory of the ethics of belief; that is, a theory which tells us what a man is obligated, permitted, and forbidden to believe, from the point of view of rationality. A theory of the rationality of belief will consist in large part of a system of rules which determine, in a given cognitive situation, what a man’s doxastic commitments ought to be. The most general form of a theory of rational belief will incorporate a set of rules that tell us what our doxastic commitments are once it has been determined which propositions, in a given cognitive situation, are justified, evident, reasonable, unreasonable, and so forth. A general theory of this sort becomes more exact when it is supplemented with a set of rules that also determine, in a given situation, which propositions are justified, evident, etc. This latter body of rules will generally incorporate, but not wholly consist of, criteria of inductive support. In addition to criteria of inductive support, such rules will generally incorporate criteria for determining which nonexperiential propositions, if any, are justified independently of the need for inductive support, and which experiential propositions are justified but not justified by any other propositions. These criteria might serve as explications of the general concepts Justified, Evident, Reasonable, and so forth.

Inter-Theoretic Criticism and the Growth of Science

Abstract: This paper is intended to be a small contribution to a future comprehensive Theory of Scientific Growth. I take it that such a theory would give an idealized description of the repeating patterns of growth found within the history of science and show how these developmental patterns are different from those found in the case of theories such as witchcraft, on the one hand, and the patterns found in the growth of the ‘practical arts’, such as pottery-making, on the other. The theory would go on to explain why such patterns might be expected to produce scientific knowledge by pointing out the critical forces which are operating and the rationality of the responses to them. In short, an adequate philosophical theory in this area should not only give the kinetics of scientific growth, but also the dynamics of that process.

The Intelligence of Congress: Information and Public-Policy Patterns

Abstract: Proposals for improved information systems for legislatures have become a standard feature of the literature on legislative systems. Most of these proposals, however, either fail to take account of political realities or have a centralizing bias which is likely to prove incongenial to most legislators. Given the functionally fragmented structure of American politics, the methods that congressmen use to gather information are essentially rational, and likely, therefore, to prove highly resilient to change. But the form of rationality which the legislative intelligence system now favors is ill-suited to the policy needs of the society, particularly in those instances where the need for establishing orders of priority is most urgent. It may, thus, be particularly important to develop new intelligence systems in the executive branch, and in the private sector, to supplement, challenge, and engage the entrenched system of legislative intelligence.

The Rationality of Morality

Abstract: The rigorous employment of his empirical method led Bergson to the discovery that there are two distinct and irreducible moralities in the life of man — the closed or static, and the open or dynamic These two are not merely different aspects of a single morality since there is a difference of kind between them and not merely one of degree. Bergson traced each of the two moralities to a separate cause: the closed morality to social pressure, the open morality to aspiration. He found the first to be rooted in instinct and habit, and the second in the experience of moral heroes and mystics. Human beings behave as they do morally (I) because nature, acting through society, constrains them to do so, and (2) because certain heroic souls have had visions of a spiritual destiny for man and have inspired them with these visions. Social pressure and aspiration — these are the facts that must be taken into account in any inquiry into the nature and evolution of morality.

Theory in the Humanities and Sociology.

Abstract: As A nonrmmanist in a discipline?sociology?that stands relatively close to the humanities, I shall make bold to carry out my assignment by essaying a conception of the humanities that seems to me to be consonant with my conceptualization of both the behavioral-social sciences and the natural sciences. All of them, I think, should be treated as intellectual disciplines concerned with gaining rational knowledge of the human condition and of its products and environ ment. I include in the concept "environment" the cultural or sym bolic systems which, like artifacts, are at one level clearly human creations or products of human action, whatever their sources in other respects may be interpreted to be. The concept of rational knowledge in this sense involves the two basic methodological standards of science?namely logical clarity and coherence?and empirical validity. The disciplines in this sense vary not with respect to the relevance of these standards, but with respect to the nature of the objects they study, and consequently the more specific standards and methods appropriate in implement ing the general standards. Another way of putting this point is to say that as modes of action oriented to valid knowledge, the disciplines (German Wissenschaften) share the primacy of the values of cogni tive rationality, but the modes of implementation of these values vary as a function of the type of object studied, the type of interest manifested, the variety of data available, and the method appropri ate for such study. Knowledge, in the sense of this discussion, is what I should call a cultural object, or set of such objects. It consists of entities which at one level are physical, for example, black marks on white paper, but the significance of which derives from the fact that they are 495

"Locking-in" effects during a game of Chicken

Abstract: Such terms as "brinkmanship," "the rationality of irrationality," and "the doctrine of the last clear chance" have been much in vogue among intellectuals (e.g., Schelling, 1960) who are concerned with formulating a rationale to guide strategic choices in a situation of international conflict. The basic notion underlying these different terms is that a bargainer will gain an advantage if he can commit himself irrevocably so that the last clear chance of avoiding mutual disaster rests with his opponent. A child who works himself up to the point that he will have a temper tantrum if his parents refuse to let him sit where he wants in the restaurant is using this bargaining tactic. So is the driver who cuts in front of you on a highway as he appears to be deaf to the insistent blasts of your horn. And so is a nation that says to another nation that its honor as a nation and the sacrifices of its soldiers will not permit withdrawal or defeat. It is evident that this type of bargaining maneuver can sometimes be very effective. Yet, we wondered, would one expect this type of bargaining tactic to be effective when both sides could resort to it? We also wondered whether it is a ploy that is as suitable for a continuing relationship as it might be for a single, unrepeated encounter. To investigate these questions, we employed a modified ver-

Gemeinschaft, Inner Creation, and Role-Taking (Empathy): III. Charles Horton Cooley on “Social” vs “Spatial” (“Material”) Knowledge:

Abstract: This paper is the third of a series intended to relate Ferdinand Toennies' distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (and all comparable distinctions in social theory) to the difference between (1) intuitional and inferential role-taking (empathy), (2) Erlebnis and Erfahrung experience, and (3) Rorschachian inner creation (movement repsonses) and Rorschachian rationality (form responses). The paper interprets Charles Horton Cooley's concepts of “social” knowledge (or sympathy-as-communion) and “spatial” (“material”) knowledge as intuitional and inferential, respectively. It therefore clusters “social” knowledge with Gemeinschaft, Erlebnis, and inner creation; and “spatial” knowledge with Gesellschaft, Erfahrung, and rationality. The paper treats also of George Herbert Mead's concept of “attitude-taking.” It considers Mead to have confounded intuition and inference, with the result that contemporary Meadians may mean qualitatively different psychological processes when they speak of “role-taking” o...

Hospital Adaptations to Disaster: Flow Models of Intensive Technologies

Abstract: A great number of models have been employed in empirical studies of formal organizations. Some have been developed explicitly and elaborately in their own right while others are more implicit in specific investigations of organizational behavior. A majority of existing organizational models, however, fall generally into three main categories. Certainly the most famous of these is Weber's classic bureaucratic model with its emphasis on rationality. In contrast stands the natural systems model which views organizations as comprised of autonomous and often competing subparts. More implicit than either of these is a behavioristic model emphasizing the personal meaning of interaction in an organizational setting.

Rationality and Total Evidence

Abstract: The meaning and justification of the requirement of total evidence are examined. It is argued that there are several significantly different interpretations of the requirement, but each interpretation makes the requirement highly suspect. For any of the usual interpretations of the requirement, it would be quite unreasonable to conduct inquiry in such a way as to fulfill it. It is then suggested that the rational inquirer should seek the optimal amount of evidence, rather than all the evidence. This raises the problems surrounding the idea of scientific or epistemic utility.

Science Policy and Its Myths

Abstract: Forecasting is a recognised discipline, but it has not the character of scientific demonstration. The quantitative techniques inherited from the American ‘think-tanks’ working on weapon requirements dominate current thinking on technological forecasting. However the prime use of these techniques is in programming and management. Science planning therefore depends less on the mathematical rationality of these techniques for attaining an objective, than on the actual setting of an objective and the priority assigned to it in comparison with other possible objectives.

Is Rational Man Our First Priority

Abstract: In a provocative essay review of Arthur Schlesinger's book, The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas, Power, and Violence in Ameri ca,1 John Bunzel, newly appointed president of San Jose State College, raises a question to which every deeply concerned educator must ultimately turn his attention: To what part of man does public education owe its first obligation? Is it to his intellectu al-academic world, or his emotional social one? Which is most likely to in sure him a measure of happiness and a reasonable chance for survival? Mr Bunzel's position on this matter is, of course, widespread among schol ars throughout America For both Bunzel and Schlesinger, the art of reflection is the only antidote to the insanity which daily encroaches upon our democratic way of life Like Schlesinger, Bunzel "gives no quarter to those who would reject the process of reason" for the "simple ladling out of moral judgments"2 He quotes the professor who insists that a " 'spec trum of opinion and action is indis pensable if reason is to civilize pow er' " and abjures within youth the "change in life-style which locates its center in a bewildering grab bag of sources that includes hallucinatory drugs and Eastern mystics, encounter groups and communal pads in short, in the senses and emotions" Along with Schlesinger, his concern "is not simply the impulse to irrationalism which is evident everywhere, but the abandonment of rationality as a way to help set things right A liberal," he goes on to say, "does not deny or minimize the destructive tendencies that are a part of man's irrational component; rather, he reasserts the conviction that irrational motivations can best be treated at the conscious level, where they can be exposed to reason"3 Certainly there is much in Mr Bunzel's words that compels admira tion and a high level of agreement There is also a certain naivete to which historians are particularly prone This naivete is reflected in the belief that "reason" truly civilizes power, that "irrational motivations" are best cor

New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World

Abstract: The trend toward economic rationality in the USSR has not beenconfined to domestic issues alone. It is also manifest in the search for more advantageous and efficient procedures in foreign economic relations, specifically aid and trade with the third world. In this search for ways to secure tangible gains, Soviet relations with the developing countries are entering a new phase, in which economic considerations of profit are challenging the hitherto dominant political motivations.

Rationality & Political Science: A Critical Analysis of the Consumer-Choice Model

Abstract: In the preceding article Professor Dallmayr began an analysis of homo economicus as a theory of the political world, a theme which also interests Professor Conrad herein. His analytical approach tends to indicate that, as a model, rational economic choice leaves out too many factors to be usefully employed in the study of politics. That he and Dallmayr agree does not, of course, foreclose the question. But defenders of the economic approach will need to find ways of countering these arguments.

Arno Mayer's "Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956"--an Inadequate Model of Human Behavior, National Conflict, and Historical Change

Abstract: I am in general disagreement with Professor Arno J. Mayer's essay "Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956: A Research Assignment,"' which casually dismisses several central issues. He has wisely eschewed the "accident" theory of war in favor of a theory of social and political causes. No longer should historians be able to assert blithely that war was unintended, as does R. R. Palmer three times on the same page.2 Of the antecedents of World War I, Palmer writes: "Europe went off its course"; "Europe stumbled in 1914 into disaster"; "Europe went astray." But if Mayer reminds us of the need for historical determinism and causality, if he is too insightful to accept the verbal deception of referring to war as an "outbreak," he nevertheless naively subscribes to the eighteenthcentury faith in the rationality of men's motives and actions. There is something obvious and vital missing in Mayer's list of factors and conflicts historians should take into account in seeking the causes of war: "political, social, economic, and ideological" (p. 298). Whereas all of these factors are important and ought not be neglected, Mayer has denied the psychological dimensions of war. I suggest to Mayer and to your readers that his dismissal of the "fashionable focus on the aggressive drives of modern man, those same drives which are said to feed nonviolent forms of conflict, such as competition, opposition, and rivalry," is premature. With all due respect to his strategic sagacity, it is time that Carl vog.,Clausewitz be superseded as a psychological, if not as a political, analyst of war. Indeed, if Mayer chooses to ignore Sigmund Freud's profound essays on World War I-"Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" (1915) and "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917)-his expressions during the

Some Notes on the Rationality Model

Abstract: In this set of notes on the importance of integrating the geometric mean into the mainstream of financial reasoning with regard to risky ventures that might fail we discuss some forces which are tending to make financial markets conform to the rationality hypothesis, present a model that is particularly useful in analyzing investments that are too big to be prudently undertaken by one decision-making unit, show the model's applicability to a number of decision areas such as large scale R & D investment, and indicate some perils and pitfalls in using wealth maximizing equations to guard against financial ruin.