Showing papers on "Sovereignty published in 2022"

Execution of death penalty in narcotics crime in the perspective of national law in indonesia

Abstract: The abuse of illegal drugs is a threat to the sovereignty of the nation and the state of drug eradication requires the role of all parties to narrow the movement of drug dealers who are still trying to market the illicit goods in indonesia. The regulation on narcotics crime and death penalty is very important in regulating the law for the perpetrators of narcotics crime for the sake of national and state sovereignty.In Indonesia today, the imposition of criminal sanctions in the form of a death penalty by a judge for perpetrators of narcotics is one of the policies adopted in Law No. 35 of 2009 on narcotics and cannot be separated from the criminal law norms adopted by the criminal law so far, for example in Article 10 of the Criminal Code. Another thing in the other world is that there is a significant development of narcotics users by taking depenalization actions against users that aim to replace prison sanctions that are sometimes applied to other criminal sanctions such as Social Work sanctions. The research method used is juridical empirical meaning is to identify and conceptualize the law as a real and functional social institution in a patterned living system.

Human Rights

Abstract: America’s new global power after 1945 was central to the rise of universal human rights as a set of practices and ideals. The new moral language thrived when it received official US backing and usually withered when it did not. Domestic and transnational movements also laid claim to these ideals to press for changes in how states treat their own citizens. Over time their efforts enshrined a view of individual rights as the business of the international community and the domain of international law rather than a matter of strictly internal sovereignty. As the language became global, the rest of the world harnessed and contested human rights ideals in ways that changed Americans’ own aspirations at home and abroad.

Before the West

Abstract: How would the history of international relations in 'the East' be written if we did not always read the ending – the Rise of the West and the decline of the East – into the past? What if we did not assume that Asia was just a residual category, a variant of 'not-Europe', but saw it as a space of with its own particular history and sociopolitical dynamics, not defined only by encounters with European colonialism? How would our understanding of sovereignty, as well as our theories about the causes of the decline of Great Powers and international orders, change as a result? For the first time, Before the West offers a grand narrative of (Eur)Asia as a space connected by normatively and institutionally overlapping successive world orders originating from the Mongol Empire. It also uses that history to rethink the foundational concepts and debates of international relations, such as order and decline.

Contested Spatialities of Digital Sovereignty

Abstract: ABSTRACT “Digital sovereignty” has become a buzzword in digital policies. Contrary to the imaginary of digital transformation as preceding an era of limitless global networking in the 1990s, approaches to state regulation and delimitation of data flows as well as programmes for national digital infrastructures are justified with calls for digital sovereignty across very different contexts. This forum brings together contributions from political geography, law, computer science, and ethics that compare and analyse discourses and practices of digital sovereignty. The case studies on Russia and the EU reveal parallels as well as fundamental differences in the conception and implementation of digital sovereignty. Essays on the challenges posed by new forms of cross-border interaction (such as cloud computing) and new actors (such as digital platforms) illustrate that the traditional coupling of concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and the state, of jurisdiction and borders, must be rethought. The essays in this forum thus make it clear that the digital transformation is not simply a socio-technical modernisation process. It is rather shaped in specific ways and should be understood and analysed as (geo)-political discourses and practices. The forum contributes to the development of a political digital geography that analyses how the digital transformation is contested and produced in specific ways and unearths the politics and spatialities conceived and produced in these discourses and practices.

Race and racism in the founding of the modern world order

Abstract: While race existed as a cultural marker in earlier history, a mutually-reinforcing link between racism, slavery and empire is a distinct product of western Europe and the US-led world order. Yet, mainstream scholarship on International Relations has obscured the question of race or worse, legitimized its exclusion in discussions of world order-building. At the same time, demand for racial equality from anti-colonial forces presented an alternative and inclusive conception of world order. The first part of this article offers a brief discussion of concepts of race, racism and world order. The next part examines how racist ideas and norms created exclusionary frameworks and approaches of world order, such as the European ‘standard of civilization’ principle. The third part looks at the role of racism in the emergence of the American-led world order, including US President Woodrow Wilson's rejection of the ‘racial equality’ principle in the League of Nations Charter, the privileging of ‘sovereign equality’ over ‘racial equality’ in the UN Charter, and the scant attention given to the link between colonialism and denial of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet, anti-colonial leaders and conferences, especially the 1955 Bandung Conference, integrated ‘national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism’, and demanded racial equality as a fundamental human right. The final part cautions against the dangers of complacency and compartmentalizing the study of race and racism, and calls instead for viewing racism as an inter-linked global challenge, hence integral to the emerging research agenda of Global International Relations.

Digital currencies, monetary sovereignty, and U.S.–China power competition

Abstract: The rise of digital currencies challenges practices of monetary sovereignty and impacts the international monetary order. Drawing on recent IPE debates about the public-private nature of money, the critique of the “impossible trinity” and “territorial currencies,” this article explores the competition between China and the United States over and within the international monetary system. The two largest economies display strikingly divergent regulatory approaches to cryptocurrencies and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). China completely banned cryptocurrencies but became a front-runner in developing a CBDC. It aims to expand the RMB's global role without giving up its monetary control. U.S. administrations have instead reluctantly considered regulating cryptocurrencies. Discussions on a potential digital U.S. dollar (USD) only began in 2020. Washington aims at preserving the existing cross-border financial mechanisms and offshore infrastructure for USD-denominated transactions and credit creation. It focuses on financial crime and maintaining the innovation dynamic of its private sector to preserve its “exorbitant privilege.” Emerging financial infrastructures and standards for digital currencies are the new technological arena for U.S.–China monetary competition. 数字货币的崛起对货币主权实践发起挑战，并对国际货币秩序产生重大影响。借鉴国际政治经济学近来关于货币公私属性的辩论，以及围绕“不可能三角”和“领土货币”的批判性辩论，本文主要探讨中美在不断变化的国际货币体系中的竞争。世界最大的两个经济体对加密货币和央行数字货币的监管方式存在巨大差异。中国完全禁止加密货币，但在发展央行数字货币方面处于领先地位，目的是在不放弃对货币管控的情况下扩大人民币的全球影响力。相反，美国政府只是在长期拖延后才开始探索对加密货币的监管，直到2020年才开始讨论数字美元计划。华盛顿犹豫不决的原因是它希望保留现有的跨境金融机制和离岸基础设施，以创造大量以美元计价的交易和信贷。其政策重点是在遏制金融犯罪的同时保持私营企业的创新活力，以维护美元“嚣张的特权”。因此，新兴金融基础设施和数字货币标准正在成为中美货币竞争的新科技领域。 As of March 1, 2022, there are 9516 different cryptocurrencies whose total value exceeds U.S. dollar (USD) 1.95 trillion (CoinMarketCap, 2022). Governments have begun to research and develop Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) (Bordo, 2021; Buckley et al., 2021). Eighty-six percent of the world's central banks are actively exploring CBDCs, while 14% have already deployed pilot projects (BIS, 2021; Boar & Wehrli, 2021). What impact does the digitalization of national currencies, the rise of blockchain-based private money, and other innovative financial technologies have on the monetary sovereignty of states? The rapid growth of cryptocurrencies is receiving critical attention from lawmakers and regulatory agencies worldwide (Auer & Claessens, 2018; Galavis, 2019; PBOC, 2021; Riley, 2021). Their development has ignited debates among policymakers and theorists on the transformative implications for international monetary governance, financial systems, and public policy (Bilotta & Botti, 2021; Brunnermeier et al., 2019; Campbell-Verduyn & Bernards, 2019; Campbell-Verduyn, 2017; Rose, 2015). Some argue that the proliferation of stablecoins could initiate a systematic “unbundling” of currencies and national monetary authority. Others assert that cryptocurrencies could enable money laundering, terrorist financing, and tax evasion (Brunnermeier et al., 2021; Williams, 2014). This paper explores the evolving relationship between the digitalization of money and monetary sovereignty. It attempts to improve our understanding of how emerging digital currencies affect the policy choices of the world's largest economies, the United States and China, in the context of competition dynamics in the international monetary system. Do cryptocurrencies and CBDCs influence monetary autonomy and can they engender a power shift between the United States and China? China is the first major economy to issue a sovereign digital currency. Chinese analysts fear that private units of account, such as the planned Libra cryptocurrency (now called Diem), pose unprecedented challenges to monetary sovereignty (Guo & Wang, 2020). Cryptocurrencies might also allow countries to circumvent U.S. control over financial transactions and increase the monetary autonomy of rival great powers. As China established its significance in fintech (Ehrlich, 2020; van der Lugt & Hough, 2021), the emergence of a Chinese CBDC could be a “game-changer” (W. Shen & Hou, 2021). The impact of Chinese CBDC is controversial. On the one hand, some observers anticipate a “Sputnik moment” (Murray, 2022) or even the eventual downfall of the USD as the primary global currency (Bhatt, 2021; Campbell, 2021; S. Fleming & Pickford, 2021; Smith, 2019). Others say that digital currencies are overhyped and that U.S. financial primacy is not under stress (Chorzempa, 2021a; Li, 2021; Paulson, 2020). IPE scholarship on global monetary relations traditionally tackles innovation, power, and order issues. Building on insights about the structural aspects of financial and monetary power (Gill & Law, 1989; Gilpin, 1987; Strange, 1971), recent studies point out that the persistent primacy of the United States in the global monetary system contradicts predictions of the demise of the liberal international order (Norrlof et al., 2020; Winecoff, 2015; but see Goh, 2019). Conceptually, our study bridges two burgeoning research topics: monetary power and techno-geopolitics. We contribute to the research on China's monetary power (Cohen, 2012; Helleiner & Kirshner, 2014; Kwon, 2015; W. Shen & Hou, 2021) by exploring the digitization of international financial (infra)structures and networks (de Goede, 2021; Green & Gruin, 2021; Rella, 2020). By examining digital currencies and financial blockchain applications, we also broaden the technologies included in research on the techno-geopolitics of China and the United States (Mueller, 2020; Rosenbach & Mansted, 2019; Wong, 2021). The paper is organized as follows: Section “Monetary Sovereignty and Digital Currencies” situates digital currencies within recent conceptual debates on monetary sovereignty and the evolution of the international financial system. In Sections “China: Defending Monetary Sovereignty through Digital Currencies” and “USA: Balancing Crypto Regulations with Fintech Innovations,” we draw on expert discourses, official documents, and policy decisions to explore the strategic motivations behind the regulatory measures on cryptocurrencies and CBDCs adopted by China and the United States In both cases, strategic discourses have shifted while regulatory policies and ambitions have diverged (Chorzempa, 2021a). Section “Digital Currencies and U.S.–China Power Competition” examines how the two different monetary regimes of the United States and China drive competition across emerging financial infrastructures and standards and whether new transnational infrastructures for the digital Renminbi (RMB) strengthen the Chinese position vis-à-vis the United States. Virtual currency, digital currency, and cryptocurrency are often used interchangeably. To avoid confusion, we only use the terms “digital currency” and “cryptocurrency.”. The European Central Bank (2012) defines virtual currency as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community” (p. 5). It does not have a legal tender status and is not issued nor guaranteed by any jurisdiction (Financial Action Task Force, 2014, p. 4). If digital currency is considered a subset of virtual currencies, there is a contradiction because some digital currencies have a legal tender. For example, the CBDC is the virtual form of a country's fiat currency that is issued and regulated by the competent monetary authority of the country (Seth, 2021). If digital currency is defined as any currency or money-like assets primarily managed, stored, or exchanged on digital computer systems, “it is the overall superset that includes virtual currency, which in turn includes cryptocurrencies” (Frankenfield, 2020). Cryptocurrencies are digital money based on blockchain technologies. Most CBDCs are digital currencies but are not necessarily based on distributed ledger technology (Narayanan, 2020). The broader evolution of the global monetary system and the structure of currencies offer crucial insights to understand the intersection of monetary sovereignty and the rise of digital currencies. The relevant historical context for Bitcoin and CBDCs is the territorialization and deterritorialization of money and currency regimes. Cohen (1998) and Agnew (2005) illustrate that the monetary arrangements of countries over the last 150 years are variegated. They rarely operate according to a Westphalian logic of usage confined to the territorial borders of states. In North America, for instance, the emerging nation-states Canada, the United States, and Mexico needed decades to replace foreign gold and silver coins—the Spanish-American dollar—that were widely used from Cancun to Toronto, alongside various local coins and tokens, with a territorially exclusive national currency issued by the central bank (Helleiner, 1999). During the Bretton Woods era, the global monetary system was dominated by currencies that circulated within national jurisdictions and were controlled by a single public authority (Murau et al., 2020). Modern Money Theory turned this historical constellation into a theoretical proposition: monetarily sovereign governments have to be able to fully control the “functioning of the domestic monetary system,” including the legal means of payment and regulatory frameworks for banking, finance, and payment mechanisms (Tymoigne, 2020, p. 2). Research in economic geography and international political economy scrutinizes the state-centric assumptions of modern macroeconomics. Mundell's (1963) and J. M. Fleming's (1962) influential work normalized the so-called “triple coincidence” which proposes that the political decision-making entity, the economic area (defined by the GDP boundary), and the currency area overlap territorially (Avdjiev et al., 2016, p. 412). The central research puzzles thus focused on countries’ inability to have all three goals of independent monetary policies, fixed exchange rates, and capital mobility (the “impossible trinity”). Politicians are forced to choose only two (Aizenman, 2013; cf. Rodrik, 2000). The main counterargument against privileging “territorial currency” is empirical. This framework cannot capture the complex geographic and transnational relationships of money, governance, and financial flows. The focus on the impossible trinity (or “trilemma”) and exchange rate regimes no longer corresponds with the highly globalized situation of many currency regimes. The diversity of monetary policy choices and currency constellations is not just obvious from the dollarization of many smaller economies but also from some of the most important currencies, such as the Euro and the USD. These are not territorially bounded but function as international currencies (Agnew, 2005), which are used and issued onshore and offshore in the form of credit money. The expectation that cryptocurrencies could deterritorialize money corresponds with the possibility of the denationalization of money as envisioned by F. A. von Hayek (cf. Fantacci, 2019). Unlike government fiat money, Bitcoin is created, distributed, traded, and stored using decentralized blockchain technologies. Bitcoin can therefore be considered a global currency beyond the reach of regulatory agencies (Rose, 2015). In times of crisis, declining confidence in national currencies could push citizens to increasingly use cryptocurrencies for financial transactions (Williams, 2014) or even a “self-contained ‘money-world’” (Hayes, 2021). At the moment, it does not seem like a wave of deterritorialization of currencies is imminent. The only exception might be Diem. If it were to operate as a global unit of account, most economies might be exposed to progressive penetration because of the network effects from Meta's (formerly Facebook's) platform (Brunnermeier et al., 2021). For instance, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire opined that Meta's plans to issue a cryptocurrency could promote the privatization of money on a global scale. To cope with Meta's dominant position and the risks for consumers, companies, and national sovereignty, Le Maire suggests the European Central Bank should create a public digital currency (Novak, 2019). Arauz (2021) notes that CBDCs and stablecoins threaten financial stability in weaker economies in the Global South. They could facilitate capital flight and foster the substitution of national currencies in economies at the bottom of the global monetary hierarchy. The second debate concerns the definition of money. The nature of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other tokens remains essentially contested: are they a unit of account, a financial asset, or a new institutional technology? (cf. Davidson et al., 2018; Fama et al., 2019) Most relevant to these questions are different theories of money. The credit theory of money deemphasizes the role of public institutions in the creation of money. Scholars in this school of thought conceptualize money as a unit of account backed by a state but essentially shaped by market actors. Private actors create most money in a regulated environment instead of central banks (Murau & Klooster, 2020). For instance, Chinese commercial banks are money multipliers that can issue banking money 10 times the amount China's central bank issues fiat money based on a “fractional reserves” model (W. Shen & Hou, 2021). Murau et al. (2020) distinguish between three types of money creation: central bank credit, commercial bank credit, and shadow bank credit. All can appear inside and outside of the jurisdiction of a state, and only the first is under the direct control of state authorities. Monetary sovereignty regimes, therefore, differ with respect to state influence over money creation, use, and management within a jurisdiction and concerning the offshore creation of credit money.1 The decoupling of different dimensions of money and the severing of national territory and currency corresponds with IPE scholarship, which examined monetary policies are part of global geoeconomic power structures and shifting transnational hierarchies (Cohen, 1977; Helleiner, 2005; Konings, 2007; Strange, 1988). Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has enjoyed the highest monetary autonomy because the USD is used as a global reserve currency and as a means of payment and value storage. Following Murau et al. (2020, p. 2), the current global financial system can be characterized as an “offshore U.S.-dollar system” that greatly benefits the U.S. economy. The U.S. government not only gains from “seignorage” but can also run a balance of payment deficit and delay or redistribute the burden of adjustment costs to other actors (Cohen, 2005; Eichengreen, 2011, pp. 45ff.). Emerging digital currencies can be categorized according to Murau et al.'s (2020) tripartite framework. Cryptocurrencies belong to the shadow bank credit category, though they do not function as full-fledged units of account, and their volatilities are high. Their usage and value are beyond the purview of national legislation and monetary authority (Park et al., 2020). Cryptocurrencies share similarities with the financial instruments at the core of rapid financial globalization before the 2008 financial crisis, when there were regulatory spaces of exception and a lack of oversight (cf. Murau, 2017; Roberts, 1995; Sikka, 2003). CBDCs, on the contrary, is an example of central bank money but could later also become instruments for commercial bank credit. The digital RMB, for instance, is a hybrid model in which the CBDC is a “direct claim” on the central bank but “authorized operators” such as state-owned banks and private Internet banks as intermediaries that provide e-valets and services for users (Auer et al., 2020, p. 22). A CBDC is thus regulated digital money that promises the convenience of digital currencies while retaining the control or oversight of states (Greene, 2021). Like cryptocurrencies, CBDCs are designed for cross-border payments, which involve complicated international clearing mechanisms, foreign exchange policies, and compliance requirements (The People's Bank of China [PBOC], 2021). When practices of monetary sovereignty in a financially globalized world respond to digital currencies, they inevitably diverge. The concept of monetary sovereignty, therefore, cannot privilege the exclusive rights of jurisdiction “to issue currency,” “to determine and change the value of that currency,” and “to regulate the use of that currency, or any other currency, within its territory” (Gianviti, 2005, p. 4). Instead, internally effective monetary sovereignty can be described as the ability of states to control public money, regulate private–public money, and manage private money to achieve their economic policy objectives (Murau & Klooster, 2020).2 Regarding the external components of monetary sovereignty, the position of the unit of account linked to a state within the global monetary hierarchy shapes this state's currency regime. The USD is tied to a global currency regime, while the RMB still resembles a classical territorial currency (Agnew, 2005, p. 448) despite attempts to internationalize it (Cohen, 2017). The former is supported by the long-standing international trust in the USD and technically facilitated through a suite of transnational infrastructures and institutional mechanisms that allow for efficient transactions, credit creation, and currency swaps. The attitudes of the Chinese government towards cryptocurrency and CBDC differ. China does not recognize cryptocurrencies as legal tenders. It has banned financial institutions and payment ecosystems from handling cryptocurrency exchanges. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities promote the digital RMB, as the central bank wants to breathe new life into the internationalization of the RMB (cf. Cohen, 2012; Liang, 2020) while reducing the exposure of China's economy to the U.S.-controlled financial networks. China's regulation of cryptocurrencies corresponds with the stepwise strengthening of public oversight and regulation of all new digital financial technologies since 2015 (cf. J. Wang, 2021; Zhou et al., 2018). Initially, China was a major hub for Bitcoin mining and trading (Ekman, 2021). In 2014, Chinese exchanges accounted for the largest share of Bitcoin's global trading volume. More Bitcoin was traded in RMB than any other currency and the price of Bitcoin strongly correlated with market and policy developments in China (Gloudeman, 2014). The earliest sign of crypto-related restrictions came in December 2013, when the PBOC and four agencies jointly issued the Notice on Precautions Against the Risks of Bitcoins.3 It defined a token as “a specially designated virtual commodity” that does not possess “the same legal status of a currency.” Therefore, Chinese financial and payment institutions were prohibited from engaging in any Bitcoin-related activities or services to “protect the status of the RMB as the statutory currency, prevent risks of money laundering and protect financial stability” (PBOC et al., 2013). The actions of Chinese authorities caused an upheaval in cryptocurrency trading and Bitcoin mining. In September 2017, Chinese government agencies jointly issued the Announcement on Preventing Financial Risks from Initial Coin Offerings (ICO Rules) (PBOC et al., 2017). Accordingly, tokens and other virtual currencies involved in ICO financing are not accepted as legal tenders. Based on the ICO rules, all platforms that provide trading and exchange services for coin offerings are prohibited from offering exchange services between fiat currencies and virtual currencies. They are also prohibited from purchasing or selling virtual currencies and providing pricing, information intermediaries, or other related services (PBOC, 2017). Henceforth, crypto-related regulations in China became increasingly tighter and strictly enforced (Pan, 2021). Although trading cryptocurrency was officially banned, online cryptocurrency transactions continued through foreign exchanges. Hence, capital flight enabled by stablecoin transactions remained an official concern (M. Hu et al., 2021). In May 2021, the authorities prohibited financial institutions and specialized firms from providing any services related to cryptocurrency transactions (Reuters, 2021a) after the PCOC had defined cryptocurrencies as primarily speculative instruments instead of investment tools, posing potential risks to financial security and social stability (PBOC, 2021). In September 2021, China declared all cryptocurrency transactions strictly illegal and blocked access to foreign platforms. The dramatic decline of crypto market capitalization during the second quarter of 2021 (Figure 1) can be attributed to China's effective implementation of a crackdown. Currently, around 80% of the Bitcoin fiat currency exchanges use U.S., EU, and Japanese units of account (Coinhills, 2022). China's State Council's Financial Stability Committee simultaneously strengthened the rules for crypto mining in 2021. These restrictions caused a sharp decrease in Chinese mining power (see Figure 2) and the migration of miners to other countries. The discussions among Chinese scholars reflect worldwide concerns. They pinpoint various problems of digital currencies such as transaction, systemic, liquidity, legal, and technical risks. As the global influence of cryptocurrencies increases, they may gradually replace sovereign currencies, especially in small economies (Chen & Ming, 2021, p. 16; B. Wang & Wei, 2021, p. 84). Digital money is expected to enable the “decentralization” of monetary transmission on a global scale, which may lead to the “de-governmentization” of the entire financial ecology (Chen & Ming, 2021, p. 16). Like decision-makers in Europe,4 the Chinese government is anxious about the potential of Meta's planned digital currency. Mu Changchuan, head of the PBOC Digital Currency Research Center, pointed out that if Meta's 2.7 billion users used Diem, it would limit the global influence of the digital RMB (Bram, 2021). Facebook's CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, remarked during a Congressional hearing that Diem is intended as a worldwide payment system, which “will be backed mostly by dollars and […] will extend America's financial leadership as well as our democratic values and oversight around the world” (Zuckerberg, 2019, p. 1). Chinese leaders consequentially view Diem as a threat while China seeks more monetary autonomy. Arguably, Chinese monetary policy acted quickly to protect its territorial currency regime. China chose to extinguish all kinds of shadow bank credit or private units of account within its jurisdiction. This implied not only abandoning its central position in the global cryptocurrency ecosystem (Sharma, 2021) but also giving up the influence over the price of cryptocurrencies (cf. Axelrod, 2021). Yet, even while onshore competition against the RMB was strictly ruled out, Chinese authorities advanced their vision of a digital currency for domestic and global use. Developing a Chinese national digital currency raised questions concerning monetary policy. The exploration of the digital RMB can be traced back to 2014 when the PBOC began researching the prospect of developing a digital currency.5 In 2017, PBOC (2017) established an institute to study this endeavor in-depth. Some commentators assume that the government aims to replace the remaining cash in circulation, increasing competition in China's mobile payments market (Kharpal, 2021). Others speculate that the digital RMB's goal is to dismantle the existing mobile payment system, dominated by Ant Group's Alipay and Tencent's WeChat Pay (Yang, 2021). Chinese experts stress that the digital RMB is a centralized currency and mobile payment platforms are wallet-like supporting infrastructure, so these can “co-exist and complement each other” (Liu, 2021). The digital RMB can interoperate with Alipay and WeChat Pay (Bram, 2021; Gjoza, 2018; Peters et al., 2020). The PBOC (2021) clarified that it wanted to prevent criminal activities and limit the risk of disintermediation and uncontrolled cross-border financial flows. But its requirement for banks to provide 100% reserve for all CBDC deposits changes the current fractional reserve system. Widespread adoption of the digital RMB could thus lead to a scenario in which the capacity of commercial banks to generate bank money is reduced (W. Shen & Hou, 2021). In 2021, the PBOC launched several pilot tests in Shenzhen, Suzhou, Xiong'an, Chengdu, and Shanghai. According to Chinese media reports, 261 million unique users experimented with the digital RMB, making transactions worth nearly 13.78 billion USD by the end of 2021 (Xinhua, 2022). During the Beijing Winter Olympics, foreign currency banknotes could be converted into digital RMB (Helms, 2022). The internationalization of the RMB is a key motive of China's central bank to promote the digital RMB (Reuters, 2021b). Typically, digitalization can promote the role of a currency as a global store of value as a reserve instrument. The other way is to become a medium of exchange for international payments (Brunnermeier et al., 2021, p. 21). If CBDCs are used in cross-border payments, their influence goes quickly beyond the national territory. Their national issuers have control over the money, including the right to issue the currency and regulate—or even program—the uses of that currency (Gianviti, 2005; Greene, 2021). The objective of developing the digital RMB is to explore the improvement of cross-border payments and to set up exchange arrangements and regulatory cooperation mechanisms with foreign central banks and monetary authorities (PBOC, 2021). If the digital RMB is widely used, it could not only help to reduce China's dependence on the dollar-dominated global banking system but also challenge the hegemonic position of the dollar, which is a long-term goal of the Chinese leadership (Choyleva, 2021). Contemplating a future global monetary system shaped by national digital currencies, Zhou Xiaochuan, a former central bank governor, stressed that none of the evolving CBDCs should adopt a “dominance of the world” approach (Chinanews, 2021). Concerns about monetary sovereignty animate the hope that the Chinese CBDC will reduce the ability of the United States to impose sanctions and blockades through its influence over the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) (Bhatt, 2021; Dans, 2021; van der Lugt & Hough, 2021). To issue the digital RMB is necessary, in combination with alternative payment systems for China to enhance its currency sovereignty while enhancing RMB usage globally (van der Lugt & Hough, 2021). In contrast to China, the U.S. government has been reluctant to regulate Bitcoin and has not yet created a CBDC. Its private sector has been more active in promoting the adoption of cryptocurrencies. Nonetheless, during the past 2 years, U.S. policymakers had a subtle attitude change towards CBDCs while the attempted regulation of cryptocurrencies remains fragmented. In the United States, cryptocurrency exchanges and initial coin offerings are largely unregulated. Due to China's radical ban, and the absence of restrictions in the United States, cryptocurrencies blossomed in United States Globally, almost 40% of the Bitcoin trading volume in online exchanges is handled in USD (see Table 1). Unlike the centralized Chinese supervision model, the United States adopted a multi-agency, decentralized supervision model to regulate cryptocurrencies. Several government agencies on the national and state levels exert regulatory authority over digital currencies.6 Although their approaches are not efficiently coordinated, and relevant categorizations of digital currencies greatly differ (Hughes, 2017), the concern with financial crime and tax fraud is a leitmotif. In 2013, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which persecutes domestic and international financial crimes and implements anti-money laundering efforts (Lennon, 2021), issued guidance on virtual currencies under the Ban Secrecy Act. The guidance treats virtual currency as “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some environments” but does not have a legal tender status in any jurisdiction (FinCEN, 2013). The U.S. Department of Treasury has defined Bitcoin not as currency but as a type of money service business. Since September 2015, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has classified Bitcoin and other virtual currencies as commodities covered by the commodity exchange act. Cryptocurrencies are thus under the CFTC's scope and the agency can clamp down on unregistered firms in the United States that trade derivatives of the cryptocurrency. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are property, making them relevant for tax policies. U.S. presidents are generally skeptical of cryptocurrencies. Former U.S. President Donald Trump was not supportive of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies (The Guardian, 2019). He asserted that Facebook's Libra “will have little standing or dependability” and the USD is “both dependable and reliable” (van Boom, 2019). The Trump administration expressed a desire to strengthen regulations on cryptocurrencies to prevent them from undermining the USD. Bank officials invoke the infamous period of “wildcat” banks in the 19th century as a point of reference (Held, 2019). Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Gary Gensler moved to investigate “Wild West” abuses in the $1.6 trillion crypto market (Sutton, 2022), as the SEC has categorized most tokens as securities. The regulation proposal of the FinCEN (2020) focused on financial crime. It required money service businesses, like cryptocurrency exchanges, to collect identity data about users to make it harder for Bitcoin users t

Digital/sovereignty and European security integration: an introduction

Abstract: ABSTRACT The notion of digital sovereignty, also often referred to as technological sovereignty, has been gaining momentum in the European Union’s (EU) political and policy discourses over recent years. Digital sovereignty has come to supplement an already substantial engagement of the EU with the digital across various security policy domains. The goal of this article and of the overall Special Issue is to explore how the discourse and practices of digital sovereignty redefine European security integration. Our core argument is that digital sovereignty has both direct and indirect implications for European security as the EU attempts to develop and control digital infrastructures (sovereignty over the digital), as well as the use of digital tools for European security governance (sovereignty through the digital). It is thus essential to further explore digital sovereignty both in terms of European policies and of a re-articulation of sovereign power and digital technologies – what we suggest calling digital/sovereignty.

Reflections for the interdisciplinary study of the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022

Abstract: The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is an unusual geopolitical event that puts the security of Western Europe at risk and, at the same time, erodes the norms of international law that regulate, at least in theory, relations between civilized countries. Indeed, it is a tragic event that has cost the lives of thousands of civilians who have been victims of war crimes and serious violations of their fundamental rights. In this sense, the objective of this editorial is twofold, on the one hand, to present volume 40, number 73 of Political Questions and, on the other, to briefly explain the causes and geopolitical consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is concluded that the invasion of Putin’s Russia in Ukraine can trigger a prolonged and extensive conflict that can even confront NATO directly with Russia. Ideologically, it is a conflict that means a clash between different political models such as the liberal democracies of the West (ensuring human rights, adherence to the principles of international law - the sovereignty of the country, freedom of speech, free movement around the world, etc.) with the militarist and neoconservative authoritarianism of tsarist roots.

Conflicts of sovereignty in contemporary Europe: a framework of analysis

Abstract: Contemporary conflicts of sovereignty in Europe have gone beyond the clash between national and supranational sovereignty. Sovereignty conflicts are increasingly occurring within member states. This paper develops a conceptual framework that distinguishes between foundational, institutional and territorial conflicts of sovereignty, elaborating on this taxonomy with reference to the historical evolution of the concept of sovereignty in Europe. It provides an account of why we have seen a proliferation in conflicts of sovereignty within European states. This is due in part to the notion of “shared” sovereignty. Central to European integration, this notion has introduced considerable institutional indeterminacy into the political systems of member states, leading to many of the institutional conflicts of sovereignty we see in Europe today. The struggle of national party systems to institutionalize societal conflict via partisan competition is another contributory factor. This has displaced conflict onto the terrain of how popular rule is institutionalized within the national state. In developing this framework, the paper provides a method for distinguishing between political conflicts tout court and those touching specifically upon sovereignty. Moreover, the framework helps us distinguish between those conflicts of sovereignty most destabilizing for a polity and those which are less so.

Digital sovereignty and taking back control: from regulatory capitalism to regulatory mercantilism in EU cybersecurity

Abstract: ABSTRACT In recent years, we have been able to observe the emergence and mainstreaming of an EU discourse on digital sovereignty, which highlights the importance of gaining back control of EU digital infrastructure and technological production, based on the EU's perceived loss of economic competitiveness, limited capacity to innovate, high degree of dependence on foreign digital infrastructures and service providers and, related to all these factors, difficulty in providing EU citizens with a high level of cybersecurity. Bearing in mind that a considerable percentage of these infrastructures and service providers are under private sector control, the present article asks how this sovereignty discourse conceptualises the role of the private sector in EU cybersecurity. Drawing from a Regulatory Capitalism theoretical model, this article proposes that the EU has instead entered a Regulatory Mercantilist phase where it seeks to reassert its control over cyberspace, impose digital borders, accumulate data wealth and reduce its dependence on external private sector actors whose values may not reflect those of the EU order. A new approach to cybersecurity is emerging, in which the non-EU private sector can be perceived as much of a threat as foreign powers, and from whom digital sovereignty must be secured.

Conflicts of sovereignty in contemporary Europe: a framework of analysis

Abstract: Contemporary conflicts of sovereignty in Europe have gone beyond the clash between national and supranational sovereignty. Sovereignty conflicts are increasingly occurring within member states. This paper develops a conceptual framework that distinguishes between foundational, institutional and territorial conflicts of sovereignty, elaborating on this taxonomy with reference to the historical evolution of the concept of sovereignty in Europe. It provides an account of why we have seen a proliferation in conflicts of sovereignty within European states. This is due in part to the notion of “shared” sovereignty. Central to European integration, this notion has introduced considerable institutional indeterminacy into the political systems of member states, leading to many of the institutional conflicts of sovereignty we see in Europe today. The struggle of national party systems to institutionalize societal conflict via partisan competition is another contributory factor. This has displaced conflict onto the terrain of how popular rule is institutionalized within the national state. In developing this framework, the paper provides a method for distinguishing between political conflicts tout court and those touching specifically upon sovereignty. Moreover, the framework helps us distinguish between those conflicts of sovereignty most destabilizing for a polity and those which are less so.

The impossible energy trinity: Energy security, sustainability, and sovereignty in cross-border electricity systems

Abstract: The article explores energy policy tradeoffs faced by states that expand renewable electricity production and are part of cross-border electricity systems. We develop the concept of an impossible energy trinity (IET), which posits that many states cannot simultaneously achieve energy security, sustainability, and sovereignty. We argue that these states have three options to cope with the challenge of intermittent electricity production from domestic renewables. The dirty option resorts to base or reserve electric generating capacity from non-sustainable sources. The insecure option accepts system stability risks and/or higher electricity prices. The non-autonomous option cedes control over domestic energy rules to pursue integration with neighboring electricity grids and markets. We empirically illustrate our novel concept using the case of Switzerland, which finds itself at the crossroads of the three options. The country has to choose whether to add conventional generation capacities, accept grid instabilities and higher electricity prices, or integrate with the EU electricity market and rules. We discuss generalizations to other countries and ways to manage the IET. We conclude that public pressure for decarbonization and economic pressure to maintain secure energy supply render the non-autonomous option most likely in many states. The operation and governance of transboundary grid structure thereby influence energy transitions on national and subnational scales.

Emerging digital citizenship regimes: Pandemic, algorithmic, liquid, metropolitan, and stateless citizenships

Abstract: ABSTRACT This article develops a conceptual taxonomy of five emerging digital citizenship regimes: (i) the globalised and generalisable regime called pandemic citizenship that clarifies how post-COVID-19 datafication processes have amplified the emergence of four intertwined, non-mutually exclusive, and non-generalisable new techno-politicalised and city-regionalised digital citizenship regimes in certain European nation-states’ urban areas; (ii) algorithmic citizenship, which is driven by blockchain and has allowed the implementation of an e-Residency programme in Tallinn; (iii) liquid citizenship, driven by dataism – the deterministic ideology of Big Data – and contested through claims for digital rights in Barcelona and Amsterdam; (iv) metropolitan citizenship, as revindicated in reaction to Brexit and reshuffled through data co-operatives in Cardiff; and (v) stateless citizenship, driven by devolution and reinvigorated through data sovereignty in Barcelona, Glasgow, and Bilbao. This article challenges the existing interpretation of how these emerging digital citizenship regimes together are ubiquitously rescaling the associated spaces/practices of European nation-states.

Decolonisation is a Political Project: Overcoming Impasses between Indigenous Sovereignty and Abolition

Abstract: In this article we seek to intervene in conversations that frame Black abolition and decolonisation as antagonistic political projects. We respond to Garba and Sorentino’s (2020) “Slavery is a metaphor”, which critiques Tuck and Yang (2012; “Decolonization is not a metaphor”) and decolonisation. Our concern is that scholarship in this vein denies Indigenous sovereignty and futurity while unnecessarily characterising decolonisation as antiblack. We contend that ontological, epistemological, and disciplinary traps lead to this problem: reductions, conflations, and taking settler-enslavers’ word as truth. We suggest that critiques of settler colonial studies shouldn’t be confused with the aims of Indigenous decolonisation, where the former is largely driven by white scholarship and the latter is an Indigenous-led project rooted in Indigenous epistemologies. We focus on questions of land and sovereignty, gesturing toward framings that are inclusive of Black, Native, and immigrant communities.

Geographies of migration II: Decolonising migration studies

Abstract: Migration is deeply entangled with colonialism, not only in the historical emergence of nation-states, sovereignty and mobility but in the ongoing continuation of colonial power relations underpinned by racism and exploitation. This report on the geographies of migration explores this relationship through a focus on postcolonial approaches to migration in geography, and emergent efforts to instil a decolonising agenda into the study of migration.

Using Indigenous Standards to Implement the CARE Principles: Setting Expectations through Tribal Research Codes

Abstract: Biomedical data are now organized in large-scale databases allowing researchers worldwide to access and utilize the data for new projects. As new technologies generate even larger amounts of data, data governance and data management are becoming pressing challenges. The FAIR principles (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable) were developed to facilitate data sharing. However, the Indigenous Data Sovereignty movement advocates for greater Indigenous control and oversight in order to share data on Indigenous Peoples’ terms. This is especially true in the context of genetic research where Indigenous Peoples historically have been unethically exploited in the name of science. This article outlines the relationship between sovereignty and ethics in the context of data to describe the collective rights that Indigenous Peoples assert to increase control over their biomedical data. Then drawing on the CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance (Collective benefit, Authority to control, Responsibility, and Ethics), we explore how standards already set by Native nations in the United States, such as tribal research codes, provide direction for implementation of the CARE Principles to complement FAIR. A broader approach to policy and procedure regarding tribal participation in biomedical research is required and we make recommendations for tribes, institutions, and ethical practice.

Border security and the digitalisation of sovereignty: insights from EU borderwork

Abstract: ABSTRACT The European Union’s effort at controlling its external borders is an endeavour that increasingly relies on digital systems: from tools for information gathering and surveillance to systems for communicating between different agencies and across member states. This makes EU borders a key site for the politics of “digital sovereignty” – of controlling digital data, software and infrastructures. In this article, we propose a new understanding of how the concepts of digital and sovereignty interplay: sovereignty by digital means, sovereignty of the digital, and sovereignty over the digital. We do it by analysing three key manifestations within the EU’s borderwork: firstly, the expansion of EURODAC to include facial biometric data; secondly, the creation of the (future) shared Biometric Matching System (sBMS); and thirdly, the EU-funded West Africa Police Information System (WAPIS). These databases and systems exemplify three transformations of EU borderwork that invoke different dimensions of digital sovereignty: expansion of techniques for governing migration; interoperability of EU databases facilitating the internalisation of borders through domestic policing; and extra-territorialization of borderwork beyond the geographic limits of the EU.

Accelerating Hong Kong’s reeducation: ‘mainlandisation’, securitisation and the 2020 National Security Law

Abstract: ABSTRACT Whilst Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 has influenced education in various ways, major reforms perceived as promoting mainland control have been resisted. For two decades, Hong Kong’s educational autonomy under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula was thus largely maintained. This changed radically with the response to the protests of 2019–2020, culminating in the introduction of a National Security Law. This has drastically constrained Hong Kong’s civil society, enhanced central government control of education and accelerated efforts to reeducate Hongkongers as loyal PRC citizens. We trace how this transformation has been enacted and justified, and reflect on its consequences. We analyse the current situation through the lenses of ‘internal colonialism’ and securitisation, which have characterised governance of China’s restive periphery under Xi Jinping. We argue that analytical perspectives in Comparative Education, relating to postcolonialism/decolonisation and globalisation, obstruct or distort understanding of Hong Kong’s present predicament.

Between a rock and a hard place: European energy policy and complexity in the wake of the Ukraine war

Abstract: Despite increasing political tensions, the major European economies have done little to strengthen their energy security prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022. Shocked by Russian atrocities, Western nations condemned the war and decided to support Ukraine’s effort to defend its territory. Beyond quantifying EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports and explaining how this dependence came to be, this paper analyses the multifaceted implications of Europe’s efforts to regain its energy sovereignty. A comparative vulnerability study between Germany and Lithuania complements this analysis, highlighting two fundamentally different ways to approach energy security issues and tackle the looming energy crisis. What will become apparent in this article is that: trade cannot be a panacea for bridging political divides; the war and the policy announcements that accompany it place unprecedented burdens on Western economies; a country’s historical background plays – as the German-Lithuanian case demonstrates – an essential role in crafting its energy security strategy and in its readiness to act in crisis situations; and the accelerated deployment of renewable energies and other measures aimed at steering European economies away from Russian fuels encounter barriers that cannot be solved with political will alone, they also require breakthroughs in power storage technologies and extensive investments in critical infrastructure projects.

Narratives of digital sovereignty in German political discourse

Abstract: Digital sovereignty has become a prominent concept in European digital policy, and Germany stands out as its leading advocate in Europe. How digital sovereignty is being understood in German politics is therefore highly relevant for broader policy debates on the European level. This motivates the main objective of the article to map out the different meanings that are attributed to digital sovereignty in German political discourse. Specifically, the article adopts a narrative framework to reconstruct the narratives through which these meanings are constructed. The analysis identifies seven different but overlapping narratives of digital sovereignty in the German discourse that serve to promote partly contradictory political agendas. We argue that this diversity is not a bug, but a feature. Specifically, it supports rich internarrative linkages which benefit the broader resonance of each individual narrative. It also enables a broad set of political actors to enlist digital sovereignty for their specific priorities.

Who Holds Sovereign Debt and Why It Matters

Abstract: The behavior of the investors in sovereign debt can have important implications for the ability of governments to borrow during distress periods, such as the on-going pandemic and armed conflict crises. To study this issue, we construct an aggregate data set of sovereign debt holdings by foreign and domestic investors, further disaggregated into banks, non-bank private, and official investors for 95 countries over twenty years. Analyzing these holdings leads to several important findings. First, increases in the outstanding supply of sovereign debt is largely absorbed by private non-bank investors. Per additional unit of debt, these non-bank investors absorb 69% despite accounting for only 46% of the outstanding amounts on average. Second, utilizing a more granular data set of euro area investors, we find that investment funds play the largest role among private non-bank investors, rather than insurance and pension funds or non-financial investors. Third, we use an investor demand framework to estimate investor demand functions using the marketclearing identification implied by our data. Although investor demand for AE debt is relatively insensitive to government yield, demand for EM debt is significantly related to yield across investor groups. Counterfactual analysis shows that an increase in debt for an average EM country would lead to a proportionally higher increase in borrowing costs across its overall creditors, but an out-sized increase if private non-bank investors disappear. Taken together, our analysis suggests that EM sovereign borrowing is highly vulnerable to nonbank investors such as hedge funds and mutual funds. JEL-Codes: F34, G11, G15, F41